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Résumé de synthèse
o
Après avoir situés les éléments principaux du modèle de psychanalyse
existentielle de Jean-Paul Sartre au sein du modèle criminologique de
socialisation violente de Lonnie H. Athens, mon projet essaye principalement
d’équiper les profileurs de société avec les outils nécessaires à l’identification des
conspirateurs légitimes qui hantent les chemins interprétatifs de la création
violente. Afin de donner une définition précise de ces individus isolés qui se
trouvent bloqués dans l’imagination de l’isolation, et qui existent comme
exceptions uniques en dehors du modèle existentiel criminologue d’ interaction
social constante, des amplifications simultanées de la notion d’ « Autre » par
Sartre et de la désignation de « communauté fantôme » d’Athens apparaissent
comme une nécessité inévitable. Un supplément théorique révèle ainsi de manière
évidente les motivateurs situationnels cruciaux qui surviennent suite à ce que
j ‘appelle « makeshift phantom consultants », don’t l’existence a été suggérée par
des différents chercheurs sur la violence et les amusements à travers les siècles et
don’t l’identité est exacerbée par ce que Frank Lentricchia et Jody McAuliffe
appellent le « désire artistique transgressif ». En définitive, une combinaison
intégrante des faits et de la fiction saillants permets aux profileurs de s’équiper
avec non seulement les outils nécessaires mais aussi les armes créatives requises
afin de démontrer comment la criminologie existentielle résurrectée, 1’ intégration
des théories de Sartre et d’Athens, en plus de la contribution de Lentricchia et
McAtiliffe et ma délinéation personelle, sert à démystifier les motivateurs
correspondants derrière les manifestations agressivement violente et
transgressivement artistique.
Mots clés: Existentialisme. psychanalyse criminologue, interaction symbolique.
écriture de prison, déviance, violence, activisme
Abstract
o
Upon situating the core elements of Jean-Paul Sartre’s model of existential
psychoanalysis within Lonnie H. Athens’s criminological model of violent
socialization, my project specifically endeavours to equip unrelated societal
profilers with the tools necessary to identify the legitirnate co-conspirators
haunting the interpretive channels of violent creation. In order to accurately assess
those isolated individuals interpretively trapped inside the isolation of
imagination. and who exist as unique exceptions outside the existential
criminological mode! of consistent social interaction, sirnultaneous amplifications
to both Sartre’s notion of “the Other” and Athens’s designation of “the phantom
community” present themselves as inevitable necessities. A theoretically
amended appendage thus convincingly reveals the crucial situational motivators
imparted by what I have deemed “makeshifi phantom consultants,” whose
existence has been suggested by disparate entertainrnent-violence researchers over
the centuries, and whose identity has been fuelled by what Frank Lentricchia and
Jody McAuliffe have designated “transgressive artistic desire.” In the end, an
integrative melding of the resounding •facts and fictions permit profilers to equip
thernselves with not only the necessary tools but the creative weapons required to
demonstrate how existential criminology resurrected, the integration of Sartrean
and Athenian theories, in addition to Lentricchia and McAuliffe’s realization and
my own informed delineation, serves to demystifi the corresponding propellers
behind aggressively violent and transgressively artistic manifestations alike.
Key words: Existentialism, Existential Psychoanalysis, Criminology, symbolic
interactionism, Prison Writing, deviance, violence, activism
Q
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 Existential Criminology Revisited 24
Chapter 2 Phantom Others Revisited 60
Chapter 3 Creating Violence / Creative Violence 97
Chapter 4 Hardened Criminals / Hardened Criminologists 134
Conclusion 163
Notes 178
Works Cited 194
Introduction
o
‘2
“The knowledge that our rnany sciences discover is flot forbidden in and ofitself. But the human
agents who pursue that knowledge have neyer been able to stand apart from or control or prevent its
application to our lives.”
Roger Shattuck, forbidden Kno3vledge (225)
“But naturally, you can’t always be reasonable.”
Albert Camus, The Stranger (1 1)
The year was 1980 and the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal
Justice Sciences was being held in Okiahoma City. A novice criminologist and
conference participant by the name of Allen Sapp, awarded his doctorate from
Sam Houston State University that very year, had just finished delivering a paper
entitled “Existential Criminology: Responsibility and Meaning in Criminal
Behavior.” If there had been a single round of applause, nobody seemed to hear it,
and if there had been a single shred of peer approval, nobody wanted to voice it.
Unfortunately, young Allen’s predominantly positivistic counterparts and
competitors had feit nothing short of an affront, as though the idealistic greenhorn
flot merely spoke on the existential individuaÏ’s potential connection to
criminality but somehow sullied academic airspace with taboo. Over twenty-five
years later. the now seasoned Dr. Sapp, so as to appease the incessant contact
efforts of a determined doctoral candidate confident in the Sartrean existential and
suspicious of the contemporary criminological, succinctly relays why his theory
had been discarded so vehemently: “They told me: ‘Existentialism is a
philosophy, flot a theory of criminal behavior’” (“Re: Existential Criminology
Query” n. pag.).
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The evaÏuative synopsis apparently stopped the would-be trailbiazer dead
in his tracks:
I did not pursue the issue affer that paper received no support or
encouragement. However. a few years later, the hottest thing in
criminological theory was “Rational Choice Theory,” which is nothing
more than what I c1aimed-criminal behavior is free will. a series of
choices one makes from available options.” (Sapp. ‘Re: Existential
CriminoÏogy Query’ n. pag.)
That observation inevitably brings to mmd the controversial criminologist
Richard Quinney. who, beyond being linked to the labelling tradition of crime and
criminology. has been tagged an existential dreamer in a field wherein Sartres
Qther and Camuss absurd are stiil childish distractions best lefi to the
insignificantly artisticallv inclined. Dr. Quinnev recails bis detractors in a
poignant piece published in The c’ritical CriminoÏogist in Ï 994. Reminiscing
about the shifi in ontology that had taken place during the 1 960s. he reflects on
the bittersweet:
In those days. I was trying to make my own song. One resuit was a book I
called The Social Reaflty of Crime (1970). Shortly afier its publication.
Taylor, Walton. and Young, in their influential book The New
Criminology. wrote about my efforts: “IvIany of Quinneys statements
about a theoretical orientation to the social reality of crime seem to be the
product more of the authors own existential angst than they are the resuit
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of clear-headed theoretical analysis.” [...] My questioning of the
conventional scientific enterprise took further attack from Robert Merton
in his book SocioÏogicaÏ Ambivalence. J-le wrote: t...] “Such total
subjectivism conceives of social realitv as consisting only in social
definitions. perceptions, labels. beliefs. assumptions, or ideas, as
expressed, for example. in full generality by the criminological theorist.
Richard Quinney. when he writes that ‘We have no reason to believe in
the objective existence ofanything.” (n. pag.)
Outcast criminologists in the vein of Sapp and Quinney are much braver than
their critics have imagined. which is a designation people in the philosophical
sciences can authoritatively make afier being strong-anTled into drawing the rnost
ftindamental une in the current analytical sand: Freud or Sartre? The unconscious
or the conscious? Psychological shackies or self-created freedorns? Until
stumbling upon the violentization process and primary interlocutors as proposed
by American Criminologist Dr. Lonnie H. Athens, there did flot appear any
logical support or opportunity for middle ground. Before proceeding momentarily
to Athens. as well as the crucial aspects of Sartre. let us ponder what remains the
fatal contradictory flaw in a purist’s brand of existential criminology. Quiimey
marvels:
How can we know for certain of the existence of anything. including
existence itself? The mmd is the grand piano which provides the space for
the mice--our thoughts--to play. We humans cannot step outside of our
5existence. And we cannot know, in the larger scherne of things, or non
things, if the grand piano is other than a dream. The dream of a cosmic
dreamer. Why not? (n. pag.)
While flippant to suggest that a question begged is a question begging to be
answered, Quinney apparently invites the same criticisrn that Sartre himself
became so welI acquainted with, anticipated dismissals justified by what Merton
deems to be an existentialist’s vague generality. Sapp once proclairned that
crirninal behavior is a rational choice accompanied by individual will; Quinney
equates the individuaFs interpretive channels to the indeterminate keys of a
‘grand piano,” one that might not actually exist. It appears that a lingering
question mark migh/ support responsibility orperhaps “cosmic” excuses shrouded
in mystery and based on the caveats life might not possess. Why not?
Becatise, if ever a discipline did exist wherein specificity and exactitude
must be status quo, it is the study of criminal human behaviour. There cannot be
any exceptions to the rule, however intricately crafied a system might be. and
even one miniscule blemish equals a model that must be reassessed as quickly as
the case study that shatters the rnould. At times, students and teachers of literature
can afford to be dead wrong, to espouse theories and revised inversions that
throngs of dissimilar poets snicker at yet give credit to for some sense of
distinctive aestheticism. However, it remains impossible to afford the sarne luxury
to contemporary criminologists if they are to fathom the authentic propellers
behind dangerous violent acts and actors. Rational-choice theory, essentially
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intent on sharpening and elaborating B.f. Skinner’s and then Hans Eysenck’s
assertion that criminal acts are made from realistic choices “given the possibility
of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain” (limes 20$).1 exists in itself as a
crucial layover for an integrative caÏl-to-arms. Nevertheless. based on the
aforementioned charge of vague generality. this particular brand of profihing
should only be digested as a springboard toward the specific.
Even candid ‘free will’ experts themselves, such as Stephen G. Tibbetts
and Chris L. Gibson. have acknowledged and alluded to necessary exterior forces
by insisting that our understanding of the etiology of crirninal offending depends
on the creativitv and persistence of our fellow criminologists in examining
individual perceptions of the costs and benefits of criminal activity” (19). At the
mere mention of the word creativitv.” it has been made abundantly clear who is
;iot being invited to participate in the future of criminological debate; ironically,
the very same practitioners who maintain either Freudian or bioÏogically bound
strangleholds on the rationale deemed acceptable for deviant exploration.
Therefore. it is usefril at this stage to be acquainted with the contemporary
psychologists and scientists eternally devoted to the unconscious, chromosomes.
testosterone. or any other pre-determinant contributing to the erasure of man’s
individual choice.
Deciphering and overcoming The Coppelia Complex,” as proposed by
Dr. Roger Shattuck in forbidden Knowledge, represents a technically-minded
quest and question:
7In the E.T.A. Hoffmann story “The Sandman,” Nathanael finally loses lis
mmd because the dancing doli Coppelia. which he has mistaken for a real
flesh-and-blood woman, alerts him to the possibility that lie, too, may be a
mechanical being, a robot. For Nathanael. the bottom drops out of both
reaiity and identity. In despair, lie throws himself from a tower. Molecular
bioÏogy and socio-biology treat our essential functions as determined and
take no account of consciousness and free will. Are we ail dancing dolis
without knowing it? (Sliattuck 219-220)
According to any interpretation of deviant human behaviour rooted in the
unconscious. invisible puppeteers are rnost certainiy in charge. However, the
masses are stili waiting to hear precisely who or what these forces consist of and
precisely to what extent they convincingly contribute to either aggressive or
violent practices. In Profite of a CriminaÏ Mmd: How ?sychoÏogical Profiting
Solves Truc Crimes, the biochemist Brian Innes refers to analytic stagnation by
informing lis readers that “a great deal of present-day psychological expianations
of the developrnent of violent or sexually deviant personalities rernain rooted in
Freudian theories” (199). Innes subsequentlv concludes that Ioyalists intent on the
irreducible must readily acknowledge that even the most precise study of the
unconscious remains unable to “take into consideration many other factors that
lead to a crirninal personality” (199).
WhiÏe the nineteenth-century Italian Psychiatrist Cesare Lombroso lias
been credited with developing the first scientific theory of criminal man,”2
8modern-day profilers have abandoned the idea that physiognomy and congenital
weakness possess the crucial answers that we seek herein. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that ‘the lengthy intellectual historv of criminology has been dominated
by the belief that physical features are extemal signs of inner and spiritual
darkness” (Beirne 187). As a resuit, societv has flot yet entirely abandoned the
geneticists who deem that the study of chromosomes has the potential to allocate
and elucidate future human conduct. As the Canadian criminologist Neil Boyd
recounts in The Beast Within:
In the 1960s research into the Iinkage between violent crime and biology
became more sophisticated, drawing upon the burgeoning discipline of
genetics. Researcher Patricia Jacobs reported that a disproportionately
large percentage of violent men in Scottish prisons had an extra Y
chromosome—a genetic anomaly that affects about one in a thousand men
in the general population. Women tvpically inherit two X chromosomes
and men an X and a Y chromosome; in these exceptional cases men
receive two Y chromosomes. Jacobs and lier coïleagues, in their survey of
several Scottish jails, found ten to twenty times as many men with the
extra Y chromosome as would have been anticipated. They described
these XYY chromosome males as double” males or “super” males and
suggested that such men were taller than average and more inclined to
criminal behaviour. (101)
Precisely due to the “exceptional cases” XYY chromosome males present to the
9C overail study of deviant human behaviour this une of enquiry, iII-equipped W
account for any and ail exceptions to die raie, must be penaliz.ed for imprecision
much like Freud and his predecessors.
As Andnws and Bonta confirm in The Psychology ofCriminal Conàci.
“die existence of die XYY anomaly is extremely rare in die general population
(less dian 1%), and h links weakly widi criminality and flot at ail widi violence”
(166). Moreover, in regards to die proponents of testosterone-fiielled analyses of
aggressive behaviour Hoffmann’s dancing doil can be considered a raging buli
set in motion. However, vague generality and die testosterone/aggression
connection go hand in hand as one must instantaneously reject die notion dia
hormones unfaiingly control human fimction and consequence. Boyd cites at
least dine major problems widi correlating adrenaline levels and human bnitality:
First when adiletes and odiers intentionally increase die levels of
testosterone in diefr bodies by a &ctor of four or more, diere are no
reliable data to suggest dia diey become more aggressive. Second, when
testosterone levels are increased for medical reasons, for a range of
conditions. diere are no data W support increased aggression. McI difrd,
when violent men and non-violent meri are compared, testostemne does
flot appear W have any consistent relevance. (135)
We have already established dia a dieory or process aimed at fadioming die
motivations behind turbulent behaviour must be endrely precise and able to
account for divergent individual acts and actors. fle scientific profflers who
C
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daim that they have achieved a functioning une of enquiry have either Ïost sight
of our common goal or submitted themselves to unbalanced statistics that to this
day remain more suggestive than determinative.
Is it in fact possible to discover the true causation behind deviant
aggressive performance? If one breaks away from the preconceived and popular,
the answer remains “affirmative.” However, let us consider our specific
investigation’s overarching goals and then go back in time so as to explain how
and why the leap from existential to rational choice to our new coordinates has
been made. Any remaining sceptics shouÏd heed a suggestion by a violent Italian
thinker or their tirne reading this thesis will be Heli: “Wherefore I think and
discern this for thy best, that thou follow me; and I will be thy guide, and lead
thee hence through an etemal place” (Alighieri 14).
Upon situating the core elements of Jean-Paul Sartres model of existential
psychoanalysis within Lonnie Athens’s criminological model of violentization.
criminal profilers shah unmask the legitimate interlocutors haunting the
interpretive channels of aggressive human performance. So as to accurately assess
those unique individual exceptions outside this existential model of violent
interaction—those interpretively trapped inside the isolation of imagination—a
simultaneous amplification to both Sartre’s notion of “the Other” and Athens’s
designation of “the phantom community” presents itself as an inevitable
necessity. A theoretical appendage convincingly reveals the crucial situational
motivators irnparted by what we shail calI makeshifi phantom consultants
Hregarding not only the possible motivations of violent individual offenders but
also transgressive individual artists. An interdisciplinary melding thus permits
individuals to equip themselves with the tools necessary to demonstrate how
existential criminology resurrected, the integration of Sartrean and Athenian
theories, in addition to the informed delineation of makeshifi phantom
consultants, points to a potential demystification of the corresponding propellers
behind aggressively violent and transgressively artistic expression alike.
Those outside of current criminological enquiry deserve to pose at least
three questions: What is violentization? What is the phantom cornrnunity? Who or
what is the makeshift phantom consultant? Those outside of twentieth-century
philosophical theory deserve to pose at least one question: What is existential
psychoanalysis? While the relevant tenets of Sartre’s existentialism and applied
psychoanalysis will be elucidated in chapter one and three, a better acquaintance
with Dr. Lonnie H. Athens is required at this stage.
In Dr. Richard Restak’s “The Great Cerebroscope Controversy,” a satirical
critique of the neuro-biological stance on violent behaviour, introductions are
being made at a fictitious meeting ofthe National Institutes of Health (NIH):
Moderator: Before we get into the neuroscience, let’s hear from a man
who has interviewed and studied more violent people than anyone else
alive. Lonnie H. Athens is a criminologist with two qualifications for
understanding and explaining violence. First, he speaks from experience:
As a young child Athens regularly suffered violent beatings at the hands of
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his father. Second. Athens. in his capacity as one of the nation’s foremost
crirninologists, spent more than 30 years interviewing hundreds of violent
people. In those interviews. Athens discerned a pattern. Violent people
are violent because they incorporate the attitudes and values of other
violent people they have been exposed to. This “phantom comrnunity,” as
Athens puts it, is the ‘hidden source of emotions like fear. anger. hate and
love. It also provides a skewed interpretation of people and situations that
serves to justify violence in the eyes of the violent offender.” [...J As I
underszand it. Mr. Athens believes that violent criminals. as a resuit of
early exposure to violence. interpret their world different from their non-
violent neighbours and that their violence emerges from these different
interpretations. (Restak 80-81)
The process of violentization explains hou an individual becomes a dangerous
violent offender. The individual’s phantom cornmunity explains why. And
whereas Restak’s moderator is rnerely a fantastically contrived character. one
Lonnie Athens is most certainly flot. He is a former protégé of the University of
Chicagos Herbert Blumer and a staunch subscriber to the symboÏic-interactionist
approach to criminological thought.3
As Blumer restates in the introduction to Athenss third major work.
Violent CrirninaÏ A cts and A ctors Revisited:
It mav be that a new approach is in order, one that cornes doser to the
detection and study of violent behavior as it actuaÏly takes place in the
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empirical world. This is essentially the lead that underlies the present work
of Du. Loirnie Athens, [as] he has sought in a pioneering effort to approach
the study of violent crirninal behavior from the point of view that bas
corne to be known as syrnbolic interactionisrn.” (4)
The foundation suppolÏing this “point of view’ rernains “the prernise that human
action takes place always in a situation that confronts the actor and that the actor
acts on the basis of defining this situation that confronts him” (Blurner 4). Beyond
the complernent to Sapp and Quinney, for those cornfortably versed in Sartre,
immediate connections shouÏd become clear. In a designated chapter from the
1 943 work Being anci Nothingness. a lrecursor and theoretical counterpart to
symbolic interactionisrn was originally evoked in Sartue’s postulation that his own
unique brand of existential psychoanalysis rejects the notion that the
“environrnent acts rnechanically on the subject under consideration. The
environment can act on the subject only to the exact extent that he cornprehends
iL that is. transforrns h into a situation” (Existenticil Psychoanalvsis 54).
Therefore, like Athens, and contrary to long-held beliefs of disparate critics.
Sartre concerns hirnself with the real by deducing the reality of a subject’s
intirnate circurnstances: “Hence no objective description of this environment
could be of any use to us. [...] By renouncing ail mechanical causation. we
renounce at the sarne time ail generaÏ interpretation of the symbolization
confronted” (Existenticil Psvchoanalysis 55).
Athens’s second significant work on hurnan behaviour, The Creation o/
o
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Dungerous Violent Offenders, contains essential case studies linked to
individualistically geared analyses of situations. Sartre’s second major work of
existential biography, Suint Genet, contains an essential case study linked to
individualistically geared analyses of situations. Moreover, it is not sheer
coincidence that the stages of development locatable in both texts, which will be
compared and elucidated in chapters one and three, syrnbolically prompt a
comprehension of the “deviant” individual’s own active and interpretive roles.
Sartre, the existential humanist, and Athens, the symbolic interactionist, have
actually taken it upon themselves to scrutinize those dues first proposed in 1893
by the pioncer of profihing, Dr. Hans Gross,4 in Criminul Investigation: In any
formal investigation of crime, “every conversation. every concise statement, every
word thrown out by chance, every action, every aspiration, every trait of
character, every item of conduct, [andj every look or gesture” (Gross 146) should
be scrutinized. In short. everything that relates to the individual’s specific
situation.
In addition to Sartre and Athens, Michel Foucault, in his essay ‘About the
Concept of the Dangerous Individual in Nineteenth-Century Legal Psychiatry,”
legitimately ponders if violent acts can be grasped by acknowledging the
existence of designated” violent offenders. He asks: “By what signs can they be
recognized, and how can one react to their presence?” (‘About the Concept” 1 98).
Foucault, like Gross, provides a methodical solution through choice words by
insi sting that “there must be confession, self-examination, explanation of oneseif,
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[and a] revelation of what one is” (“About the Concept” 177) if one is to
comprehend our legacy of planetary ferocity. Proceeding an exarnination of the
first two stages in Athens’s Violentization process as detailed in both The
Creation of Dangerous Violent Offenders and “Violentization in Larger Social
Context.” as well as theii correspondence to the core elements of Sartr&s
existential humanism as detailed in the first two stages of metamorphosis outlined
in Saint Genet, the second chapter of this thesis concems itself with assessing,
compai-ing, and updating Athens’s crucial theory of the phantom community as
well as Sartres demarcation ofthe Other.
While it scems that both the criminologist and the philosopher have
derived their concepts from the theory first proposed by the philosopher and
social psychologist George Herbert Mead,6 it also appears that Athenss and
Sartr&s perceptions of influential others are too extreme: the former for its rigidly
narrow postulation of who or what constitutes an individual’s primary group
members; and the latter for its flaccidly broad postulation of the individual’s
predominantlv figurative relationship with secondary and even third-rate group
members. Ironicallv. Sanre himself lias insisted on that which he falls a tad short
of exp licating:
What we are dernanding then [...] is a veritabte ineducible; that is, an
irreducible of which the irreducibiÏity wouÏd be seif-evident, which would
not be presented as the postulate of the psychologist and the resuit of lis
refusal or bis incapacity to go further, but which when established would
16
produce in us an accompanying feeling of satisfaction. (fxistentiaÏ
Psychoctnalysis 27)
While the specificity of Athens’s phantom other remains the most convincing
update to Mead’s theory of provisional interlocutors, twenty-first-century
profilers. intimately acquainted with the interpretive imaginations of isoÏated
individuals, have unearthed the only “consultants” missing from Athens’s
phantom conception.
James P. Steyer provides an insight into an oxymoron. or, the authentic
fictive interlocutors that comprise primary communities for a myriad of isolated
individuals locked into post-modern reality:
American kids now spend 40 percent less time with their parents than kids
did in the mid-sixties. Thats right, 40 percent less time—just seventeen
hours a week total with their parents, down from thirty hours in 1965. At
the sarne time, they spend far more than double that amount of turne--more
than forty hours per week on average—staring at the tube or the computer
screen. listening to the radio or CDS. and playing video games. Now.
which is the parent in the picture? (4)
Steyer has directly alluded to this investigation’s appendage, makeshifi phantom
consultants. Clearly, the support for such a formulation and supplement to the
primary group transcends scientific observation:
If another person spent five or six hours a day with your kids, regu1arl
exposing them to sex. violence, and rampantly commercial values. you
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would probably forbid that person to have fttrther contact with them. Yet
most of us passively allow the media to expose our kids routinely to these
same behaviours—sometimes worse—and do virtually nothing about it.
(Steyer 5)
Alas, this problematic issue simplv remains steeped in common sense and
substantiated logic. By the end of the second chapter, an unveiling of makeshifi
phantom consultants will be conducted and then supported by an evaluative
synthesis of dissimilar textual materials that appraise the imaginary or flctitious
other’s influence on the isolated individual’s interpretations.
In Media Violence and Its Effec[ on Aggression, an implied rejection of
the makeshift phantom consultant bas been posited:
Films and television programs that contain violence are not designed to
convey the message that violence is good or that people should engage in
violent acts. They do not contain information that is likely to convince
anyone of anything; thev do not contain explicit messages in favour of
aggression or violence. (Freedman 204)
Two imperative problems with this observation present themselves as questions:
Who can say or legitimate{v verify that aggressive artistic expression is flot
intentional? And since when does the intention of a model have anything to do
with the way it is digested or interpreted by dissimilar individuals? Thus Brewster
Ghiselins introduction to The Creative Process exposes an undeniable caveat:
The alien, the dangerous, like the negligible near thing, may seern
o 1$
irrelevant to purpose and yet the cali to our own fmitful developrnent. This
does not mean that we should surrender to whatever novelty is brought to
attention. It does mean that we must practice to sorne extent an
imaginative surrender to everv novelty that bas even the most tenuous
credentials. Because life is larger than any of its expressions, it must
sometirnes do violence to the forms it bas created. (31)
In the end. and due to the fact that todav s violent expressions have become larger
than life. our fathorning of makeshifi phantom consultants wiÏl sanction us to
understand. in a credible manner. the analogous violentization processes
undergone by the violent offender and the transgressive anist.
Undoubtedly. the Marquis de Sade’s “principle of delicacy” will always
appÏy to the enraged killer and the outraged artist alike. However. if the choices
we make spring from our interpretation of available options. as the existentialists.
rational-choice experts, and symbolic-i nteractionists collectively reinforce, then
the ernaciated une that separates those who pick up a gun or hife and those who
pick up a pen or brush bas neyer even existed: at least. not for ah motivationaÏ
intents and purposes. “What?” asks Nietzsche. “A great man? I aiways see only
the actor of bis own ideal’ (Bevond Good & E-dl 83’). If it were flot for the
uncontrollable limitations imposed on individuals bv smaller stature. slow
reflexes, fits of panic or physical handicap. who knows how many more physical
horrors our soc iety would have to endure?
Accordingly, the third chapter of this thesis examines an inspired hybrid of
ê
violence, and relies upon Frank Lentricchia and Jody McAullife’s pseudo-original
theory of “transgressive artistic desire” from their 2004 work Crimes of Art +
Terror. This particular forrn of deliberated aggression ‘is desire not to violate
within a regime of culture {...] but desire to stand somehow outside, so much the
better to violate and subvert the regime itselr (Crimes of Art + Terror 2).
Proceeding an examination of the final two stages in Athens’s Violentization
process as detailed in both 1989’s The Creation ofDangerous Violent Offenders
and 2003’s ‘Violentization in Larger Social Context”—as well as their
coirespondence to the core elernents of Sartre’s existendal humanisrn as detailed
in the final two stages of metamorphosis outlined in 1952’s Saint Genet—this
aspect of the investigation does not concern itself with the phvsical violentization
process and the dangerous violent individual who undergoes it. Rather, the focus
shifis onto the transgressive artistic process and the irnaginatively aggressive
individual who undergoes it.
Although this correlation might appear ostentatious to some, it bas
nonetheless been under serious consideration since at least the eighteenth century.
for instance. Thornas De Quincey’s “Murder Considered as One of the Fine
Arts”5 rnelded the killer and the artist by conceiving of a scenario where murder
experts congregated and deliberated on acts of violence in the same manner that
art experts congregate and deliberate on particular paintings. Since De Quincey
was apparently seeking an almost aesthetic appreciation” of transgressive
expression (Gaute and Odell 16). a labelling of Lentricchia and McAuliffe’s
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theor as pseudo-original is wananted as their arguments have been admittedly
borrowed from dissimilar profilers and profiles. They have even conceded that
their “thoughts about art are old, old thoughts, and [they], flot being especially
professional, are probably guilty ofbeing amateurs, in the root sense ofthe word”
(‘lnterview” n. pag.). Fortunately, Lentricchia and McAuliffe can commiserate
with positivistic criminologists. They too have collected “oÏd, old thoughts” and
proved through scientific and psychological stagnation that even experts can be
‘guilty ofbeing amateurs, in the root sense ofthe word.”
While the prison writings of Jean Genet, as well as the philosophical
theories buttressing Sartrean existentialism, are recognized by European outcasts
as authoritative catalysts for their own artistically aggressive expressions, The
Autobiography oJMatcolrn Xhas been designated a makeshifi phantom consultant
to throngs of American criminal artists intent on exploring their own
imaginatively radical outlets.9 Afler the assassination of Malcolm,” writes H.
Bnice franklin. ‘prison writers achowledged him as both their political and
spiritual leader: he is conventionally cornpared to Moses, Jesus, even Allah”
(Prison Writing 148). “In a sense,” adds Angela Y. Davis, ‘the feeling that
Malcoim had conjured in me could finally acquire a mode of
expression—collective, activist, and, I hoped. transformative” (An Autobiography
290). Accordingly, the fourth chapter of this thesis introduces hardened
crirninoÏogy. an unofficial field of criminological enquiry that consists of prison
c writers’ philosophically transgressive investigations into the harsh realities of the
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prison-industrial-complex.
By integrating the hardened criminologist’s seasoned narratives, both
concretely and fictitiously demonstrative. into Athens’ own sociologicaily-based
assessment of ernbedded violence in major and minor communities, it becomes
abundantly clear that the rnost authoritative voice on human violence belongs to
those who have undergone both the physicai and the artistic violentization
process. Athens’s specific designation of malignant communities undeniably
transforrns into a lucid magnification under the lenses of hardened profilers
trapped inside the most sadistic subculture. as prison writers have aÏways feit
compelled to provide more than symbolic mirrors reflecting our own hypocritical
natures. These unique expert-participants provide a behind-the-scenes look into
the patriarchal keepers and reapers controlling both internai and externai
communities and authentically iliustrate how the problem of violence, at both
individuai and institutional leveis. cannot be left to the original perpetrators of a
warped patrimonial Iegacy bound to perpetuating lopsided power. As Nietzsche
forewarns: “What a time experiences as cvii is usually an untimely echo of what
was formerly experienced as good--the atavism of a more ancient ideal” (Beyond
Good ana’ EviÏ 90). Chapter four therebv eerilv concludes with a comparison of
the current American inter-prisoner power hierarchy and the penal power
structure that existed in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany. The horrifying
parallel ultimately discloses an equally honific individual reality in that specific
situations transform with immediate settings whereas violent models rernain
perfectly intact.
Finally. so as to situate hurnanity’s fusion and confusion with phantoms,
the imagination. and the real, the present investigation would be incomplete if it
did not point to possible alternative solutions on top of an overview of feasible
theorems and foreseeable consequences. (Athens hirnself asserts: A theory with
no policy impLications is sterile, whereas a policy not guided by any explicit
theory is foolhardy” [Violent Criminal AcIs 155]). The conclusion must also re
establish the original reiationship that once existed between criminology,
institutions, and narratives. Nothing other than a literature of the specific, a viable
crirninology relies on the narratives of criminals and their crimes lest the field
(and ail hope) perish. Is criminology tue microcosm of literature as prison is hie
microcosm of society? Interpretations abound. Stiti, the criminal expert and
historian Colin Wilson has insisted that it is actually Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s
Sherlock Holmes who should be credited with paving the criminological way.
Seeing as though Sherlock Holmes first appeared in 1887, twelve years prior to
the publication of Lombroso’s L ‘Uomo Delinqtiente. this is not mere conjecture.
Consequently. inforrned ontological detectives should keep in mmd that
not ail is elementary:
Holmes’s ideal remains unrealized—a survey of criminality that should be
far more than a mere list of crimes and criminals, yet which should also be
more human in its essence than that rather academic branch of social
science known as criminology. What seems to have fascinated Holmes is
o
nO the feeling that there must be îincÏerÏying patterns that have been so far
unrecognized. And such patterns must obviously lie in the mmd of the
murderer. as weIl as in bis social environment. But how does one go about
recognizing them? (Wilson 10)
One goes about recognizing them by investigating violent phantom models,
anticipating Sartre. memorizi ng Athens. and reading onward. It remains fitting
that the first existential criminologist was Sherlock Holmes. a makeshifi phantom
consultant conjured by Doyle and then released, interpreted, and taught by
criminalitv experts such as Dr. Joseph Beli. Doyle’s instructors at the Edinburgh
Royal Infirmary. and even Du. Edmond Locard. a pioncer in contemporary
forensic science. Indubitably more than a mere overview of the major findings
that proceed this investigation into violence and the isolation of imagination. the
concluding chapter. like the overarching project itself. exists as a challenge to any
and aIl profilers and literary critics who practice bad faith.
Q
Chapter One:
Existential Criminology Revisited
o
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“Existentialism is an attempt to cinderstand man, it is a doctrine of human life; and it certain!
contains a sense oftragedy. But perhaps most of ail existentialism is an offering to mankind of an
alternative way ofviewing man, his nature, and the human condition.”
Dr. Allen Sapp. “Existential Criminology: Responsibility and Meaning in Criminal Behavior” (3)
“lfwe couid flv out that window hand in hand. hover over this great city, gently rernove the roofs. and
peep in at the queer things which are going on, the strange coincidences, the plannings. the cross
purposes, the wonderful chain ofevents, working through generations, and leading to the most outré
resuits, it would make ail fiction with its conventionalities and foreseen conclusions most stale and
unprofitable.”
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 4 Case of fdentity (134)
Many people experience anger, jealousy, resentment, or embarrassment,
and entertain the possibility oftaking some kind of aggressive recourse. Indeed. to
denv the existence of our Dauwinian impulses remains to this day an entirelv
foolish endeavour. Yet while some people merely contemplate action, others are
quick to lash out. Therefore. the question must be posed: How can certain
individuals bring themselves to physically perpetrate the violence others merely
contemplate? David Berkowitz, better known as The Son of Sam,1 begins his
autobiographical-essay with the dubious daim: “The Devil made me into a
murderer” (n. pag.). The Pulitzer-Prize-Winning-Author Richard Rhodes locates
media taglines specifically designed to disturb: “a senseless murder;” “no
apparent motive:” “he just snapped:” an explosive outburst:” “we will probably
neyer know why” (Why They Kil! 67-6$). Although the proceeding chapter will
examine that N’hy, let us demystify precisely hou’ the violent offender behind the
sensational headlines, satanic or otherwise. cornes to be capable of perpetrating
aggressive acts.
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The mistake would be to introduce Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis first
and then proceed to extract the commonalities within Athenss process of violent
socialization (hence. ‘violentization”). Although Sartre was bom forty-five years
before Athens, this is flot a simple case of superseding seniority. For existential
criminoÏogy to be revisited thoroughly and presented credibly, one must begin by
understanding the first two stages of development as proposed by the succinct
criminologist, Athens. and then proceed to elucidate the first two stages of
metamorphosis as proposed by the admittedly prolix existentialist, Sartre.
However. so as to perceive the specific rationale fuelling the overali study herein
under consideration. let us address a few sequential exceptions:
As the evil action wills itself as pure destruction, when you have reduced
its perpetrator to being only a case. only an illustration of contemporary
society. there remains no residue; the crime is the criminal’s failure. The
culprit considers his act. that highly individual act which changes into a
universal before his eyes, and he no longer recognizes it. The stupidest
murderers will be content with muttering until the day of their execution:
“I don’t understand what I did.” (Sartre, Saint Genet 23 5-36)
Clearly. to discard the individual’s own violent interpretation of self and render
that person statistic-worthy” remains an act of bad faith and potentially
hazardous to everyone’s health.’2 That stated. there are manv aspects of Sartre’s
existential biography of Genet that will be and should be left out of this particular
work.
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Since we will be paralleling existential psychoanalysis as it lias been
applied to the criminal artist. much of our immediate task relies on filtering out
the self-indulgently superfluous passages that pervade Sartre’s massive
ontological case study. Citing an intentional overkill. Susan Sontag describes
Saint Genet upon conception as ‘a cancer of a book, grotesquely verbose, its
cargo of brilliant ideas borne alofi by a toue of viscous solemnity and by ghastly
repetitiveness” (441). Indeed, it does Iegitimately appear as though Sartre lias
taken Grosss judgment from System der CrirninaÏity, that “everything in life can
be utilized.” and somehow transformed li into a mere launch-pad for fiirther
exploration.
Tue other aspect of Sartre that will flot be credited herein has been
suggested by Loren Ringer in Saint Genet Decanonized. Ringer justifiably
accuses Sartre of making unsupported fantastical daims about homosexuality and.
more specifically, Genet’s own sexual predilections in terms of lis real and
fictitious characters: Sartre continues to play the role of the indignant
heterosexual male who nearly starts to hallucinate when, titillated by Genets
dirty books. lie witnesses Genet’s brawny boys wax androgynous” (46). This
tendencv to ha1lucinate” actually evokes what is perhaps the principal motive for
leading with Athens and solidifying thiough Sartre. namely, the latter’s arguabÏy
inaccessible assemblage of thought: or. that which has prohibited serious
interdisciplinary investigations into existential psydhoanalysis and its potential
applications outside the field ofclinical psychiatry.’3 Whereas Athens provides a
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chronologically sound process in terms of narrative straightforwardness, Sartre’s
logistical model has the tendency to annihilate time and sequence at will which
inevitably ‘tums into a kind of momentary departure ftom the narration. There is
a point here beyond which our analysis cannot pass.” (Jameson 120).
In actuality, the present work can escape from Sartre’s verbose quicksand
by discarding the insignificant grains and reassembling his findings in and
through the chronological stages of metamorphosis originally posited via Saint
Genet’s table-of-contents. Nevertheless, one should neyer confuse discarding
insignificant observations with discarding passages that appear to be riddled with
riddles. Consider one of Sartr&s more tame examples:
The metamorphosis occurs imrnediately. He is nothing more than what he
was before, yet he is now unrecognizable. Driven from the lost paradise.
exiled from childhood, from the immediate. condemned to see himself.
suddenÏy provided with a monstrous and guiltY “ego” isolated, separated,
in short changed into a bug. An evil principle dwelt in him unperceived.
and now it has been discovered. It is this principle which is the source of
everything. It produces the slightest impulses ofhis soul. (Saint Genet 18)
With an aesthetic dash of Kafka.’4 Sartre is in fact referring here to the myth of
Jean Genet’s original crisis. wherein Genet has been labelled a thief by his Mother
and thus objectifled by the Other and condemned to play his role for eternity in a
liturgical drama. The metamorphosis entails an inward blow that does not actually
transform (à la Ovid) young Genet into an insect but actually announces his
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Sartrean identity as living dead man” condemned to the freedom that
accompanies the severance and amalgamation of being in-itse1f/for-itse1f.’ Why a
seerningly mythical account of Genet’s initial becoming deserves to be allocated
a]ongside serious criminological enquiry is due to its correspondence to Athens
first stage of violentization. designated “brutalization.’ As Athens explicates in
The &ecition ofDcingerozis Violent OffeIuÏL1s’:
Brutalization is a composite experience consisting of three more elemental
experiences: violent subjtigalioii. personal horrification, and violent
coaching. Although these three experiences are ail different from each
other in certain important concrete respects, on a more abstract plane there
is a reat and indisputable unity between them. They ail involve in their
own way people undergoing coarse and cruel treatment at the hands of
others that produces a lasting and drarnatic impact upon the subsequent
coarse of their lives. Thus. these experiences may be thought of as
constituting a trilogy. (Athens. C’reation ofDangerozi.s 27)
Whereas Athens succeeds in presenting the case studies ofthose who have violent
inclinations and are able to physically act on them, Sartre succeeds in providing a
case study of a man who has taken his violent inclinations and transformed them
into alternative manifestations of hostility. Therefore. let us initially examine
Athenss conceptions of violent subjugation, personal horrification, and violent
coaching prior to revisiting the initial act of metamorphosis as detailed in Saint
Genet.
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Proceeding disparate evaluations of Samoff Mednick’s study of the
indices of the autonomic nervous system (and its connection to the bio
physiological theory of the making of dangerous violent actors). as well as
Marvin Wolfgang and franco Fenacutïs investigation into the variance of
occurrences of aggressive criminality (and its connection to the social
environmental theory of the making of dangerous violent actors),16 Athens
presents the overarching argument ffielling his own investigation:
The key to this discovery will not corne through developing theories from
studying the social environments of dangerous violent criminals. nor from
studying their bio-physiological make-ups. {.. j The key to the discovery
of the creation of dangerous violent criminaïs lies in developing theories
from the careful study of their social experiences. (Creation ofDangerous
16-17)
Informed by the methods of Blumer and the school of symbolic interactionism.
Athens assembles the entirety of his material from interviews conducted with
prison inmates previously convicted of unrelated violent offences. Although
certainly not the first time prisoners had been required to unmask the face of
violence.7 he would distinguish himself from the positivists in lis field by flot
establishing a manner in which the interviews were to be conducted.
Alternatively, the focus becornes how “the subjects described the experiences
which they, rather than [he], deerned significant for their lives and the
(Z’ approximate time in their lives when they had undergone these experiences”
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(Athens, Creation ofDangerous 23).
The Wisconsin Correctional System Board insisted that the young
criminologist suppiy a predetermined questionnaire to the prisoners who were to
be potential case studies. Athens adamantly refused on professional grounds and
toid them outright: “This is symbolic interactionism. We dont believe in
instruments. Instruments prejudge the situation. They’re damaging” (Rhodes,
Why They KitÏ 40). The innocent directive was interpreted as an intentional insuit
by the board members. sornewhat like that affront experienced by the Academy of
Criminal Justice Sciences aller listening to the one-time existential criminoÏogist
Alien Sapp. However, aller red tape and fervent objections. the sceptical powers
that be in Wisconsin did in fact grant Athens entry into their prison system. By the
end of his interviews and information gathering, the determined criminologist had
discerned that an individuai’s direct “social experiences” with “prirnary group
members” (who assiduouslv force said individuai to undergo violent subjugation.
personal horrification. and violent coaching) inescapabiy lead to the completion
of the first stage in the overaïl violentization process. Once again. regardiess of
how much time elapses between these experiences, it shouid be reiterated that ail
aspects of this three-step progression inztst be experienced for the brutalization
process to be considered actualized: “Thus, the number of weeks. months, or
years it takes to finish this stage is subject to great variation” (Athens. C’reation of
Dangeroats 56).
Athens concept of primary group members has been derived from the
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original theory proposed by Charles Horton Cooley in Social Organization.’8
Cooley would categorize primary group members as “those characterized by
intimate face-m-face association and cooperation” with the individual in question.
A primary group member’s relationship with the individual “involves the sort of
sympathy and mutual identification for which ‘we’ is the natural expression”
(CooÏey 25). Athens builds on this notion in order to take the generalization of
we” and bestow upon the unit a specific idemity. He contends:
A primary group may be more accurately defined as a group characterized
by regular face-to-face interaction and intimate farniliarity between its
members. such as a famlly. gang, or clique, whereas a secondary group
can be characterized by the absence of the quality of intimacy, such as a
large school’s graduating class.’ (Creation ofDangerous 2$)
Due to the fact that direct social experiences cannot exist without the involvement
of primary group members, it is crucial to be familiar with these interlocutors
before examining the metamorphosis the term undergoes in Athens’s next
significant work, Violent CrirninaÏActs andActors Revisited.
During the brutalization stage, an initial technique practiced upon an
individual at the hands of a primary group member is violent subjugation. Violent
subi ugation has occurred when ‘bona fide or would-be authority figures from one
of the subject’s primary groups” perpetrate violent action so as to coerce the
subject to succumb to their authoritative control (Athens. Creation ofDangerous
28). There are two ways for violent subjugation to be perpetrated: one way is
through “coercion,” or when ‘authority figures employ violence or the threat of
violence to force the subject to comply with some command (including to show
respect) (Athens, Creation of Dangeroïts 29); and the other way is through
“retaliation.” or when “authority figures use violence to punish the subject for
past disobedience to them or for a present dispiay of disrespect towards them”
(Athens. Creation of Dangerons 31). In coercive subjugation, the perpetrating
primary-group-member will comply with the individual’s subrnissive pleas
whereas in retaliatory subjugation” the perpetrating primary-group-member
refuses to heed the individuaFs acquiescence for the abuse to end and instead
commences with the beating as thougli inspired to do more harm. Athens
explains: “By the tirne the battery is finally brought to a hait, the subject has sunk
into a stupor. As the subject slowly awakens from this stupor. humiliation at being
mercilessly beaten down overcomes him” (Creation ofDangerous 33).
Coercive subjugation and retaliatory subjugation resemble one another in
that the individual’s attitude quickly becomes an insatiable “rage which is partiy
cooled when it is transformed into an intense desire for revenge against the
subjugatof’ (Athens. Creation of Dangeroits 33). Clearly. proceeding a violent
attack perpetrated by an intimate or primary group member, the individual’s
imagination will begin to conjure sweet retribution and in effect create violence
long before lifting a solitary finger. As Athens solidifies:
The humiliation from being brutally beaten down incenses the subject.
Q [Their] buming rage becomes cooled only iater when it is transformed into
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a desire for revenge. The subject’s desire for revenge expresses itself in
passing fantasies in which they batter, maim, torture, or murder [their]
subjugator. (Creation ofDangerozts 29)
The two forms of subjugation perpetrated against individuals are done so in order
to exercise two separate imperatives. Whereas coercive subjugation’s objective is
to force a temporary acceptance of the rules being immediately stated by the
primary group member, the goal of retaliatory subjugation is to force perpetual
subservience upon the individual so as to dictate any and ail future situations
invoiving mandatory obedience. Athens distinguishes these forms of control by
stipulating that the degree of violence perpetrated in retaliatory subjugation tends
to be much more brutal than the degree of violence perpetrated in coercive
subjugation. However. this is not a steadfast decree and clearly depends on the
specific situation and the specific primary group member under consideration
(Athens. Creation ofDangerous 36. 38).
Personal horrification constitutes another technique individuals must
endure at some point in the brutalization stage. This experience is unlike violent
subjugation in that the brutaiity being perpetrated by a primary group member is
flot being exacted upon the individual personally. Instead, said individuai is
forced to watch as a person close to them heiplessly endures a vicious assauit. The
individual who undergoes personal horrffication experiences a terrifying internai
drama that begins with the commencement of the intimate’s beating. In this
c drama, “every blow of the subjugator and the victim’s reaction to it is
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into the subject’s mmd” (Athens, Creation of Dangerous 40). The individual
subsequently weighs out the odds of how successful he or she will be in halting
the abuse versus the potential harm that will be received personally by trying to
intervene. The problem is resolved. albeit fleetingly, when the individual decides
that, despite the desire to protect the intimate undergoing violent subjugation, a
successful physical altercation with the perpetrating primary group member
remains a clear-cut irnpossibility. The ensuing metamorphosis occurring withm
the individual who does flot intervene stems ftom overwhelming feelings of
vulnerabilitv, dismav and dishonour (Athens. Creation ofDangerozts 40-4 1).
While the impartial observer can readily allocate ail culpability unto the
primary group member who forces the individual’s intimate to undergo violent
subjugation, the immediate transformation nonetheless involves a change in the
individual’s interpretation of who bears accountabilitv for the violent episode.
Riddled with regret and embarrassment, this individual wrongftdly assumes
significant liability afier deducing that the brunt of the blame resides on an
internai level. Undeniably, there is a fine une that separates violent subjugation
and personal horrification. however. one should flot and cannot assume that the
latter constitutes the more bearable situation of the two. As Athens purposefttlly
maintains:
The worst part of both of these odious experiences is the twisted feelings
and thoughts which can linger on in a disordered state long after the
immediate experiences which generated them cease. Thus although the
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experience of personal horrification may be less traumatizing than violent
subi ugation from a phvsical standpoint, it is not less traumatizing from a
psychotogical standpoint. (Creat ion ofDangerous 44)
Violent coaching comprises the third aspect of the brutalization process
and involves a primary group member training an individual in an unceremonious
fashion on how to respond aggressively when engaged in potentially violent
situations. Since violent coaching is undergone intermittently and matter-of
factly, neither student nor teacher are necessarily cognizant of the fact that they
have assurned their designated roles. The underlying principle governing violent
coaching remains the dictatorial opinion of a violent prirnary-group member who
espouses that nations are inhabited by many mean and nasty people, both inside
and outside primary groups. and the novice must be properly prepared to deal
with these people when he meets them” (Athens, Creation of Dangerous 47).
Moreover, five identifiable “techniques” are utilized by dissimilar violent coaches
in the course of their savage tutorials: “vainglorification.” ‘ridicule.” “coercion.”
“haranguing.” and “besiegement.”
The method of “vainglorification” wiÏl be utilized by violent coaches in
order to delude the individual into thinking that they will be considered valiant
afler physically triumphing against a would-be opponent. Through the rehashing
of “violent anecdotes,” the violent coach convinces the individual that
unprecedented status can be achieved through successful assaults (Athens,
Creation of Dangerous 48-49). “Ridicule” is the method practiced by violent
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coaches as they attempt to make the individual feel ashamed for flot engaging or
triumphing in violent situations. The violent coach persistently torments the
individual and implies that future violent punishments are imminent unless the
coachs violent expectations can be met. Athens clarifies that this perpetual
taunting on behalf of the violent coach is meant to beat down the individual’s
interpretive process so that the perception of no viable option other than violence
presents itself as inevitabilitv: If people are subjected to derision or the threat of
it long enough because of their failure to perform some action. then the point will
finaliy be reached where they will prefer to take that action rather than suffer”
(Creation ofDangerous 49-50). Consequently. the third technique of ‘coercion”
can be digested in the most literai sense. Individuals are told that unless they are
wiÏling to engage phvsicaÏlv with a would-be opponent, they will receive an act of
brutality delivered unto them personalI by their violent coach for disobeying
orders (Athens, Creation ofDangeroits 5 i).
Unlike the actual or implied phsicalitv invoÏved in the aforementioned
rnethods, haranguing involves a brand of psvchologicai warfare in that the
violent coach constantly presents scenarios of violence and instructs the
individual on how they should respond. (This techniques reïationship with the
makeshift phantom other is explored in the proceeding chapter). While no
distinguishable threats accompany this method of coaching, the unending
sermonizing on and irnplied desire for violence has been conjured so as to
suggest, discreetly or otherwise, that when the time cornes the individual should
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do as the violent coach persuasively suggests (Athens, Creation of Dangerous
52). Notwithstanding, the final technique of “besiegement” is the most brutal of
ail the methods since it invo ives ail of the devices practiced by violence coaches
with the exception of haranguing. Besiegement is the conglomeration of
vainglorification, ridicule and coercion, and it is directed at an individual with the
intention of ensuring that he or she will heed the violent coach’s savage lessons
when the opportunity presents itself Athens explains that “coaches shrewdly hand
out different social penalties and rewards with the sole purpose in mmd of
achieving the same goal: prompting violent action on the part of the novices’
(Creation ofDangerous 54).
When the brutalization stage has finally been compieted, or when violent
subjugation. personal horrification, and violent coaching has been entireiy
undergone, the individual begins to contemplate the consequences of their
personal experiences with violence and indubitably gets “lefi in a confused.
turbulent condition” (Athens, Creation ofDangerous 56). This undesirable state
of mmd. as proposed by Athens. has been observed previously by Sartre. who
writes in his earlier synopsis of Genet: “Driven from the lost paradise, exiled from
chuldhood. from the immediate. condemned to see himseif suddenly provided
with a monstrous and guilt ego, isolated. separated, in short changed into a bug’
(Saint Genet 1$). Once again. we cannot discard seemingly fantastical passages
based on mere appearance. Before examining “defiance,” the second overali stage
c in Athenss violentization process, let us tum back to the initial stage of
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metamorphosis in Saint Genet so as to extract the core elements supporting
Athens initial stage of brutalization.
Whereas the present investigation appraises the application of Sartrean
profihing to symbolic interactionism, Allan Sapp, a purist in the vein of Richard
Quinney. had originally endeavoured to applv existentialism to rationaÏ choice.
Therefore, Sapp posited the following aim of ‘existential criminology” prior to
the term’ s twenty-first-century resuscitation:
An existential criminology would focus on the existential view of the
nature of man and disregard questions of intent. responsibility. capability.
and culpability since such questions are answered by existentialism in the
simpÏest of terms--every man is totaÏly responsible for every action and
reaction he takes. The search for the “causes of crime” could focus on the
lirniting environment, recognizing that crime is merely a human action
based upon the choice of the individual to perform that action.
(“Existential Criminology” 7-8)’
This premature objective reveals the dual imperative of including only the
relevant tenets of existentialism and discarding anything resembling the
unsubstantiated. To begin with, Sartr&s psychoanalysis was neyer created with
the intention to reveal or bestow any semblance of culpability;2° rather. it was
meant to implicitly affirm the presence and actions of outside forces who impact
the individual’s interpretive process, particularly in the beginning stages of
development. Even Sartre’s most extreme vision of human freedom neyer forgets
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an original condition of imprisonment “for there must of necessity be a
presentation to me ofthe object which I am” (Being andNothingness 366).
As Athens stipulates. it is the primary group member acting as violent
coach that objectifies the individual and presents them with options. An
existential brand of crirninal profihing would flot delegate any extemal liability?
Sartre states no such thing when fie deerns that the individual’s “original fali is the
existence of the Other” (Being and Nothingness 352). While the Sartrean Other’s
identity will be elucidated in the proceeding chapter, a symbolic interactionist can
irnmediately identify this outside entity as a constituent of at least soin e extemal
liability regarding the creation of dangerous violent offenders. That is. to the exact
extent that culpability can be attributed to another when it comes to a human
choice that would not have been made under specifically aÏtered circumstances.
Rhodes tellingly observes:
One prejudice that has comforted us is that violent criminals are
categorically different from the rest of us—mentalÏy iii. or brain darnaged.
or monstrous. or anomic. or genetically or subculturally determined.
Lonnie Athens demonstrates to the contrary that violent people corne to
their violence by the same universal process of soliloquy and dramatic
self-change that carry the rest of us to conformity, pacifisrn. greatness.
eccentricity or sainthood—and bear equal responsibility for their choices.
(Whv Tl7ey Khi 285)
Sapp was therefore relativelv incorrect on the first account, however, absolutely
C 41
spot on in that ‘any search for the causes of crime’ could focus on the limiting
environment. recognizing that crime is merely a human action based upon the
choice of the individual to perform that action” (Sapp. Existentiat Crirninology 7-
8). There cannot be a universal formula or milieu applied to individuals with
dissimilar interpretations for the very same reason that a deterministic stance on
human existence cannot fathom the legitimate propellers behind ail individuals
who engage in violent behaviour.
Consider the specific aim of Sartre’s unique brand of criminology:
Existential psvchoanalysis “renounces the supposition that the environment acts
mechanically on the subject {...]. The environment can act on the subject only to
the exact extent that he comprehends it that is, transforms it into a situation”
(Sartre, Existentiat Psychoanatysis 54). If. as Athens stipuiates, it is the primary
group member acting as violent coach that objectifies the individual and presents
them with a presentation of options. it is also the primary group member acting as
violent coach who creates the individual’s immediate state and thus “transforms it
into a situation.” Indeed, both Athens and Sartre have recognized the imperative
daim by Cooley, that an individual’s lirniting environment shaïl contain the
answers we seek herein (23-24).
In Saint Genet, Sartre flot only applies his analysis to the perfect prototype
of the criminal artist but works to elucidate how the crirninal artist cornes to be.
Whiie we shah continue to extract the commonalities between Athens’ initial
stage of brutalization and Sartre’s initial stage of metamorphosis, here is a
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purposeful synopsis of Genet:
Placed under observation for a time. he gave evidence of evil instincts and
committed punishable offences. This is ail that was needed. By the gaze
that surprised him. by the finger that pointed at him, by the voice that
cailed him a thief. the collectivity doomed him to Evii. They were waiting
for him. There was going to be a new vacancy: some old convict lay dying
on Devil’s Is1and there has to be new blood among the wicked too. Thus,
ail the rungs of the ladder which he has to descend have been prepared in
advance. Even before he emerged ftom lis mothef s womb, they had
already reserved beds for him in ail the prisons of Europe and places for
him in ail shipments ofcriminais. He had only to go to the trouble ofbeing
born: the gentie, inexorable hands of the Law will conduct him from the
National Foundling Society to the penal colony. (Sartre. Saint Genet 31)
Clearly, Sartre is playing with Genet’s Iimited/Iimiting options. In Irrational Man,
William Barrett poignantly assesses Sartrean analysis,2’ and, as a bi-product, the
issue of individual responsibiÏity. I am flot myseif,” he writes, “and I can neyer
be myseif. because my being stretching out beyond itself at any given moment
exceeds itseif. I am always simuitaneously more and less than I am” (246). What I
am and what constitutes “me” is how I act and interpret the specific situation I am
in. Yet the apparent freedom of any original choice has been shackled prior to
conception by the mettle of an other.
The initial act of metamorphosis as presented non-sequentially in Saint
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Genet corresponds to Athens’s first stage of the violentization process in that a
horrible metamorphosis is undergone by an individual at the hands of a primary
group member before being thrust into what Sartre rightfully deems a “dizzying”
state: “In ail probabiÏity, there were offences and then punishment, solemn oaths
and relapses [but] it does flot matter. The important thing is that Genet Ïived and
has flot stopped reliving this period of his life as if it had lasted only an instant”
(Saint Genet 17). The consequences of Genet’s initial confrontation with his
primary group member specifically parallels the subsequent conditions under
which an individual unwittingly undergoes Athenian violent subjugation.
‘During violent subjugation.” writes Athens,
“[...] subjugators, such as
fathers, stepmothers. older siblings. neighbours. or school-mates, use or threaten
to use physical force to make a perceived subject accept their domination”
(“Violentization in Larger Social Context” 8). Born and bred in instiutions, Jean
Genet was a perpetual ward of the state, a theme that would corne to dictate the
greater part of his life. He was taken in by Morvan peasants who believed in a
devout upbringing. To say devout is to say religious, but to say religious is flot to
say non-violent seeing as though phvsical discipline and Christianity have always
gone hand in hand. A timeless truth that existed long before the wraith of any
religious tablet or crucifixion, “Athenss work exposes the ugly irony at the center
of Christian discipline: that it serves not to prevent violence but to further its
production” (Rhodes. Why They Khi 3 16).22 By the age of ten. Genet’s mother,
serving as Sartrean Other, catches him in the act of stealing and practices
coercive subjugation” on her adopted son who immediately feeÏs shame at being
apprehended and castigated. Genet’s mother herseif was also known to “fich”
from local shops and neighbours, however, she had nevertheless maintained lier
sanctioned doctrine of discipline disguised as religious devotion.
“This virtuous anger is relentless,” daims Sartre. “It is flot enough for it to
murder a chuid: it must also contrive a hopeless future for the monster it lias just
fabricated” (Saint Genet 11, 19-20). The first stage in brutalization, violent
subjugation, was experienced by Genet (the individuai) at the hands ofhis mother
(a primary group member) within a particularÏy specific situation. This
individual’s interpretation of the situation wouÏd inevitably evoke feelings of guilt
and shame as lie unwittinglv experiences a fantastical transformation as per
Athens’s previous stipulation: “The subject’s buming rage becomes cooled only
later when it is transformed into a desire for revenge” (Creation of Dangerous
39). Remember that a ‘desire for revenge” cari be exacted only by those
legitimately capable of distributing violent reprisais whereas those not suited for
physical violence must inevitably find alternative outiets. As Sartre reaffirms:
‘One cari understand being tom at first between the passionate desire to dispel
these biases and the eagerness to justify them. And as they cannot be overcome. it
is the eagemess that prevails” (Saint Genet 179). Whereas chapter three wiil
analyze the ways aggressive writers and killers discover their designated
inspirations, the rest of this chapter will heed Sartre’s question considering
Genet’s small physical stature and unresponsiveness to violent interaction: “What
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else could lie have done?” (Saint Genet 179).
3r the time that violent subjugation lias occurred. “He is fifleen years old
[and] lias become what they wanted him to be: a hardened thief’ (Sartre, Saint
Genet 76). The second stage of brutalization. “personal horrification.” would flot
be confirmed until Genets penal immersion. Specificaily how Genet could
acquire primary group members and/or undergo personal honification in prison is
readiiy explained by Athens’s concept of “dramatic self-change.”23 This particular
type of transformation equally applies to those who undergo basic training in the
military and those who are initiated into the prison subculture. Primary group
members in such situations are assurned without contemplation and quite literally
forced upon an individual. for what was once familiar is now gone and new
interpretations unwittinglv form. Nevertheless. Genet has gone from being under
the control of a stem adoptive mother to being under the control of... well. . .a
stem adoptive mother. As Sartre dutifully conveys, Genet’s desire for revenge
that arises after violent subjugation can now be understood more completely:
He both worships and hates her, smothers lier with kisses and seeks to
debase lier. He is stiil fairly young when he addresses the Meffray
Reformatory as if it were lis own mother; lie imagines that it appears to
him “with ail that is peculiar to women”: tenderness, slightly nauseating
stale smeH emanating from the open mouth, deep heaving bosom, in short
everything that makes the mother a mother. (Saint Genet 8)
There is no universal schemata to be appiied. only an individual’s interpretation
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of the symbolic interaction undergone in immediate and specific circumstances.
Once again, while Genet does flot necessarily undergo personal bonification at
the hands of bis first adoptive mother. he undeniably experiences such while
immersed in the womb of his next state-sanctioned keeper: ‘Rejected by the
inmates of Mettray. having becorne, for the second time. a scapegoat and butt, he
again resorted to the method which had worked for him once before,” an escape
into the isolation ofimaination (Sartre. Saint Genet 119).
Genet would be designated a ‘queen” upon his penal entry and thereby
cast off into the same group as the other effeminate prisoners barely surviving on
the lowest levels of the inter-prisoner power hierarchv. Although the penal power
system will be investigated in chapter four. the following bas to be ascertained
now: when designated criminais who cannot physicaily protect themselves enter
prison. the idea of rejection takes on a much more radical. mucli more honendous
characterization. As in dramatic self-change, the same patriarchal logic equally
applies to the soldier and the prisoner: ‘Rape—actuaÏ and symbolic, heterosexual
and homosexual—recurs in war tirne [and in prison]. h expresses domination and
conquest, while humiliating enemy [and submissive] males” (Goldstein, Men and
Mascidinities 817). Genet’s particular situation can be summed up tragicalÏy: “It
is not enough to say that one rapes this live. fluid person: one mutilates him”
(Sartre, Saint Genet 260-26 1). Under the care of Mettray Genet experiences
coercive subjugation, [wherein] the subjugator does flot accept the subjects
signal of submission and hait the battery, but cruelly and relentlessly continues it”
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(Athens, Creation of Dangerous 32). Surrounded by assumed primary group
members being forced to endure the same savage treatment, Genet’s intimates,
now comprised of ceilmates. cellblock neighbours, fellow queens, and pimps,
collectively comprise his makeshift family.
Athens states that in personal horrification an individual helpÏessly
watches as ‘a mother, brother. close friend, neighbour, or schoolmate” gets
brutally beaten and, as a resuit, experiences the same psychological dismay
accompanying violent subjugation (‘Violentization in Larger” 8). Genet’s
imprisoned brethren qualify and Sartre confirrns the precise situation as it
correlates to Athens’s postulation of the individual’s condition afier enduring
personal horrification: ‘It does flot require much imagination to guess what lie
suffered. [...J Genet contemplates with terror the new world in which it lias been
decided that lie is to pass lis life and that other society which will be his” (Saint
Genet 76). Alas. such are the tragic monologues that accompany dramatic self-
change.
There is in fact a specific passage from ‘Violentization in Larger Social
Context” that actually clarifies two extremely important issues as they relate to
our investigations immediate goals. One issue concems the final stage in
brutalization. violent coaching,” whereas the other issue serves to elucidate
Athens’s theory in terms of why society lias so many more violent men than
women:
Because violent coaches suffer from the same gender bias as many other
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members of society. they usually find it more acceptable for females than
males to play subordinate rather than superordinate roles and that it is
more acceptable for females to rely on reasoning, charm, and guile rather
than brute force to settie dominance disputes. Thus, fernales may just as
oflen as males enter the brutalization stage. but males much more ofien
complete this stage. (Athens I O)
Whereas Genet’s violent coaching wouid be qualified by the pimps he was
enamoured to, the violent male/violent female question has to be addressed so as
to not become one of the aforementioned models that do not fit the mould.
Rhodes purposefully reinforces Athens’s views on why so few women end up
perpetrating violence: Besides their smaller average size, [...1 women are
evidently discriminated against as candidates for violent coaching [...J just as
they are discriminated against in other selection processes dominated by men’
(Why They Kilt 136). However, as Robbins indicates. 85 percent of ail homicides
are committed by men. but that leaves 15 percent for the ladies” (3). According to
Athens. gender itself does flot play an issue in violentization. As Sartre
emphasizes, ail that matters is the individual’s specific situation and interaction
with others.
Anyone familiar with the specific case of dubbed serial killer Aileen
Wuornos —who was convicted of violentiy killing seven men, who had an
abusive grandfather to ‘coach” her early on, who “spoke of being homeless from
the tirne she was sixteen, of being raped, held hostage, kidnapped, and tied to
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beds” (Robbins 34)—will understand that gender is merely a societai allocation
dictating nothing other than objectifications and stereotypes. Wuomos wouid
daim that while she was prostituting her ‘johns” were either in the midst of
raping her or about to rape her. In fact, proceeding her first brutal killing,
“Aileen’s drummed-up rage came pouring out, and she found it easy to kili the
others. In Fier television interview, she said, ‘I know I’d kili again, because of the
dirt I’ve been through” (Robbins 38). Wuornos’s interpretation of her own
specific situation. compounded with the fact that she had previously undergone ail
requisite stages of violentization, served to both foreshadow and dictate that
violent reprisai was her only symbolic response.
In regards to Genet specifically. the ‘johns” wouid corne, however, first
there were the pimps” Fie submitted himself to unendingly. As Sartre expiains:
“The Pimp is destiny, pure Evil in its glamorous appearance; Genet is nothing but
a dissolute hoodium, just about good enough to be the slave of a rigorous master”
(Saint Genet 330). Sartre would designate the evoked consequences of primary
group members in the same way that Athens describes the traurnatic resuits
triggered by designated violent coaches: “The mere presence of the Pimp is
experienced by Genet as a rape; bis sacred and powerful voice is a rape for the
ear” (Saint Genet 28$). Moreover. Sartre’s synopsis of Genet’s hoiiific education
proceeding violent coaching corresponds to the consequences proposed by
Athens:
Genet vill invent exquisite tortures for himseif. wili refuse himseif ail
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hope, will impose vile contracts on himself, will besot himself with
misfortune. He wilI have no tastes other than the distastes which lie has
overcome. and if lie feels more delicate desires, lie will tolerate tliem only
in order to tum tliem into instruments of torture. (Sartre, Saint Genet 67)
Unfortunately. to tlie same extent that Athenss violent coach represents for the
individual an ali-powerful captor and subjugator, “tlie pimp represents the
lieartbreaking and eternal beauty of a pitiless God” for Jean Genet (Sartre, Saint
Genet 135). Evocatively, Sartre’s own perceived implications of “Tlie Jonah
Complex” would fathom the consequences of violent coaching long before the
term officially existed.2
Afier undergoing the stage of brutalization by experiencing violent
subjugation. personal holTification, and violent coaching, the individual has been
positioned to enter Athens’s second stage in violentization dubbed “defiance.” It
is at this stage of the individual’s turbulent life that they “want to find a nostrum
for tlie personal disoi-ganization from which they are suffering. More specifically,
thev seek to resolve the crisis into which their brutalization has thrown tliem”
(Athens, Violentization in Larger” 10). Whlle the tenets of existential
psychoanalysis and symbolic interactionism equally serve to imply that personal
aversions from the past have the potential to transform into preferential future
actions, an implied question stiil haunts the logical divide: Can what we fear the
rnost authenticaÏlv have the capacity to meet us halfway? Athens lias answered:
“In attempting to find an answer to this question. the subject becomes a bundie of
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conflicting thoughts and emotions. It is in this stage of emotional turmoil and
confusion that the subject enters the defiance stage” (Creation ofDangeroiis 57).
At this point. the disoriented individual sets upon serious contemplation of
the world at large. They subsequently reanalyse personal relationships with past
and present primary-group members so as to resituate a conception of how people
“actuaÏly conduct themselves towards cadi other, as opposed to the pictures of
how they conduct themselves towards each other contained in fictional accounts
of social life” (Athens, Creation of Dangerous 57). As an individual enters into
the defiance stage. they aiso ternporarily engage in serious contemplation over the
state of mankind as a whole before being tbrust back into the reality of their
particularly distressing situation. As a result of the individuaïs brutal treatment
over the years, they must now allow their interpretive channels to undergo a
process that threads together a range of heightened emotions. By the time they are
done piecing together the consequences of a brutalized past, the individual has
been lefi to pose yet another question that has been a long time in the making:
“What can I do to stop undergoing any further violent subjugation and personal
horrification at the hands of other people?” (Athens, Creation ofDangerous 59).
Tus pivotai query anticipates how a violent transformation undergoes its own
metamorphosis and transmutes from fantasy into reality. As can be deduced by
this point, both Athens and Sartre are uniformly equipped to provide a purposeful
answer to this question. However, tic status quo must be maintained and
supersede once again age and authority.
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Athens writes:
The subject becornes determined for the first time [...] to attack other
people physically who unduly provoke [...J with the serious intention of
gravely harming or even killing. This deeply emotion-laden resolution
springs from the special way in which the subject was induced from the
volcanic blending of the wrenching experiences of violent subjugation.
personal horrification, and violent coaching to corne to terms with the
brutalisation experience as a whoÏe. Each one of these separate
experiences made its own more or less unique contribution to the final
combustible mixture. leading the subject to make a mitigated violent
resolution. Although this mitigated violent resolution may not be a
socially desirable one, neither is it a totally unreasonable one in light of
the odious experiences from which it was born. (Creation ofDangerous
62)
Sartre similarly announces:
The others had convinced him that he harboured within himself a
pernicious nature, an evil will. He sought for years to perceive it, he even
tried, though in vain, to put his conscious freedom at the source of this
nature. In short, he wanted to make an object of it. He now changes his
line of attack: he makes himself an object for it. He resigns himself to
neyer seeing it, provided he is conscious of being seen by it. This
demoniacal postulation toward Evil expresses his will, his absolute
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freedom which has flung itself into an irremediable commitment. But it is
his wjll as Other. It is stili a nature, but a nature-making nature, and it is
Genet’s clear consciousness which becomes a nature-made nature. (Saint
Genet 144)
Bach prolific rejoinder unmasks the transformation as a cornmitment to violent
resolution; which is to say that the individual is now willing to engage in violent
(and even “lethal”) recourse if they feel capable of ‘successfully” perpetrating
such (Athens, Creation oJDangerous 60). Upon experiencing brutalization, Genet
subsequently enters into Athens’s “defiance” stage. However, there was a
problem—Genet was an unsuccessftil candidate and ill-equipped physically to
undergo further stages ofthe “physical” violentization process.
Indeed. “Genet’s misfortune and conversion can be explained only by a
tension between incompatible groups and ethical systems” (Sartre, Saint Genet
52). Therefore. as a means of emotional survival and resolution. he is compelled
to express his created aggressiveness altematively:
Genet wants to do Evil. fails. decides to will his failure; whereupon he
changes into a traitor, lis acts change into gestures and being changes into
appearance. Now, the law of appearances and gestures is Beauty. We have
got to the heart of this strange endeavour, in that secret place where Evil,
engendering its own betrayal, is metamorphosed into Beauty. Evil,
betrayal, failure, gestures, appearances, Beauty: this complex assemblage
is the tangle of snakes’ which we have been seeking. (Sartre, Saint Genet
0 54
192)
The “Beauty” which Sartre speaks of can be understood as Genet’s newly
designated commitrnent to a unique brand of literarv creation. Nevertheless, along
with Athens’s final two stages in violentization. chapter three examines Genet’s
alternative manifestations of violence, bis tranressive artistic desire” as
proposed by Lentricchia and McAuliffe. In the meantime, a purposeful
confirmation ofhow individuals become violent should be briefly resituated.
What Athens was essentially attempting to accomplish was a melding,
rather than an isolation. of ‘bio-physio1ogica1” and “social environmental”
causations of physical aggression. In the end. his findings demonstrated a logical
and verifiable truth in that just as there are no social experiences without social
environments. there are no social experiences without bodies” (Athens, Creation
ofDangerous 15-16). Much like Sartre suggested sornewhat circuitously almost a
half-century earlier. the creation of criminality relies on specific situations being
interpreted and experienced by specific individuals who must learn to cope. The
existential summation of Genet is actuallv every man’s précis: “I-le is alone
beneath the fixed light which has not ceased to traverse him” (Sartre. Saint Genet
137). While both freudian and Sartrean analyses subscribe to interpretations by
external forces so as to materialize authentic identity, the most fundamental divide
between these schools of profiling resides in the conception of self-knowledge.
Unlike Freud, Sartre adamantly states that an individual must accept his or her
C absolute freedom in order to exist on an authentic level free ofbad faith as it is the
C individual alone who ultimately carnes the most prolific tools for revelation
(ExislentiaÏ Fs’choancilvsis 57—59).
As Hazel Barnes solidifies in her introduction to Being and Nothingness.
recognition cornes not in ecstasy but in anguish. It is not a merging with a higher
power but a realization of isolation, not a vision of eternity but the perception that
one is wholly process. the making of a Self with which one can not be united’
(xxxi). While Athens implies that individuals are responsible for their actions and
does not subscribe to theories propagating psychological breaks from reality, he
does not outright deny the existence of a Freudian-conceived unconscious.
Nevertheless, Athens does clearly reject any kind of universal postulate, symbol.
metonym. etc. that furthers the notion of the mmd being divided into multiple
segments and erasing not only the fullness of the individual but the fullness of the
criminal act. People do make choices and then must live with the consequences;
however. these options do not spring from an irnaginary weB. Preference and
interpretation alike arrive through the deliberation, the interference, and the mere
existence of others. Like Sartre, Athens definitely recognizes that every
“individual desire. however trivial, lias meaning only in connection with one’s
fundamental relation to Being (i.e., one’s basic choice ofone’s mode of being. the
way in vhich one chooses to exist)” (Barnes xxxii). Clearly. being condemned to
freedom, as a concept. cannot tangibly exist unless there are captors. And who are
these keepers and reapers? They are as dissimilar as the individual being formed.
Due to the fact that it remains an impossibility to speak of formed
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individuals without considering them to be the rnost reliable profilers of their own
devices, let us consider the following passage from Jean Genet’s most
autobiographical work:
Each of the movements which make up this swift and devastating life is
simple and straight. as clean as the stroke of a great drafismen--but when
these strokes are encountered in movement, then the storm breaks, the
lightning that kilis them or me. Yet. what is their violence compared to
mine. which was to accept theirs, to make it mine, to wish it for myself to
know it, to premeditate it, to discern and assume its perils? But what was
mine, wiÏled and necessary for my defense. my touglmess, my rigor,
compared to the violence they underwent like a malediction, risen from an
iimer fire simultaneously with an outer light which sets them ablaze and
illurninates us? (The Thief’s Journal 16)
Distancing the unadulterated truth from the grandiose aestheticism of Sartre or
Genet has neyer been an easy task yet the latter’s own specifically unattractive
breakdown reveals precisely that which we have contemplated thus far—while
simultaneously shedding a distinct light on the issue of culpability as patrimonial
legacy.
Indeed. just as violent individuals are created by intimates, those intirnates
were once created by intimates, who themselves were created by intimates, and so
on back in time and direct ancestral une. Genet’s interpretation of primary group
members and the ensuing choices proceeding their violence—accepting it,
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remaking it, wishing for it, knowing it, premeditating on it, discerning it, and
assuming il—in short, everything that the first two stages of Athens’s theory of
violentization entails—unearths the notion that culpability can be equated to
rationality or irrationality, despite daims made by existential extrernists. Sapp
was too vague when he stated that an “existential criminologist seeks meaning
and responsibility for criminal behavior whollv within the individual offender”
(“Existential Criminology’ 7). To say “wholly within” is to neglect “meaning” or
interpretation as something formed subsequent to an individual’s specific
situation and symbolic interaction.
This chapter ends with a return to the suspicious daim made by The Son
of Sam, wherein he directly implicates The Devil” as the primary interlocutor
responsible for creating a murderer destined to serve a 365-year sentence. At first,
Berkowtiz’s essay appears to be a fruitless narrative for our intents and purposes.
however, based on what we have leamed about the early stages of the
violentization process. lis testimony actually implicates the specifically hwnan
sources responsible for shaping a potentiallv violent offender:
The day after I graduated I went into the Army. I had just turned 1$
several weeks earïier. I joined the Armv, in a sense. to start a new life and
get away from my problems. But even in the service I had trouble coping.
though I did manage to finish my 3 year enlistment. (Berkowtiz n. pag.)
Do flot forget the correlation between dramatic self-change, institutions, and
violent offenders. In “The Short Course for Murder: How Soldiers and Criminals
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Leam to KiJL” Joshua Sanbom draws upon Athens’s violentization model and
provides insight into how The Son of Uncle Sam could have become a violent
perpetrator proceeding his military discharge:
It is highly significant that the processes by which young men are
transformed into violent criminals so closely parallels the way that they
are trained as soldiers. In each case. vio1ent coaches” undertake a process
to ‘break down” young men by making their ‘will” to commit violent acts
stronger than what Dragomirov called their “intellectual desire for self
preservation.” This coaching is norrnallv done within the confines of a
hyper-masculine moral code that stresses the importance of courage, of
dynarnic activeness. of “honor,” and of duty. The methods of these
coaches are unrepentantlv violent. The new moral structure that
violentized individuals adopt is constructed and confirmed by acts of
brutality. Demonstrating authority, dominance, and effectiveness through
violent acts systematicallv undermines the variety of notions of social
relations and of social control that “recruits” had intemalized in the
“civilian” world. (Sanborn 121)
When David Berkowitz clairned that lie had trouble coping” afier being
discharged. what was lie specficaÏly referring to? Is it possible that the U.S. Army
trained the Son of Sam to be a murderer on and off the battlefield?
According to Athens’s theory. Berkowitz was equipped with the physical
training to become a killer. However, since specificity is this thesis’ foremost
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goal, it would be irresponsible to confirm that a government created one of their
most notorious serial killers without substantiating ail of the precise details of
Berkowitz’s individualized situation. Nevertheless, what remains as the most
ftightening conelation provoked by Sanborn’s application is the fact that
exchanging the word prisoners”’ for “soldiers” demarcates the exact same
outcome. Indeed. “the most basic lesson of the comparison between soldiers and
criminals is that individuals become violent mainly as the resuit of powerful
processes of microsocialization” (Sanborn 122). Sartre experienced this truth
firsthand as a prisoner of war.26 Genet experienced it firsthand as a prisoner of
society, and Athens observed it firsthand as a profiler of prisoners of society.
Through an examination of the first two stages of Athenian violentization
and Sartrean metarnorphosis, this chapter attempted to define precisely how such
powerful processes shape an individual’s interpretive process in relation to
contemplating and attempting violence within highly specific contexts. The
freudian unconscious lias flot been implemented so as to keep truth, evidence, and
responsibility entirely intact. Before retuming to the final stages of
metamorphosis, the next chapter will elucidate precisely who or what is
responsible for the creation ofconscious individuals interpretive process so as to
arrive at the most important question crirninologv endeavours to answer—that
ever-elusive why.
o
CChapter Two:
Phantom Others Revisited
.
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“The root is invisible to us. It exists, in a sense, in another realm from our above-ground
world. But it is this invisible root that determines what kind oftree and fruit will be produced.”
Eric Holmberg, Heils Betis (Part III)
“I have no patience for revelations, for new beginnings. for events that take place beyond the
realm ofmy immediate vision.
Brett Easton Ellis, .1nîerican Psycho (241)
Narratives by philosophical criminologists reveai insidious truths about
violent crimïnals, violent soldiers, and, as a resuit, violent states. By staying true
to an imperative investigative desire for holistic specificity, we are at least
warranted in speculating over an inversion and thereby contemplating whether or
flot narratives by phiiosophical soidiers reveal insidious truths about violent
civilians. Bearing in mmd the tenets of Sartrean and Athenian profihing, this
chapter begins by gauging a modifled reversai and briefly considering two
infamously dissimilar miÏitary experts: Sun Tzu. a direct and representative force
of China’s most honoured lineage of warriors, and Machiaveili, a circuitous and
legendary Italian strategist. Whiie chapter four wiil resituate in more depth the
delineation of strategic and historic observations, the present chapter attests to
their purposeful application to existentialism and symbolic interactionism, as well
as their intrinsic connection to makeshift phantom consultants.
So far this investigation has been concemed with how violent individuals
are created. We have referred to Sartrean Others” and Athenian “primary group
members,” allocating the creation of dangerous violent individuais into a category
of knowledge that cannot subsist without the advertent or inadvertent influences
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imparted by outside and even armed forces. We have recognized how individuals
leam to perpetrate violence, although. we have not yet established why they are
actually compeÏled to do so. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu’s seemingly simplistic
psychological assessment anticipates the complex Sartrean Other with the
general/General’s profile of an enemy:
And so in the militarv—
Knowing the other and knowing oneself.
In one hundred batties no danger.
Not knowing the other and knowing oneseif,
One victory for one loss.
Not knowing the other and not knowing oneseif,
In every battie certain defeat. (12)
Sartre’s designation of the individuai’s relationship with the Other, like that
posited by Sun Tzu in his positioning of warriors, remains undisputedly
antagonistic. In Tue Tragic Finale, Wilfrid Desan states that “in order to recover
my individuality I must overcome the freedom of the Other” (85); whereas in
“Comedian and Martyr,” Robert Champigny reiterates: “The self of the Sartrean
man is intimately haunted by the Other” ($0). 0f course. Sartre himseif solidifies:
“For it is flot a case of an empty and universal form but of an individtial difference
that has to do with both forrn and content. There is Genet and there are ail others”
(Saint Genet 22). Consequently, even a ghost of a designation must have a
c specific purpose.
6i
The Other’s impact and identity have been rooted in the belief that any
alternative being exists as a risk to the individual’s seif-governing freedom, hence
the Other as even the free man’s judge, jury and executioner. According to Sartre,
despite the fact that an individual must exist both in-itself and for-itself, they
caimot survive in absolute seclusion since they are forced to exist alongside
alternative souls, hence. the Sartrean mode of ‘Being-for-Others.”27 Sun Tzu
implies that merely knowing oneseif without unmasking the enemy does flot yield
victory and that being ‘ab1e to transform with the enemy is what is meant by
spiritlikc” (24). Sartre enforces this decree by stating that since the Other
remains perpetually with us. there remains no choice but to appraise innateÏy
disparate confrontational situations lest we too become the eternally subjugated:
“The Other’s anger. in so far as it appears to his inner sense and is by nature
refused to my apperception. f...] is perhaps the cause of the series of phenomena
which I apprehend in rny experience under the name of expression or gesture”
(Sartre. Being anti Nothingness 307). Consequentiy, as the relationship with the
Other is a perpetuai battie in progress and aiways locatabie in a specffic situation
containing the subjugator and the subjugated. The Art of War requires no officiai
battlefield.28
Thus.” writes Sartre. “the evildoer is the Other. EviI—fieeting, artful.
marginal Evil—can be seen only out of the corner of on&s eye and in others”
(Saint Genet 30). Like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli aiso insists that fending off nemeses
becomes achievable through an emulation of familiarity and patrimonial legacy.
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In 151 5, he would purposefiully elucidate:
I say. then. that in hereditary states. accustomed to their prince’s famiÏy,
there are far fewer difficulties in maintaining on&s rule than in new
principalities. Because it is enough merely flot to neglect the institutions
founded by one’s ancestors and then to adapt policy to events. In this way,
if the prince is reasonably assiduous he will aiways maintain his rule[.]
(33-34)
Athens’s designation of the violent individual’s relationship with primary group
members. much like Machiavelli’s positioning of the ruler. remains grounded in
the immediate. Building off of Cooley. in The Crearion of Dangerous Violent
Criminaïs. Athens had recognized intirnate others as fathers. mothers, brothers,
sisters. close relatives. friends. and gangs or cliques; those outside yet intimate
forces that collectively comprise an individual’s primarv group due to recunent
and significant interactions.
In Athenss third major work, Violent Crirninal Acts andActors Revisited,
the criminologist would abandon Coolev’s perception ofprimarv group members,
revive George Herbert Meads perception of the generalized other, and then
distinguish his own unique identification of the phantom comrnunity in order to
successftilly locate the means in which a “process of interpretation” advances or
restrains acts of violence (Blumer 6). Whereas Meads generalized other takes the
mere identities of primary group members and resuscitates their indicative roles,
Athens attempts to seize these phantoms of identity and dissect their impact. He
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readily admits that both Mead’s theory and his own postulation ofphantom others
consign
the interlocutors with whom we routinely consuit when forming our self-
conceptions or the interpretations of situations that confront us. Thus our
self-conceptions are related to our interpretations of conflictive situations
because in constructing both of them. we rely on advice from the same
consultants. (Violent CriminaÏ A cts 139)
Thus the Machiavellian correlation actually becomes clearer proceeding the
Athenian update “because it is enough merely not to neglect the institutions
founded by one’s ancestors and then to adapt policy to events” (Machiavelli 34).
Yet there exists at least one crucial dissimilarity between Mead’s and
Athenss designative theories. for while the former can be grasped as the general
perception obtained from within the larger and more impersonal community. a
“phantom community’s perspective is the one we derive from ou; past significant
social experiences. which may be different ftom those of our present corporal
communitys members” (Athens, Violent criminaÏ Acts 139). (This clearly
discounts Athens’s own stipulation of dramatic self-change, which was discussed
in the preceding chapter. and which is undergone by an individual in extreme
situations such as upon entrance into a military or penal institution). Nonetheless,
if the perspective of the phantom community presents itself as violent. the
individual will inevitabÏy obey Machiavellïs directive by adapting violent policy
to specific events so as to not neglect the institutions founded by the individual’s
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intimate interlocutors. Virginia Woolf would inadvertently battle that double bind
in her prophetic statement: “h is far harder to kiil a phantom than a reality” (240).
A succinct reapplication to the first two stages of metamorphosis in Sainï
Genet reconfirrns a verifiable specificity: Genet hirnself was not objectified and
influenced by a generalized other. but rather bv a conglomeration of precise
phantom cornrnunity members who he inadvertently—not unconsciously—
conjured and relied upon based on significant social experiences from the past.
Can there be both consciousness and co-conspirators who might not be physically
present? The answer has to be yes’ since there rernains a gigantic difference
between being well camoufiaged and thoroughly hidden. We will summarize
Sartre’s somewhat broader designation of the Other prior to Athens’s much
narrower designation of the phantom commcLnity since precision remains the
principal objective. Ultimately, between the overt fiexibility of Sartre’s notion and
the explicit inflexible essence of Athens’s classification resides the final phantom
interlocutor—again, wel I -camoufiaged but certainly not buried—the makeshifi
phantom consultant. This alternative to a primary group member exists as an
isolated individuaïs fictitious advisor and. in conjunction with physical
violentization. can lead to emulation and hence interpretations that deern violence
to be the oniy course of action.
Nevertheless, for now keep in mmd that the Sartrean condition of Being
For-Others is dependant upon what the existentialist perceives as the ‘Gaze.’2
This gaze initiates and amplifies the for-itself existence of the individual as they
o
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instantaneouslv recognize that they have been transformed into an object by and
for an outside consciousness. This transformation is posited as an object estranged
from an impending freedom since the individual’s situation becomes altered and
thereby outside of self. As in Athenian brutalization. emotions rooted in sharne
accompany the individual as they become conscious of being under the
objecti/ing gaze, though h is God’s omniscient stare that constitutes the most
representative example of Being-For-Others in the eyes of Sartrean profilers. The
logic behind this inescapable gaze buttresses the fact that we are flot only
eternally condemned to our freedom but also condemned to know that we are
being watched by the ultimate panoptical authority and thus etemally objectified.
In the early stages of Saint Genet—wherein Sartre’s most lucent
observations are locatable prior to being subjected to redundant reappearances—
resides the phuÏosopher’s rnost purposeful unearthing of the Other, which
moreover exists as exactly that which was to be fatefully and inadvertentÏy
apprehended by Athens in lis quest to symbolize interaction and culpability alike.
Sartre, the original existential criminologist, proclaims:
Evil is the Other. The Other than Being, the Other than Good, the Other
than self. Here we have the key to Genet. This is what must be understood
first: Genet is a dhuld who bas been convinced that le is. in his very
depths. Another than Se/ Ris life will henceforth be only tIc history of
bis attempts to perceive this Other in himself and to look it in the face—
that is. to have an immediate and subjective intuition of lis wickedness, to
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feeÏ he is wicked—or to flee it. But this phantom—precisely because it is
nothing—will not let itself be grasped. When the child turns to it. it
disappears. When Genet tries to run away from it, suddenly it is there[.]
(Saint Genet 350)
From what has been assessed thus far from Athens’s postulation of the phantom
community, more than coincidental vocabulary warrant an authoritative
correlation to the symbolic interactionist’s understanding of coercive others.
However, under a Sartrean identification of the Other’s modus operandi. these
phantoms cannot be grasped since they are strangers in the way that God and his
gaze are strangers. present but invisible, and unfathomable to interpretation of
self By the end of his initial opus, Sartre confirms that ail happens as if the
world, man, and man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing only a missing God”
(Being and Nothingness 792). However, just as we cannot trnly verify if God is
actually watching us, an individual cannot assume that an alternative other who
has flot established an intimate connecfion resides within immediate or relevant
knowledge and hence interpretive valves.
Even if an individual caimot be alienated from potential freedom unless
another’s consciousness specifically stands in the way of that freedom, control of
a specific situation can only be lost when the Other’s gaze is immediate, present,
and, quite literally, in that individual’s face. More than anything else, there must
be an authentic individualistic recognition of the Other as a constitutive phantom
c community member for them to exist as such. Although to state that Sartre has
69
been too general about the identities of outside others does not mean that he is
remotely incorrect about their detrimental roÏes, judgements, or accompanying
consequences. Citing an ontological delousing of the body and mmd, he defends
hirnself by anticipating an impending judgement:
It is before the Other that I am guiÏty. I am guilty first when beneath the
Othef s look I experience my alienation and my nakedness as a fali from
grace which I must assume. This is the meaning of the famous une from
Scripture: They knew that they were naked.’ (Being and Nothingness
531)
Nonetheless. Sartre has included invisible co-conspirators that need not be there
because thev have neyer been there and will most likely neyer be there. They are
phantoms of an inconsequential nature since they are actually someone els&s
phantoms and hence only signfficant to that other individual.
As Athens explains in Violent CriminaÏActs andActors Revisited:
Thus. even people living within the boundaries of the same corporal
community may have different phantom communities, an existential
circumstance to which Mead paid insufficient attention. Since the phantom
companions that constitute our phantom communities travel with us
wherever we go. we can aiways avail ourselves. for better or worse, of
their counsel, no matter what corporal communities we may be inhabiting
at the time. (139)
C An individual’s phantom community remains capable of being altered just as
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C situations are capable of being transformed as it is the changes in [the
individual’s] phantom communities that are responsible for the type of violent
career they undergo” (Athens, Violeni (riminal AcIs 139). Unlike Sartre’s Other.
who is omnipresent and everywhere. Athens specifies that within an individual’s
interpretive channels. there are speci/ic phantom community members—a
conglomeration of overlapping voices that emerge as one afier being
formed/forged through time and significant past experiences—who work to
inform the individual about the type of resolution to engage in a specifle
confrontation. Athens believes that crime is a product of ‘socia1 retardation’ to
the extent that individuals are governed by “an cLnderdeveloped [...] phantom
community. an us that hinders them from cooperating in the ongoing activities
of their corporal community or the larger society in which it is embedded”
(Violent Criininal AcIs 144). Both Sartre and Athens agree that discord is
residential both within and between individuals, and that one’s community can
impart persuasive directives regarding altercations within circumstantial confines:
however, the latter bas also identified three specific types of “communities” that
individuals reside in: “civil. malignant. and turbulent” (Violent Criminal Acis
148).
While chapter four wiIl ascertain the consequences of these communities
on both sociologie and microcosmic levels, it is important to understand them as
Athens first proposed them, in relation to the members of an individual’s specific
phantom community and as motivating factors behind “escalating” and/or “de
C
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escalating” violent careers:
As ultraviolent criminals invade civil communities and marginally violent
people flee from them. these communities slowly degenerate into
malignant ones. Likewise. as ultraviolent criminals are driven from
malignant communities and marginally violent people move into them, the
con-imunity progressiveiy becomes more civil. Turbulent communities are
those that are caught in the middle of this larger process of community
change. [...] Thus turbulent communities are either in transition from civil
into malignant communities or from malignant into civil communities.
(Violent CrirninaÏ A cts 1 5 1 -1 52)
Apparently individuals can go through similar violentization processes and even
5e reared by similar phantom community members. However, as Athens
stipulates, the changes or lack of changes made to and in an individual’s
immediate community inevitablv dictates whether or flot the future entails an
interpretive commitment to perpetrate violence, or an alternative resolution to
avoid it. As ex-convict Randv Staff underscores in How I Became a
Disorganized’ Dangerous Violent Criminal:” “If my ultra-violent self and the
unmitigated violent phantom comrnunity around which it revolved had remained
intact, no amount oftreatment could have ever helped me” (74). fortunately. Staff
was able to find new and non-violent phantom community members who
welcomed him with open arms. (Unfortunately, the majority of ultra-violent
offenders cannot find alternative communities that are remotely willing to do the
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same).
A purist brand of existential criminology and rational choice, as attempted
decades ago by Allan Sapp, might accuse the symbolic interactionist of
presupposing that ail individuals might or might flot (à la Dr. Quinney) allow
themselves to be governed by anyone or anything else that exists as a potential
obstacle to seif-governing freedom. In this sense, the word phantom would
maintain its original definition of a nonentity, a nothingness. However. the
problem with a nihilistic rather than a realistic interpretation of Sartre’s tenets
remains the undeniable fact that there will alwavs be lingering question marks
inserted as rule of thumb. When Sanre’s Orestes insisted 1 am my freedom” (The
flies 117). he should have completed the sentence so as to situate identity more
clearlv: I make my choices to the same extent that I interpret my available options
as imparted to me from the gaze or alternative existence of the Other. “Heu is—
other people!’ cries Sartres Garcin (No Exil 45). Naivety aside, we know the
latter declaration to prevail on both internai and extemai Ïevels.3°
As Barnes observes: “[Sartre] follows Husserl in holding that ail
consciousness is consciousness ofsomething; that is, consciousness is intentional
and directive. pointing to a transcendent object other than itseif’ (xii). While there
are aiways a range of choices to be made. why one individual chooses one road
and why another chooses a different path remains due to their specific situations.
their specific phantom community members, as weli as their specific situational
interpretations of their symbolic interactions with phantom community members.
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Sanre, in the spirit of Sun Tzu. Machiavelli. and Athens, has clearly seized the
antagonistic implication for us: “A leader who is only the ghost of a leader
cornmands phantom soldiers who obey him only so as to better destroy him”
(Saint Genet 177). Moreover. the unencumbered-free-will objection has been
anticipated by our own makeshifi phantom consultant, for even the most isolated
of individuals ultimately invent significant outiets that ignite interpretive channels
for preferential actions. Consider what Rhodes ascertained from Athens’s original
designation: ‘We are flot necessarily aware of our phantom companions as we go
about our lives. We internalize them. corne to take them for granted [and] put our
attention elsewhere (Why They Kiti $2-$3). The impact of the rnakeshift phantom
consultant can be greater than that of the phantom cornmunity member.
particularly for the isolated individual who has gone through the first two stages
of violentization and then proceeds to rely upon imaginative interlocutors and
outiets.
Indeed. the makeshifi phantorn consultant is also the one and the manY,
but an entity which is not confined by physical, mortal or even non-fictive status.
Furthermore, the reason why we are flot necessarily aware of the identities of our
makeshifi phantom consultants rernains simply because they are better
carnouflaged than the designated non-fictive or human forces residing inside the
Athenian phantom cornmunity. For instance, when in 1796 the Gothic wiiter
Matthew Lewis decreed, “There are People in the Vauhs! {...] Conceal yourself
tiil they are past” (229), he was clearly hot on the trail ofphantom others before
C
mistakenly going the way of the supernatural.31 Therefore, for a ftinctioning
definition of the makeshifi phantom consultant herein under consideration, we
must acknowledge that both an indeterminate conception of Others (as posited by
Sartre) as well a stringent classification of community members (as deemed by
Athens) does flot anticipate the persuasive phantom interlocutors haunting our
interpretive middle ground. or the consultants who literally seep through biased
cracks afier being written off as make-believe and harmless.
Since this chapter lias thus far relied upon Sun Tzu and Machiavelli to
amplify conceptions of the existentiai Other and the symbolic phantom
communitv. let us refer to a contemporary military strategist in order to simate the
makeshifi consultant. As Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman writes in Stop
Teaching Our Kids b Kilt:
Feeling scared that Freddy’s going to get you when you go to bed? Feeling
like it might be cool to carry a gun, as your hero does? Feeling fascinated
with ail the blood and gore. yet slightly ashamed about that at the same
time? Feeling sexually aroused at the beating of a near-naked woman and
verv guilty at the same time? How do our kids understand and disperse ail
the feelings that watching violence arouses? Unfortunately, most chiidren
and teens dont get these vital opportunities. There’s no one around to talk
witli them at these crucial moments. As a society, we have deemed media
outlets our number one baby-sitter. It gives us a needed break, to hop in
Q the shower. get dinner on the table, orjust read the newspaper and
0 75
afier a busy day. But if we don’t know what the baby-sitter is spitting out
at our kids. we are ail, children, parents. and society, paying a huge price.
(60)32
Grossman, a psychology professor and rnilitary scientist at West Point, focuses
his attack on the entertainment industry in particular (television, movies. internet
and video games), however, the makeshift phantom consultant (or Grossman’s
“baby-sitter”) also includes the interlocutors residing within the creative fields of
music, literature, drama, visual arts, and any other imaginative medium that
legitimatelv provides an individual an opportunitv to identify with and interpret a
makeshifi phantom voice. following the logic ffielling the adage “one man’s
poison can be another’s pleasure.” one individuaïs makeshifi phantom consultant
can be another individual’s harmless source of amusement. Consequently. ail that
is required for the phantom advisor to exist as a potential Athenian “violent
coach” remains an isolated interpretation as well as an isolated image.
In the introduction to this thesis, makeshifi phantom consultants were
described as an oxymoron, or. the ciuthentic fictive interlocutors that comprise
primary communities for a myriad of individuals locked into post-modern reality.
In a letter dated June 1. 1999. President Biil Clinton would dutifully confirrn the
makeshifi phantom consultant’s correlation to violent acts and actors:
We now know that by the time the typical American child reaches the age
of eighteen, he or she has seen 200,000 dramatized acts of violence, and
40,000 dramatized murders. [...] As their exposure to violence grows, So,
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in some deeply troubling cases of particularly vuinerable chuidren, does
the taste for it. (Ï)
What constitutes a ‘vulnerable” child remains one who feels a lack of support
from human phantom comrnunity members, who interprets no alternatives other
than spending time in isolation. and who spends more time with make-believe or
fictitious interlocutors (such as books. alternative art. music. television. movies.
video games. internet, etc.) than they do with real friends and family. In updated,
existentially-inforrned criminological terms. what constitutes a vuinerable chuld is
an individual condemned to isolation who spends more time with makeshift
phantom consultants than phantom comrnunitv members. Therefore. the
designation does not have to be as severe as Athens states nor as uncontrolled as
Sartre first posited. Based on the crucial elements of time and commitment. the
makeshifi phantom consultant is part of the phantom community and its voice
haunts the interpretive channels as much if not more than those voices imparted
by the most intimate of Others.
Prior to assessing support for the existence of the makeshift phantom
consultant and its correlation to the motivations for violence, the individual who
remains not only our theoretical supptement’s core source of inspiration but also
one of its chief detractors should be considered. When asked on PBS’s Think
Tank what he thought about subversive artistic products as they relate to
crirninality and violence in particular, Athens immediately rejected the notion by
citing that in the Medieval period, when television was nonexistent. we as a
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peope were much more vicious. “No television,” he insisted, “no video, no radio.
So you can’t attribute it to the mass media” (“Rethinking Violent Crime” n. pag.).
Athens’s rationale appears to be logical enough. however, there also appears to be
two illogical gaps: primariiy, what was interpreted as acceptable in the Middle
Ages as opposed to what has been deemed acceptable in today’s age: and
secondariÏy, what kind of alternative outiets were available in the Middle Ages
compared to the alternative outlets of today—which, as ail twenty-first-century
community members are undeniably cognizant of, are oniy a bag of popcorn.
remote controL bound page. mounted frame. rhythmic beat, moist joystick. or
high-speed internet-connection away.
The J. Paul Getty Museum released their officiai statement on a show that
Athens could have benefited from attending: “This exhibition explores the
presence of violence in the Middle Ages and examines how images of violence
were used to teach viewers moral lessons and appeal to their emotions” (3). How
could violence flot have been more prevalent in the Middle Ages than in our
present day when said “moral tessons” included both physical and artistic
examples of savagery. torture. execution and a rnyriad of other hellish torments?
Entitied ‘lrnages of Violence in the Medieval Worid,” Getty’s philanthropic
institution endeavoured to show (through documentation and artistic
representation) how medieval war and conflict were responsible for rearing a
society committed to violent resolution. Religion has aiways played its ovin
C cuipable role as a breeding ground for violence and the Bible or Koran continue to
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prevail as two of the world’s most culpable makeshifi phantom consultants.33
Accordingly. medieval politicians and respected citizens alike ofien relentlessly
pointed to Christ and scripture in order to condone and propagate warlike
behaviour that, from approximately 500A.D. to 1500 A.D.. incÏuded incessant
battÏes, gruesome toumaments. and bloody encounters over property rights (Vale
144).
Not onlv was violence permissible during the Middle Ages, it was acmally
encouraged as a vital ingredient in family resolutions, day-to-day legal matters. as
well as edification and amusement.34 Consequentl, while television and its
created violence was not yet made available, Athens has apparently forgotten
about the myriad of alternative sources of graphic entertainment, absolutely brutal
in nature. that had been made available to impressionable individuals at that time.
for instance, countless creative representations of Christ’s blood-splattered
Crucifixion were readiÏv accessible for medieval viewing pleasure and
individualistic interpretation long before Mel Gibson created his own arguably
skewed interpretation of not-so-sacred events in The Passion oJ The Christ. In
Violence and Medieval Society, Sarah Kay’s essay The Sublime Body of The
Martyr” imparts precisely why television was unnecessary for Athens’s daim to
be deerned incorrect:
Medieval audiences appeared to have relished accounts of nubile young
girls being subjected by pagan rulers to sexuaÏly charged tortures, in which
C) being stripped naked. roasted alive. broken on wheels. boiled in oil. and
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having their breasts ripped off, are clear favourites. (4)
This study. however, remains concerned with twenty-first-century violence and
the very heated and contemporary debate which surrounds it. CÏearÏy, the
makeshifi phantom consultant has existed for as long as the family unit or
phantom communitv as there have aiways been alternative artistic outiets for
individuals that desire to isolate themselves and thus interpret their imaginary
advisors as though they are legitimate phantom community members. Athens
himself concedes that our immediate interpretation of the individual’ s community
is irrelevant as it remains the individual alone who comprehends the phantoms
within.
However. in the same Think Tank interview, one ofAthens’s co-panellists,
the clinical psychiatrist Dr. Stanton Samenow, would equally dismiss the
entertainment! violence correlation though nonetheless reveal a purposefiil point
ofentry when positing: “What is critical is what is in the mmd ofthe viewer. Sure
there are copycat crimes, but for every copycat crime there are millions of people
who have watched the same television program and to them it’s entertainment”
(‘Rethinking Violent Crime” n. pag.). Why would Samenow daim to not believe
in the correlation when he clearly states that it remains the individuals
interpretation of what they are watching or playing or consulting with that deerns
potential consequences? He apparently plays a safe statistical game and forgets to
include the countless number of isolated individuals who have managed to bypass
predetermined consultants so as to indulge in phantoms of their own choosing.
80
This logic implies that some peopie wili interpret makeshifi phantom consultants
differently, and that these interpretations will inevitably dismiss or embrace their
phantoms amalgamated voice. In other words, Athens lias already anticipated this
inevitable situation by positing that what rests in the mmd or phantom community
of the individual is specifically that which wili differentiate one persons identity
and violence from another’s.
In order to arrive at the makeshifi phantom consultant’s cause and affect,
disparate entertainment-violence theorists, researchers. and perpetrators will be
reiied on. As it remains more convincing to advance a theory by providing
detractors a balanced account of the issue at hand, it is worth surmising the core
“myths of media violence” as outlined by the media theorist James Potter.
Although eleven supportive or unsupportive misconceptions have been posited,
most of these pertain to implementations opposed to causations and shah be lefi
out but revisited philosophically in favour of a criticai trio of illusions: “Myth 1:
Violence in the media does not affect me, but others are at high risk.t..] Myth 6:
The media are only responding to market desires.[...] Myth 7: Violence is an
essential elernent in ail fiction” (Potter xviii).
The first myth actuahiy appears to border both sides of the makeshifi
phantom-consultant debate, for as Potter underscores:
The media continualiy and profoundly affect everyone, and when the
messages are violent, people are at risk for a variety of negative effects.
However, people do not perceive these negative effects happening to them
in their everyday lives—not because those effects don’t exist. but because
people do flot know what to look for as evidence ofthe effects. (31)
Potter proceeds to explain that while individuals readily express concem for how
media violence wiIl affect other people, they themselves feel as though it cannot
have an affect on them. a narrow perspective that continues to keep the makeshifi
phantom consultant from being authenticallv identified. Lest we forget that in the
practice of Sartrean analysis the vuinerable individual has already been deemed
guilty by the Other, a rare but crucial determinant perrnitted by ontological
profilers.
In Existentialism and Criticism.” René Girard poses the question: How
can the privileged position of the observer be justified without a causal linkT The
answer, of course, is ‘bad faith.” which Girard distinguishes on Sartre’s behaif as
de1usion,” flot the impassable barrief’ posited by freudian and Marxist loyalists
(124). Undoubtedly. what Pottef s first myth also implies by default is that if
individuals did know what to look for thev would be able to perceive these
negative effects as forces that do exist within interpretive reaims. In the end. the
mere inability to acknowledge or locate the makeshifi phantom consultant does
not discount its being but merely reinforces the notion that camouflaged phantoms
will flot be located if most of us refuse to believe that a search party is even
wananted in the first place.
Potter’s sixth myth (that “the media are only responding to market
C desires”) appears to discard the ‘strength” or poignancy ofthe makeshifi phantom
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consultant: “People in the media industry get frustrated by criticism from those
who do not recognize that the media companies are businesses and that the
purpose of those businesses is to construct audiences [for] advertisers” (127).
However. Potter acmally sets detractors up for the fali and changes gears afier
sarcastically claiming that entertainrnent programmers and distributors truly
believe that their audiences cannot get enough of the violent depictions they are
being subjected to on a regular basis. He explains how media outiets “also create
and shape the demand for violence’ and that this is accomplished through “using
a storyteiling formula that is simple to follow” and pleasurable. “Over time,” he
notes. the use of this formula conditions viewers to become attracted to
violence” (127). Once more. the correlation to the Athenian phantom community
arises instantaneously as Potter refers to a process that actually acclimatizes the
individual to embrace violent acts through conditioning and consultation. Indeed,
as many other ontologically-minded profilers such as the fBI’s Robert K. Ressier,
Ann W. Burgess. and Joim E. Douglas believe: Understanding the reinforcing
quality of actions, be they in fantasy, plav. or acting-out behaviours. may lead to
different notions regarding flot onÏy motivation but also behavior change” (2l5).
Potters seventh myth (“violence is an essential element in ail fiction”)
also appears to discard the makeshifi phantom consultant’s motivating viability as
it implies that the only reason violence has been deemed essential to fiction
remains due to the fact that industry writers and storytellers have located a
profitable formuia—impiying by consequence that individualistic creativity and
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intent have littie or nothing to do with a final universal product. However, Potter
does concede that there are verifiable exceptions to this rule and even potential
consequences to be imparted by art that transcends the mere methodical cash
cow:
It is possible for more talented writers to use the good-guys/bad-guys
formula and in so doing to elevate the formula with a higher level of
creativitv. that is, to expand the conflict beyond the violence in some way
to involve the audience even more. (133)
Whule Potter is hesitant to specify precisely how the audience will be affected by
violent depictions that inadvertently warrant interpretive contemplation, lis
previous statements have insinuated that different individuals will choose to
interpret messages divergently and that the actions proceeding interpretations will
be individualized projects.
It is hard. however, to imagine how mudh more involved one becomes
with a fictitious phantom consultant when no meaningful human interlocutors are
present to provide alternative clarifications. Now imagine what happens when
human interlocutors are present but condone the creative violence said individual
lias been repeatedly subjected to. When tIc amalgamated voice initiated by the
violent makeshifi phantom consultant actually corresponds to tIc amalgamated
voice initiated bv the violent phantom comrnunity, the chance one lias of escaping
violence remains virtually nonexistent. As Rhodes eerily but lionestly deduces in
C’ Why They Khi: Violence is the Minotaur; those who survive it spend their lives
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threading its maze, looking for the exh” (27). Potter’s alleged “myths” have not
so rnuch discounted or solidified the feasible existence of the makeshifi phantom
consultant so much as they have allowed to further this thesis by announcing the
psychological blases that need to be overcome.
A purposeful reinforcement provides yet another point of entry in that
camouflaged phantoms will flot be located if most people refuse to believe that a
search party is even warranted in the first place; and makeshift phantom
consultants will continue to remain etemally invisible unless we delineate the
specific process that actually acclimatizes individuals to embrace violent arts and
acts through imaginative conditioning and consultation. Along with the final two
stages of Athenian violentization and Sartrean acts of metamorphosis, the second
obstacle exists as precisely that which shah be unearthed in the third chapter. The
remainder of this section. however. will be devoted to hardening the allegation
that makeshift phantom consultants have always been painless to locate since they
have neyer been gone.
In It ‘s Not The Media, Karen Sternheimer also argues against the
entertainment/ violence correlation and pithily wams: ‘fcar can be crippling,
especially when we fear something that poses no major threat” (220). Yet in
Killing Monsters: Why ChiÏdren Need fantasy, Sztper Heroes, and Make-BeÏieve
Violence, Gerard Joncs dernonstrates that fictitious outlets actually manage to
establish consequential relationships with vulnerable and iso lated audience
members. Founder of Media Fower for Chiidren, Joncs actually complements
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Athens by acknowledging that “[whenJ we try to make chiidren banish or ignore
their rage. they ofien respond by identifying themselves completely with it” (214).
Jones proceeds to explain that if “violent storytelling isn’t allowed to serve its
function. or is connected in young people’s mmd with transgression and self
destruction, it can begin to churn obsessively inside without catharsis” (214).
What transpires afier the self-destructive chuming has corne to a hait? When sorne
kind of action must be taken—and since the same imaginative or phantom
interlocutors have not been debunked or erased by primary group members—can
we legitimateiy discount an interpretativelv violent course of action? As Steyer
confirms in The Other Parent, by discounting fantastically provoked violence, we
are discarding reality-based evidence:
By now it’s a heart sickening cliché. Alienated, disaffected youths—Dylan
Klebold, Eric Harris. Kip Kinkel. MichaeÏ Cameal—vent their anger and
get famous” by shooting up a school—in Peari, Mississippi; West
Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro, Arkansas; Springfield, Oregon; Littieton,
Colorado, or Santee, Califomia—killing not just targeted “enemies” but
innocent chiidren and teachers in blasts of bombs or semiautomatic
gunfire. [...] There are other similarities too. The young shooters ail feit
buliied. slighted, or inferior. Ail were steeped in a hyper violent pop
culture of bloody movies and video games. And many saw the massacres
as a way flot just to get even but to make themseives the center of the
media’s attention. (69)
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Once again. if primary group members are flot present, or simply incapable of
imparting affirmative guidance. the isolated individual will inevitably find another
interlocutor so as to be the centre ofat least one phantom’s attention.
In The Creation ofDangerous Violent Crirninals. Athens readily admits:
“Human social experiences can provide a murky and nebulous domain through
which one can quickly and easily lose one’s way” (21). Just as he once deemed it
necessary to bypass the vague generality imparted by Mead’s or Sartre’s theory of
generalized others/Others. we too must filter out the reckless notion that the
media as an institution qualifies as a culpable advisor. As recent history serves to
identi1j, there are in fact specific makeshifi consultants to be designated and
considered by dissimilar but verifiably violent criminals: Dylan Klebold and Eric
Haffis—the Columbine-High shooters from Colorado who murdered twelve
students and one teacher before killing themselves on April 20, 1999—had
“reprorammed their copy of Doom to simulate the slaughter they were planning
and used the game to practice for il” (Jones 168); Kipland Kinkel—the Thurston
High shooter from Oregon who murdered bis parents before unleashing forty
eight rounds of ammunition into his unsuspecting classmates on May 21, 1998—
‘put the lyrics to a Marilyn Manson song on bis wall, which asserted that there
could be ‘no salvation. Ris sister reported that it was unlikely that anyone at
home ever asked him why those words meant so much to him” (Joncs 120); and
Michael Carneal—the infamous Heath-High shooter from Kentucky who
murdered three classmates and wounded five others on December 1, 1997—
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“leamed his murderous technique from the movie The BasketbatÏ Diaries. Afier
he watched the film, he mused to a ninth-grade friend, Wou1dn’t it be neat to go
in the school and shoot people that you don’t likeT” (Steyer 70).
In his assessment of the allegedly scientific evidence. discarder Jonathan
L. Freedman states that while violent creative outiets might cause an isolated
individual to become somewhat excited[,] it is the arousal that affects them, not
the content” (208). Freedman’s elementary error resides in the fact that it is not
areusai that provokes individuals to perform violent acts but interpretation. That
Doom. Marilvn Manson. and The Basketbail Diaries are harmless if not
pleasurable sources of amusement for the masses remains an insignificant detail.36
That specifically isolated individuals have relied on and interpreted such
interlocutors much more intimately than others is significant. Klebold, Ranis,
KinRel, and Carneal had ail undergone the physical violentization process at the
hands of primary group members—from their homes or schools—and then
proceeded to make choices entailing pseudo-escapes into the isolation of
imagination wherein individualized interpretations of violent makeshifi-phantom
consultants carne te be. Since these individuals were made capable of both
perpetrating actualized violence and conjuring imaginary violence, and due to the
insurmountable amalgamation. their disparate yet overlapping resolutions could
have been deemed anticipatory.37
Nevertheless, if in the end an individual’s interpretation of phantoms
provides the only concrete evidence. revelations of the perpetrators’ owri
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observations are in order:
It’s going to be like fticking Doem!” Harris said on one of the tapes,
referring to bis favorite shoot-em-up video game. ‘Tick-tock. tick, tick...
Ha!.. .Straight out ofDoorn!” The boys even discussed who would be the
best director to immortalize them in a movie. Quentin Tarantino or Steven
Spielberg. Directors will be fighting over this story,” Klebold bragged.
(Steyer 70)
Kipland Kinkel covered the bodies of both of his parents with sheets and
as he waited tbrough the night. he placed homemade bombs around the
home. putting one under bis mother’s body. Fie then turned on the
soundtrack to Rorneo and Jutiet to play continuously, and left a note, Ï
have killed my parents. I am a horrible son.” In his journal, he’d wriUen.
“My head just doesn’t work riht. Goddamn these voices in my head.”
(Rarnsland n. pag.)
“I knew I would go to prison, but in my mmd i was leaving everything
behind.” Cameal told The Courier-Joumal. ‘I perceived my life as
miserable. Nobody loved me and nobody cared.” ([Anon.], “I was leaving
everything behind” n. pag.)
Unfortunately. history also serves to reveal that troubled teenagers are not the
only parties susceptible to makeshifi phantom consultants. In a statement to the
New York Police Department on December 9. 1980, merely hours proceeding his
brutal murder of John Lennon. Mark David Chapman told investigators that prior
.
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to arriving at the musician’s hotel he had purchased another copy of a novel that
he incessantly read. relied on. and consulted with for decades:38 “I’m sure the
large part of me is Holden Caulfield, who is the main person in the book. The
small part of me must be the Devil” (McGunagle n. pag.). J.D. Salinger’s The
Catcher in the Rve. and more specificalïy, the novel’s protagonist Holden
Caulfield. would inadvertently serve as the makeshifi phantom consultant to a
self-proclaimed loner with lirnited human resources and outlets.39 Salinger’s
young hero had raged against “the phonies” of society and Lennon. according to
Chapman, was guilty under his character’s fictitious charge. As for the killer’s
own charge that the Devil also played a culpable role, we can now discount this
fallacy since imaginary phantom consultants (such as the Dcvii or God) are only
conceived of afier they are interpreted by the individual who intimateÏy consuits
either satanic or bibiical texts.
In regards to David Berkowitz, Uncle Sam might have equipped The Son
of Sam with the physical capability to perpetrate violent acts, however, his actual
motivation to manifest cvii would inevitabiy spring from who or what he believed
the Devil to be. Upon military discharge. Berkowitz’s assumed phantom others,
predominantly imaginative in nature. wouid serve to expose and demystii’ the
construed existence ofsatanic cvii:
Ail my friends that I knew before had either married or moved away. So I
found myselfalone and living in New York City. In 1975, however, I met
some guys at a party who were, I later found out, heavily involved in the
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occuit. I had aiways been fascinated with witchcrafi. satanism, and occult
things since I was a child. When I was growing up I watched countless
horror and satanic movies, one of which was Rosernaiy ‘s Baby. [...] I
began to read the Satanic Bible by the late Anton LaVey who founded the
Church of Satan in San Francisco in 1966. I began, innocently, to practice
various occuit rimais and incantations. [...] I did flot know that bad things
were going to resuit from ail this. Yet over the months the things that were
wicked no longer seemed to be such. I was headed down the road to
destruction and I did flot know it. Maybe I was at a point where I just
didn’t care anymore. (Berkowtiz. n. pag.)
Under an isolated interpretation of metamorphosis, the words imparted by deadly
texts locatable in ail artistic outlets become, for the isolated and vuinerabie
recluse. the deadly phantom voices within.
As Psychiatrist Judith Meyers reports in ‘Cultura1 factors in Erotomania
and Obsessional Foilowing:”
The link between social isolation and obsessional followers. whether
erotomanic or flot. is quite strong. [...] failures in acculturating may relate
to an individuaïs interpersonal difficuity in engaging people who are
different from himself, a lack of flexibility or ethnocentrism, or an
inability to establish a support group within the host culture. (214)
In his own staternent to the New York Parole Board on Oct. 3, 2000, Chapman
endeavoured to explain that he “was very young and stupid, and” that it was easy
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to “get caught up in the media and the records and the music” (McGunagle n.
pag). Yet Chapman, Berkowitz, Klebold. Harris, Kinkel, or Cameal represent
merely a fraction of the modem-day killers who have surmised their enemy others
as personified obstacles to freedom afier interpreting their specific situations and
the choices made available therein. When the only phantoms haunting interpretive
valves are improvised. uncontested, and dangerous, excuses attributed to youth or
stupidity are themselves nothing short of smokescreens shrouding the existence of
legitimate co-conspirators.
Sartre candidly deduces by the end of his own existential/autobiographical
profile: “As a militant, I wanted to save myseif by works; as a mystic, I attempted
to reveal the silence of being by a thwarted rustling of words and, what was more
important, I confused things with their names: that amounts to believing” (The
Words 25 l).40 A sceptical search-party of profilers could have neyer exposed the
identities of makeshifi phantom consultants. particularly if these criminologists
and alleged media experts were looking anywhere other than inside the
individual’s own unique interpretive valves. Once again, a solidification of the
existence of the makeshifi phantom consultant can only be authentically
confirmed by the isolated individual in question who interprets a specific
consultant that other individuals might have no interest in or need for.
Undoubtedly, if one relies on violent fictive interlocutors in lieu of human
interlocutors, be it be by choice or by circumstance, the degree of impact will be
unfathomable to any and ail outsiders. In Violent CriminaÏ Acts and Actors
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Revisited, Athens might have been defending his own designation of the phantom
community, however, this investigation is yet to find the descriptive nomenclature
that either discounts or does flot directly support the feasibility of the makeshifi
phantom consultant.
Thankfully. Athens’s own makeshifi justification provides the necessary
validation:
My book is hardly mentioned in criminology textbooks. seldom discussed
in research articles or monographs. and neyer noted in govemment
sponsored reports on violent crime. There are at least two possible reasons
for this neglect. f irst. perhaps the book is simpÏy devoid of insiglits. The
other possible reason. the one to which I obviously subscribe, is that the
interpretive approach in general and its application to violent crime in
particular constitute a direct challenge. if not an affront, to the
criminologists who control what passes and what does not pass for
knowledge in their field. t.. .J The interpretive approach raises serious
questions about assumptions that conventional criminologists take for
granted, their accepted procedures. and their real interest in and personal
commitment to the problems that they select to study. (Violent Criminal
Acts 113-l 14)
This passage confirms that purist existential criminologists in the vein of Sapp
and Quinney spotted the indicative trail but neglected to acknowledge the
phantom others’ accountability in regards to the motivational why behind violent
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behaviour—instead erasing these invisible spirits from the equation aitogether. As
this chapter lias served to buttress. to delete a phantom one must extinguish an old
life and find a new way of existence as one caimot escape their own skin but can
trv to escape the trappings of seclusion.
On their own. Athens’s model and Sartre’s blueprint are viable for most
but flot ail individuals since, in our contemporary tecimological world of
impersonality, not ail of us spend a significant amount of time with other flesh
and-bone beings. When the human others are not around to interfere with or
influence an individuaïs choices. who or what else other than the makeshifi
phantom consultant—the only intimate interlocutor for the isolated individual
intent on fictitious or creative outlets—exists as a feasible co-conspirator?
Jones confirrns that as soon as the individual “feels that the most powerfuÏ
parts of themselves are not seen or acknowledged. then the hidden reaim of
violent stories can begin to feel like a reality in itself’ (214). Whereas our
supplement lias focussed on designated “violent” makeshifi-phantom-consultants,
there are obviously positive and even inspirational makeshift consultants that
represent, on an individual basis, legitimate interlocutors for throngs of dissirnilar
actors in the real world. Athens himself should flot be surprised to learn that lis
own anti-violent corpus consistently consuits the phantom voice attributed to the
American author Thomas Wolfe.1’ In 1989, when an isolated, dismayed, and
recently-divorced Athens was struggiing in his career—and becoming accustomed
to academi&s impersonal rejections—he had attempted to vent lis frustrations by
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taking solace in WoÏfe’s own artistic outiet ofchoice.
Rhodes rehashes the specffics:
Remaking bis life, Athens was reading Thomas Wolfe and working on a
collection of short stories [...] with tities like “The Melting Pot Bous
Over,” ‘The Amorous Salesman.” “Piggy Crenshaw Drops into the
Manchester Café” and “A Mad Greek Cornes to Rebeldom” that recycled
Athens’s childhood as slapstick and dark comedy. (Why They Kilt 271)
Wolfe was stiil being consulted with three years later, a fact confirmed by his
symbolic appearance in The Creation of Dangerous Violent Offenders. Athens
relies on two of Wolfe’s novels. Look Homeward, Angel and The Story of A
Novel—wherein the delineations of conditioned lives and interpreted actions are
more than extractable—in order to arrive at ‘Principle thirteen: Significant social
experiences shape our phantorn cornmunity” (Rhodes, Why They Kilt 277). As
Athens elucidated in bis own work: “Although eloquently stated, WoÏfe’s
observation is imprecise. People undergo an almost endless stream of social
experiences over their waking lives, but rnost of them are trivial rather than truly
significant” (Creation ofDangerous 1$). Five years later, upon the publication of
Violent Criininal Acts and Actors, Athens was not only conjuring Wolfe’s
phantom voice but affributing direct credit unto the deceased author—whom he
had obviously neyer personally or intimately met—afier suggesting that Wolfe’s
own personal fortitude paved the way for the criminologist’s own person
perseverance: Although at first I despised the task because I associated it with
C
failure, afier I finally started it, I experienced a new feeling, one that Thornas
Wolfe (1936) sublimely captures in The Storv ofA iVovel” (Violent Criminat Acts
160). Given that Athens had legitimately relied on a makeshift phantom
consultant in order to understand violent crimes, who is to say that another
individual cannot reÏv on a different kind of makeshïft phantom consultant in
order to perpetrate violent crimes?
Ulmer fittingly suggests that “research should test Athens’s proposition
that, if community or even society-wide cultural norms, messages, discourse,
media images. etc. cause serious violence. they do 50 through violentization”
(17$). Indeed. the only fine une remains that which can be established by first
hand experience and interpretation, two irreducible pieces of evidence Sartre
would arrive at in his first existential attempt at profihing on Baudelaire: ‘But the
creature lie was. by dreaming of impossible escapes, asserted his rights and his
supreme value” (Baudetaire 9$)42 Once more. Sartre lias inadvertently managed
to pre-empt the motivations of makeshifi killers and the findings of contemporary
crimino logists.
Individuals are now fiilly equipped to enter into the final two stages of
Athenian violentization and Sartrean metamorphosis in order to fathom the
transformation from aggressively violent action to aggressively creative
expression. Becoming farniliar with those who have the capacity to become
violent and those who do not will be just as important as elucidating Lentricchia
and McAullif&s designation of “transgressive artistic desire.” That stated, and
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rather than acknowledging the necessity for plausible applications, the next
chapter will establish a specific formula—a procedure philosophically inspired by
Sartre and symbolically facilitated by Athens—that serves to unmask the acts of
metamorphosis fuelling the perpetration of artistically antagonistic manifestations.
C)
Chapter Three:
Creating Violence / Creative Violence
O
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“Wisdom wiil save you from the ways ofwicked men, from men whose words are perverse.
who leave the straight paths to waik in dark ways, who delight in doing wrong and rejoice in the
perverseness ofevil, whose paths are crooked and who are devious in their ways.”
Proverbs 2:12-2:15
“At that instant he saw, in one blaze of light, an image ofunuuerabie conviction, the reason
why the artist works and lives and has his being—the reward he seeks—the only reward he really
cares about, without which there is nothing. It is to snare the spirits ofmankind in nets ofmagic. to
make his life prevail through his creation. to wreak the vision ofhis life, the rude and painful substance
ofhis own experience, into the congruence ofblazing and enchanted images that are themselves the
core oflife, the essential pattern whence ail other things proceed, the kernel ofeternity.”
Thomas Wolfe, 0f Tiine and the River (550)
The first two stages of Athenian violentization serve to reveal how an
individual becomes unwittingly educated in the perpetration of violent choices
proceeding interpretations of specificaiiy significant situations. The informai
instruction accompanying this education involves one or more of the individuaFs
primary group members assuming the role of a violent coach who aiways lurks
behind any aggressive choices to be made. Athenss subsequent designation ofthe
phantom community serves to expose why an individual becomes unintentionafly
bound to perpetrating acts of violence proceeding distinct conversations with
primary group members. An individual’s phantom community symbolizes the
primary group’s amalgamated voice, an “us’ that imparts the significant lessons
taught by significant coaches throughout the individuaFs iifetime: “So aÏthough
we ail make choices we aren’t ail confronted by the same harsh circumstances
[...] and nobody makes the choice to be brutaiized. Others make that choice for
them” (Athens, ‘Rethinking Violent Crime” n. pag.). In the end, it remains the
individuai’s own unique interpretation of an immediate environment that
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ultimately dictates how or why violence will be avoided or embraced.
In Saint Genet, the first two stages of Sartrean metamorphosis serve to
reveal how a criminal artist becomes accidentally cultured in the perpetration of
hostile acts proceeding isolated interpretations of specifically significant
situations as well as microcosmic institutions. The unceremonious edification
involves one or more of the deviant being’s phantom community members
assuming the role of an antagonistic Other lurking behind any aggressive choices
to be made. Sartre delineates this Other as an illustration of why the criminal artist
arrives at the decision to perpetrate acts of evil proceeding distinct interpretations
or altercations. The Other represents the perpetual enemy existing inside and
outside of immediate consciousness ofselfand serves to objectify the individual’s
quest for freedom or, as Sartre emphatically reiterates. in their quest to be like
God. Due to the perpetually intrusive Gaze imparted by the reflective Other, in
itself symbolically representative of that which seizes a criminal’s freedom upon
conception, confrontational circumstances neyer cease to exist: “A choice must be
made: Genet will destroy the object if he takes hold of h; lie will let himself be
destroyed if the object takes hold ofhim” (Sartre. Saint Genet 265). In the end. it
remains the criminal’s own unique and immediate environmental assessments that
dictate how or why evil acts will be rejected or adopted.
The previous chapter explored how an isolate individuaÏ who has
undergone the early stages of violentization becomes programmed to make
C violent choices proceeding unique interpretations of significant artistic outiets. A
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camouflaged but conscious consultation involves one or more of the isolated
individuaÏ’s makeshift phantoms assuming the role of an antagonistic other
constantly lurking behind any aggressive choices to be made. Our theoretical
addendum serves to elucidate why the isolated individual becomes unsuspectingly
programmed to perpetrate or recreate acts of violence proceeding distinct
interpretations acquired through creatively antagonistic interlocutors. While
makeshifi consultants are originally delivered through artists’ creative wombs, for
vulnerabie or isolated individuals these phantoms can eventually be adapted and
hence transformed into personally-significant comrnunity members. Admits the
Son of Sam: “I am utterly convinced that something satanic had entered into my
mmd and that. looking back at ail that happened, I realize that I had been slowiy
deceived” (“Personal Testimony” n. pag.). In the end, Berkowitz’s own fantastical
detachment, as well as his own personaiized delineation of constituent violent
makeshift-phantom-consultants. dictates preciselv how and why aggressive ac:s
are simulated opposed to circumvented.
Prior to fathoming the individual’s transformation from a potentially
violent actor to an aggressively creative artist—that is, before digesting precisely
who is responsible for creating and symbolically representing dissimilar
makeshifi phantom consultants—there must be a presentation of Athens’s final
two stages of violentization in order to illustrate how individuals who have been
prepared for violence through brutalization and defiance proceed to embrace it.
Subsequent to our understanding of Athenian violentization, the final two stages
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of metamorphosis in Saint Genet must also be presented in order to demonstrate
how a criminal artist who has been prepared for violence proceeds to fail in the
world of physical evil but stili manages to express aggression by alternative
means. Through a resurrected criminological procedure that elucidates Frank
Lentricchia and Jody McAuliffe’s own elucidation of “transgressive artistic
desire” and proceeds an overali comprehension of the amended Sartrean and
Athenian models thus far presented. we shah resituate the formulaic process that
clarifies how the perpetration of artistically antagonistic representation becon?es.
Ihe third stage of Athenian brutalization. dubbed ‘vioÏent dominance
engagements.” will be actuahized when the defiant individual lias simultaneously
located and interpreted appropriate conditions in which to test a newly developed
resolve to attack peopte physicallv with serious intention ofinflicting grave injury
upon them” (Athens, Creation of Dangerous 63). The une to be crossed has
apparently been presented in ail of its lucid glory and a choice must be made: To
be violent or not to be violent? Or as the criminologist’s specific question isolates
without the Shakespearean flare: What is the proper set of circumstances under
which the subject will direct his or lier belligerence toward others with the explicit
intention of gravely injuring them?” (Athens. Creation of Dangerous 63). Tlie
answer inadvertentÏy embraces poor HamÏets specificaÏÏy indecisive situation,13
for “the subject [must be] unduly provoked or suffer greater than minimal
provocation. More precisely, the subject must suffer either maximum provocation
C or at least moderate provocation” (Athens, Creation ofDangerous 64). Therefore,
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while the individual lias reached a breaking point in that they are commifled to
engage in violent dominance engagements. they are not necessarily prepared to
engage in unrnitigated violent action if sufficient degrees of inteipreted
provocation fail to present themselves.
Afier clarifying that in addition to the “specific” circumstance, the
“specific’ outcome of the violent action remains a critically decisive factor,
Athens designates a “specific” type of violent performance called “the violent
personal revolt” in which “the protagonist is aiways a current subjugator of the
subject or of a Ïoved one of the subject’ (Creation ofDangerozts 66). Since the
subject or individual intends to prevent having to undergo anv more physical
abuse at the hands of a violent subjugator or coach, the violent personal revoit can
be considered a full-biown act of retribution directed at “a perceived evil
oppressof (Athens. Creation of Dangeroïts 66). However, the risk invoived in
this upheaval accompanies potentiaily brutal consequences:
If the subject wins. then lie or a Ioved one maY escape further oppression
at the hands of the subjugator. However, the subject realizes that if he
loses, his oppression may become far harsher than before the rebellion was
mounted. [...] Thus. for the subject. violent personal revoits usually end as
either the sweet victory long veamed for or the ‘bitter defeat’ dreaded
during past thoughts of defiance. (Athens. Creation ofDangerous 66)
Beyond providing an explanation of how, for instance, domesticallv battered
wives become capable of perpetrating ÏethaÏly violent reprisais against their
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consistently abusive spouses. the aforementioned passage also illuminates
precisely how domestically battered wives become incapable ofperpetrating such.
Athens reiterates the significant details of Case 106, ‘a middle-aged, rnarried
woman who reached the stage of violent dominance engagements but was unable
to complete it” (“Violentization in Larger 15). Insisting that specific factors
contributed to this woman’s inability to perpetrate a successful violent act, such as
‘the repeated major defeats that she suffered at the hands of her husband” or ‘her
aversion to using more lethal tactics to score a major victory over him,” Athens
ultimateÏy surmises that this particular case study simply “lacked an aptitude for
serious violence” (Vio1entization in Larger” 1 5). Hence, merely possessing the
desire for brutality alone will flot suffice if an individual is to progress on to the
final stage ofviolentization as a mere indecisive outcome wiÏl keep the individual
bound to the third stage until or unless they are able to perpetrate an undisputedly
triumphant act ofviciousness.
Accordinglv. violent dominance engagements are crucial in that they
inevitably serve to provide a collective backdrop for either the halting of a violent
criminal career or. antithetically, the springboard towards one. Cognizant of the
fact that “true praxis” consistently requires a consciousness of the relation
between the goal and the means selected for achieving it,” Athens provides a
synopsis of violent dominance engagements that this investigation shah
purposefully and subsequently utilize as its owTi springboard towards the Sartrean
correÏation in Saint Genet:
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In short, people make their original mitigated violent resolution from their
tortuous contemplation about past traumatic violent social experiences —
violent subjugation, personal horrification. and violent coaching.
However. the expansion of this resolution requires much more than mere
contemplation. It requires successftil praxis or the successftd performance
of the activity ultimately contemplated — violent action. Nothing expands a
person’s determination to be violent more than the repeated successful
performance of violent action. The more successful the performance or the
bigger the violent feat performed. then the more quickly the violent
resolution of the person can be expected to deepen and widen. (Creation
ofDangerous 71)
Whereas the narratives profiled by Athens are imparted by imprisoned case
studies who have successfttlly perpetrated physical violence, Sartre endeavours to
analyse the life of an imprisoned case study who attempts to perpetrate physical
Evil and fails. As a resuit, Jean Genet had decided to be what they had made of
him. Ris original wiIl ta assume himself entirely has not changed” (Saint Genet
353). At the outset it must be stated that Sartrean purists will undoubtedly remain
sceptical ofthe imminent parallel to Athenss violentization model, particularly if
they are stiil bound ta refuting the possibility of culpable conspirators legitimately
residing outside of an individuaïs ‘self-operating” process (Saint Genet 329). But
what if those conspirators actually resided consciously within said process? If’the
monster was fabricated” by those who first bestowed upon him ‘the primitive
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mentality of property owners” (Saint Genet 329), Genet can only exist as “self
operating” to the extent that significant directives imparted by phantom
cornmunity members have metamorphosed into interpretations that now belong to
his individualized sense of self As Genet himselfevocatively solidifies:
Not. may I point out. through some swift procedure governed by your
principles, but by means of a fatality contained within it, which I have put
there, and which. as I have intended. keeps me as witness, field of
experimentation and living proof of its virtue and my responsibility. (The
Thief’s Journal 268)
The third stage of metamorphosis in Saint Genet, aptly dubbed “The
Aesthete,” was actualized by Sartre’s case study upon his interpretation of the
specific situation and circurnstances in which to perpetrate a newly developed
resolve to perpetrate evil. “As soon as circumstances warrant,” vows Sartre,
“Genet wilI invent the gesture that derealizes” (Saint Genet 379). This isolated
souL who “dreamt only of doing harm” since the age of fifieen, who upon his
release from Mettray and then Fontevrault Prison had maintained his status as a
contemptuous outsider, would attempt to undergo the equivalent to Athens’s third
stage of violentization shortly afier his twenty-fifih birthday whereupon Genet
“retumed to France after a long period of wandering, met a professional burgiar
and accompanied hum on his expeditions” (Sartre. Saint Genet 355. 402). As
stated earlier, there was a legitimate problem as there is no means of acting on
( others directly, except physical coercion. which Genet cannot practice” (Sartre,
I---,’( 106
Saint Genet 420). Once again. regardless of the buming desire to actualize
violence, Genet, like Athens’s Case 106, would simply lack the necessary aptitude
for doÏing out corporeal punishment. The infamous thief that Genet transfonned
into was merely a consolation prize, an alternative manifestation of evil that both
his specific demeanour and stature allowed for.
‘Surrounded by welÏ-built hoodÏums,” Sartre profiles, “Genet suffered for
a long time because of what he called the sofiness’ of bis muscles. But burglary
does flot require physical strength” (Saint Genet 403). Reinforcing Athens’s
allegation from the aforementioned synopsis of violent dominance
engagements—that people make their original mitigated violent resolution from
their tortuous contemplation about their past—Sartre explains that an attempt to
perpetrate criminality was for Genet a foreseeable inevitability afler tracing the
pattems of his significant interactions and interpretations prior to that point in
time. However, ensnared in a state of limbo, unable to achieve a successful
violent performance and hence unable to progress onto the final stage of Athenian
violentization, Genet would have no choice but to halt a violent criminal career
and to find a substitute means of antagonism regardless of a lingering desire to
exact legitimate physical damage. “According to him,” adds Sartre. “this
revelation was decisive: J went to thefi as to a ljberafion.’ That is how he views
his life: a long period of absence between two interventions from without” (Saint
Genet 402). Lefi to contemplate the viotent subjugation he has already undergone
and the acts of violent reprisai he will neyer commit, Genet finds himself
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attempting to escape the reaiity of his situation through an aesthetic amalgamation
ofhis dreams and criminal acts.
When out burgiarizing his bourgeoisie victims, Genet was well known for
creating fictional scenarios wherein victims’ homes and possessions transformed
into symbolic backdrops for self-indulgent performances.45 Sartre explains that
Genet’s “acts are both poems and crimes because they are dreamt for a long time
before being committed and because he stiil dreams them while committing
them (Saint Genet 160). Therefore, aithough Genet finds himself trapped within
the third pivotai stage of violent deveiopment, he nevertheless undergoes his most
pivotai act of metamorphosis in that: “By his gesture-creating act he re-enters the
world and installs himself in it. For the ambiguity of the materiai traps resuits in
the insertion of the imaginary as such into the web of the real” (Sartre, Saint
Genet 421). Clearly, the isolation of imagination bas the capacity to serve as an
integral launch pad as much as it does a dangerous escape.
Prior to revealing precisely what the final act of metamorphosis would
become for Genet and thereby solidifying Lentricchia and McAuliffes perception
of transgressive artistic desire,” a delineation of Athens’s final stage of
“virulency” must be digested. Indeed, while Jean Genet had been fortunate in that
he was able to successfully locate and channel alternative aesthetic outiets for his
aggression despite an inability to perform violent acts, this shapeshifier-of-a-man
merely represents a single case study. In other words. what of those individuals
who have undergone the requisite stages of “brutalization,” “defiance,” and
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“violent dominance engagements.” and who are equipped to become nothing
short ofbona-fide violent offenders?
As the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky once maintained in Thought
and Learning: “To imitate, it is necessarv to possess the means of stepping from
something one knows to something new. With assistance, every chuld can do more
than lie can by himself’ (187). Vygotskv was infamous for elucidating the social
theory informing and surrounding “Zones of Proximal Development,” which
encompass the designated space that separates what an individual lias the capacity
to learn on their own opposed to that ehich they can achieve with the aid of an
adult assuming the role of a motivational teacher or coach. The psychologist
posited that through a demonstrative process known as “scaffolding” the
makeshifi student successfttlly accomplishes more difficuit feats wlien aided by
adult consultants. 0f course. whereas Zones of Proximal Development” aim at
elucidating the stages and aflainable resuits surrounding intelligent or affirmative
coaching. Athens’s criminological model obviously flinctions in reverse to the
extent that it elucidates the negative stages and consequences imparted by violent
or non-affirmative coaching.
Despite the fact that both socio-cuÏtural blueprints of hurnan deveÏopment
involve the purposeful analyses of significant interactions and contemplative
stages of internalization, the individual who enters into Athens’s final stage of
virulency has been prepared for making violence—whereas tlie individual who
c enters into Vygotsky’s final zone of proximal development has been prepared for
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making the honour roli. Indeed. virulency horrifically picks up where the violent
dominance engagement leaves off for. as Dumont imparts in Rectpe for Violence,
“the person is now rewarded for violent behavior with a reputation for toughness
and deference” (47). Regrettably, the individual has triumphed in his or her
violent dominance engagement and has therebv honoured “an earÏier resolution to
attack people physically who overtly provoke with the serious intention of gravely
harming them” (Athens, Creation of Dangeroits 72). Beyond the individual’s
sense of pride or self-flulfilment for having successffihly actualized the violence
long yearned for, in order for the successful engagement to be significantÏy
imprinted on any perpetrator’s mmd there must be a significant external
judgement made by a Sartrean Other.
‘Thus.” adds Athens, “the job of impressing the subject with the full
significance of his successful violent action is gladly performed by other people
who [...] aiways seem to take a perverse interest and pleasure in violence”
(Creation of Dangerous 72). Consequently, and despite the individual’s own
unique interpretation of bis or her own specific situation. outside opinions
communicated by secondary acquaintances or phantom community members will
directly and considerably contribute to this violent individual’s conception of self.
Now perceived as legitimately violent. the individual immersed in the final stage
becomes aware that judgments made by others have suddenly and drasticaÏly
changed in the wake ofthe violent feat” for “they no longer see the subject as they
did before the latest violent performance” (Athens. Creation of Dangerous 72-
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73). Therefore. cognizant of the fact that others are taking particular pains not to
offend or provoke in any way. the individual proceeds to take stock of a created
identity rnoulded by outside forces. Harnlet’s “to be or not to be” contemplation
inadvertently returns as the conflicted being is back in a position where lie or she
must either choose to accept and adopt this newfound notoriety or to deny and
disallow it altogether. Since this investigation bas been dealing witb the creation
of dangerous violent offenders. let us presuppose the former choice lias been
made:
As a resuit of these reverberations. the individual becomes overly
impressed with the violent petfotmance and ultimately with themselves in
general. Filled with feelings of exultancy, the individual concludes that
since they performed this violent feat. there is no reason why they cannot
perform even more impressive violent feats in the future. [... I From the
loft)’ heights of this new psychic plateau. the subject makes a new violent
resolution which far surpasses the one made before the latest violent feat.
They now firmly resolve to attack people physically with the serious
intention of gravely harming or even killing them for the slightest or no
provocation whatsoever, whereas before the individual had resolved to do
this only if more than minimally provoked by someone. (Athens. Crecitiol?
ofDctngcrotis 75)
Accordingly, in order to catapuit the making of a killer. a final “malevolent”
choice must be embraced.16 The individuaFs culminating experience with life
Q
lii
long violence has triggered a complete and radical metarnorphosis from within as
the designated violent offender paradoxically turns into an arnalgamated vitalized
and toxic force.
‘By the end of this last stage,’ enforces Dumont, “the person sensing
evil’ in another is culpable of acts of sadistic. unremitting. or lethal violence
(47). “Consequentlv,’ adds Athens. “the added nefarious distinction of being not
only a violent, but a dangeious violent crirninal can now be rightfully bestowed’
(Creation of Dangerous 79). Inevitably, the final transformation—that lias been
triggered hy a final transforrnation—will not be undergone by the dangerous
violent individual in question but by their primary group members. Intimates
begin to steer clear ofthe individual ahogether so as to avoid the likely possibility
of violence erupting around them. (“Meanwhule,” writes Athens, the subject may
find that lie is now a welcome and desired companion among malevolent groups
for whom having violent repute is a social requirernent’ (Creation ofDangerous
76)).
Pending an allocation or transition into a new prirnary group, the
individual wilI ofien have no choice but to endure significant periods of social
isolation. As the previous chapter attests. assailants such as Mark Chaprnan and
David Berkowitz had cadi individually corne to exemplify the role of rebuffed
recluse only too welÏ by relying on makeshifi phantom consultants in lieu of
affirrnative hurnan consultants. Once again—how and why could these dissirnilar
killers perpetrate the specific acts of savagery that they did? Athens, despite his
C.
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disbelief in the impact of the fantastical or make-believe, has nevertheless
responded: “Without new primary groups to fil the void created by the loss of
former groups, the subject becomes the proverbial violent outcast and loner 50
often read about in the popular press” (Creation ofDangerous 76).
Jean Genet himself was an undeniable outcast and loner so oflen read
about in the popular press, however, for reasons aitogether different than those
propelling the aforementioned criminals. Genet’s manifestation of violent
perpetration proceeding his third stage of metamorphosis was flot to be physically
actualized on a literai level. Alternatively, his aggression was to be creatively
simuÏated on a Ïiterary level. As in Athens’s model, the opening moments of the
final metamorphosis contain the same “to be or flot to be” contemplation: Genet,
painstakingly aware of the fact that he has been created to create violence,
desiring nothing other than to perpetrate the evil he has thorougffly committed
himself to, will undergo his final transformation upon iocating an altematively
aggressive expression that—in regards to both steadfast commitment and
motivational intent—purposefully leads to the equivalent of Athenss final stage
of virulency.
Aware of the desperation that ultimately fuels this conversion, Sartre
explicates:
As one can readily imagine, these reflections do not occur to him ail at
once. Nor in that order. One can also assume that he did flot reach his
decision overnight. Writing: what could be stranger, more ridiculous. and
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more intimidating too. for this vagabond? Can one conceive the insolence
and madness of the project of imposing himself upon the Just who
condemn him or are unaware of him? And besides, to write is to
communicate: if he wishes to infect right-thinking people with his dreams.
he will have to be concerned with what goes on in their heads. [...J We
have seen him go from the act to the gesture and from the gesture to the
word: but in order to go from the word to the work of art he must travel a
long road, a road full of pitfalls. It is along this road that we are going to
follow him. (Saint Genet 422-423)
following this course of enquiry, Ringer affirrns in Saint Genet Decanonized:
•‘Genet’s situation as outsider will determine flot only how we read him but also
how he perceives writing” (46). Resolved to proverbially pick up the pen and flot
the sword. by the age of twenty-eight, Genet found himself in the specific
situation that would catapuit lis final transformation and effectually pave the way
for one of tIc most influential European writers of the twentieth cenmry. Sartre
recails: ‘One day. Genet thought he was being challenged, or ratIer he challenged
himself: but le did so precisely because le judged himself capable of winning”
(Saint Genet 427). Genet—who ‘composed verses the way a bully beats up the
one who las provoked him: to estabïish superiority” (Saint Genet 427) — relays
tIc details of this specific encounter in one of his countless interviews with lis
existential profiler and thereby reveals the pivotal element that Athens’s final
stage entails: namely. the judgment made and handed down by the Other:
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I was pushed into a celi where there were already several prisoners in
‘city’ clothes. [...J They despised me. I later had the greatest difficulty in
overcoming their attitude. Among them was a prisoner who composed
poems to his sister, idiotic. snivelling poems that they ail admired. Finally,
in irritation. I said that I could do just as well. They challenged me and I
wrote The Condemned Aian. I read it to them and they despised me even
more. (Saint Genet 427)
While this passage appears to divulge the creative equivalent of a failed Athenian
conceived violent dominance engagement, whatever Genet does in the attempt to
be reintegrated into the black society will be a deliberate courting of failure.”
(Saint Genet 429). Once again. the perpetrating individual’s interpretation of the
outcome aione necessitates a consecration ofvictory.
Through bis composition of ‘The Condemned Man,” Genet would prove
to himself that, in regards to creating evil and despite Sartre’s revisions, the
Cartesian assertion “I think; therefore I am” requires no consequential
afterations.48 Violence can in fact be perpetrated on page and words do in fact
have the capacity to becorne weapons. Genet eventually succeeds in more intense
artistic dominance engagements and consequentiaily blossoms into a prolific
writer of antagonistic verse prior to assuming the nefarious or infarnous
distinction Athens wouÏd have bestowed. Once again, this particular criminal does
not become the artist in order to please others but to abusively annihulate their
senses the oniy way that he can—affirming his isolation, self-sufficiency. and
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new-found notoriety in the process. ‘In short.” writes Sartre, ‘incapab1e of
carving out a place for himself in the universe, lie infagines in order to convince
himself that he has created the world which excludes him” (Saint Genet 46$).
Undoubtedly, ‘his art will aiways smack of its origins. and the ‘communication’
at which he aims will be of a very singular kind” (Saint Genet 48 1-482).
Consequently, and just as Athens’s final stage of virulency serves as an active
backdrop for the isolated individual’s culmination of life-long violent episodes,
Genet’s expressive canvas serves as a rebel’s backdrop for lis own culmination of
life-long evil.
In one important way. the Sartrean correlation to the final Athenian stage
has been presented as intentionally vague. But why has this technique been
implemented? In truth. because to throw out modified clichés like ‘the pen can be
mightier than the sword” or ‘words can be mightier than weapons” shah remain
irresponsible gestures unless the precise formula that legitimize said daims
becomes unmasked. Just as Athens’s violentization process in conjunction with
his etucidation of phantom communities serve to demystify those misleading
media taglines mentioned by Rhodes (such as ‘no apparent motive” “he just
snapped” and ‘we will probably neyer know why”), we too must distinguisli the
authentically formulaic course of development undergone by imaginatively
antagonistic creators or svmbolic embodiments of violent makeshift phantom
consultants.
To buttress and fortify the neo-existential-criminological formula fiielling
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C the creation of artisticaÏty-dangerous violent offenders, a salient reiteration of
Lentricchia and McAuliffe’s conception of transgressive artistic desire can do us
no harm. As the scholarly duo define in Crimes of Art + Terror:
What the transgressive artist relentlessly desires [...1 is the insistent
recarvin out of ail outlines of personality and ail human variety. The
transgressive artist, then. in active rebellion against the culture’s need to
commodify him, creates something living, something capable of constant
transformatjon”—Pound’s definition of the character of serious literature.
The crime of the authentic artist is nothing other than the crime of
originality. [...] The transgressive artist believes himself to be the one
undegraded opponent of a corpsed world—weaponiess except for the
originality of his writing: the only human countercultural response, whose
failure would necessitate physical force. (2 1-22)
Lentricchia and McAuliffe’ s clearly existenti al ly-inforrned designation loses
much of its original impact upon recailing any one of Sartre’s countless
differentiations between neutral aiid aggressive creators. Consider the following
passage. wherein their wording and intent familiarÏy resound:
Unlike artists, who usuaÏly heighten beauty of form by pleasantness of
sensation and who carve even their monsters in marbie, Genet denies us
ail delight: the diamond he offers has to be sought in a gob of spit; the
more its gleam attract us, the more the saliva repeis us although the jewel
may fascinate us. we cannot forget that our hand is going to touch an
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ignoble substance. (Crimes ofArt + Terror 389)
flus Lenfficchia and McAuliffe’s conception of tnnsgressive arfistic desire
6which wants to make art whose very originality constitutes a step acmss and
beyond die boundaries of die order in place” (Crimes ofArt 2)—and which has
been mistakenly hailed as “a new form of literary cridcism” by die Univenity of
Chicago Press (Lentricchia, “Interview” n. pag.)—has merely been repacbged in
an auempt w resurrect die motives surrounding violent makeshift phantom
consultants. Sartre himself does not receive any points for oflginality as he too
puiposefiilly bonowed from odiers in an effort w correlate die two forms of
violent expression herein under deliberation. For example, in 1827. De Quincey’s
“Murder Considend as One of die Fine Arts” sewed w prelude a concluding
section in Saint Genet inversely entitled “On die Fine Arts Considered as
Murder.” However, perhaps sanctioned imitation remains a deiberate, necessary
and illustrative device when one symbolically attempta w elucidate die fomiulaic
and interpretive process of citation supporting dieories that propel bbgne as art”
“art as crime.”
Do onto odiers as diey have donc onto you, but do k w diem first”
(Adiens “Violentization in Large 18). While this inverted ‘tnotto” exists as a
maidm for ultra-violent criminals (and paranoid schizophrenics) accuswmed w
enfropic nppings, Adiens realizes dia antagonistic expression nmains nothing
short ofa simulation ofpast violent experiences and coaches metamorphosed lino
present-day phantoms of inspiration. In fle Psychology of Criminal Conduct.
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Andrews and Bonta reinforce that a lack of interpersonal controls and the failure
to deveÏop internai controïs for prosocial behaviours ‘frees’ die person to act
according to idiosyncratic and bizarre fantasies” (321). How does the isolated
transgressive artist who attempts to assault his or her audience corne to be? The
answer. as will be demonstrated. is through a creatively makeshifi yet admissibly
correlated four-stage developmental process that parallels Athenian violentization.
As substitution begets substitution. one should flot be shocked at the plausible
evidence revealed prior to replacing literal terms such as ‘violence” or “violent
offenders” with philosophical counterparts such as ‘transgressive artistic
creation” or ‘transgressive artists.”
In his concluding rernarks about Violent Acts And VioÏentization:
Assessing, Applying, And DeveÏoping Lonnie Athens’ Theories,49 Ulmer suggests:
“Interactionists would do well to engage, incorporate. use, and evaluate Athens’
distinctive theory of the self and its pharnom communities” for a myriad of
dissimilar purposes (181). As demonstrated by the ten other dissimilar
contributors to the anthology individually inspired by Athens’s distinctive theory,
this investigation has certainÏy been pre-empted by disparate societal profilers
who have allowed “brutalization.” “defiance.” “violent dominance engagements,”
and “virulency” to be metamorphosed for numerous fields of enquiry. However.
despite anv modifications made to Athenss transformational stages. the critical
constant remains the offending individuals or aggressive artist’s own unique
motives and interpretations. To bolster this investigation’s own purposeftd
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C designation of the substitutive definitions surrounding artistic violentization,
Sartre’s observations on killers and artists from the latter sections of Sain!
Genei—once again. the exemplary profile of a criminal artist who perpetually
becomes—will be called upon to solidify the following makeshift-model’s
existence:
Stage 1. The Metamorphosis: hncigincitive Brutalization
Stage 2. First Conversion: Creative Defiance
Stage 3. Second Conversion: ArtisticatÏy- Violent Dominance Engctgements
Stage 4. Final Metamoiphosis: Ariisuic ViruÏency°
At the outset, it must be re-ernphasized that there remains an extraordinary
difference between the artist who intends to create beauty (and thus inspire) and
the transgressive artist who desires to create evil (and thus repel). The latter
brand, Sartre explains, has no particular desire to produce a well-made work;’
he is unconcerned with finish, with formai perfection: for him, beattty lies
elsewhere. in the ceremonious splendor of sacrilege and murder” (Sciint Geneï
484). Lentricchia and McAuliffe purpo sefully reinforce: “In truc transformation,
we are possessed and catapulted out of the ordinary—taken over by original
vision with no wiggle room for rational escape” (Crimes ofArt 12). Hence, those
creators in the vein of Freud and even Jung—who believed that “an artist is rnan’
in a higher sense--he is collective man’--who carnes and shapes the unconscious,
psychic life of mankind” (“Psychoiogy and Literature” 221), are either holding
back the truth about invention for their own sinister purposes or simply unaware
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of an inherentlv existential and thereby radicalÏy individualistic manifestation of
saïvation. Regardless. this investigation remains solely concemed with those
artists who have been recognized by profilers in the vein of Jean Cocteau, who. in
the spirit of symboÏic interactionism. deemed artistic inspiration to be ‘a profound
indolence of our incapacit to put to work certain forces in ourselves” (“The
Process of Inspiration” 82).51
The transgressive artist-in-the-making undergoes imaginative brutalization
upon encountering, as an audience member. their first significantly-antagonistic
piece of virulent art. As in the Athenian stage of brutalization, the composite
experience of [aestheticaIly] violent subjugation.” personal [aesthetic]
horrification” and “{aesthetically] violent coaching” must be experienced
regardÏess of anv timeline for the first stage to be considered complete.
Aesthetically violent subjugation is undergone by the transgressive artist-in-the
making upon submitting creative senses and standards to the hostile intentions of
the virulent creator responsible for the piece of subversive art under consideration.
By the time the transgressive artist-in-the-making has finished interpreting or
experiencing the lessons or themes imparted by their artistically-violent makeshifi
consultant. they are lefl in a heightened state of both created and creative
excitement. The recuning fantasies consisting of imitative battering. maiming.
torturing, or murdering” (Athens, Crecttion ofDangerous 33) through simulated
acts of creation consumes this artist-to-be: however, within this primary stage
they are lefi without the confidence or tactical know-how to perpetrate the
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simuÏated violence they have been imaginatively seduced by.
Personal aesthetic horrification is undergone by the transgressive artist-in
the making when they witness another individual or artist-in-the-making enduring
and interpreting aesthetically violent subjugation through a convincingÏy
antagonistic piece of art imparted by an equally-convincing antagonistic artist. As
the transgressive artist-in-the-making will eventually require an audience to
creativelv assault. it is imperative to witness the sensory effects of aestheticaÏly
violent subjugation on an audience member so as to reaffirm the transformational
affects of virulent artists who deÏight in the corruption of imagination. Reassured
that aesthetically violent subjugation can have the same affect on others. the
transgressive artist-in-the-making proceeds to engage recurring fantasies
consisting of imitative battering, maiming. torturing, or murdering upon
confirmation that virulent ai-t. when interpreted as significant and legitimate.
achieves the horrific means intended by virulent artists. Bear in mmd the
symbolic interactionist’s conelation—in conjunction with tactically substitutive
rewording—from what would be The Creation ofArtisticaÏly-Dangeroits Violent
CrirninaÏs:’2
According to conventional wisdom. there is aiways an enormous
difference between undergoing [a virulently artisticJ experience oneseif
and experiencing someone else undergoing it. However, the conclusion
should flot be drawn that undergoing [aestheticaÏly] violent subjugation
has a greater impact upon [a transgressive artist-in-the-making] than
0 122
undergoing personal [aesthetic] horrification. The [inspirational] part of
botli of these odious experiences is the twisted feelings and thoughts
which can linger on in a disordered state long afier the immediate
experiences which generated them cease. Thus. although the experience 0f
personal {aesthetic] horrification may be less [inspirational] than
[aesthetically] violent subjugation from a [creative] standpoint. it is not
less [inspirational] from a psychoÏogicaÏ standpoint. (44)
In addition to aesthetically violent subjugation and personal aesthetic
horrification, aesthetically violent coaching must be practiced upon the
transgressive artist-in-the-making as this enduring experience constitutes the final
obligatory component of imaginative brutalization.
Sociologists Ginger Rhodes. George J. Allen. Joseph Nowinski and
Antonius H. N. Cillessen have recently employed ‘the Violent Socialization Scale
(VSS)” in an attempt to measure the progressive elements of Athens’s
violentization model.53 In regards to the first stage of imaginative brutalization.
the researchers would conclude:
{Traisgressive arti sts-in-the-making] forced to endure [Aesthetically]
Violent Subjugation and Personal [Aesthetic] Horrification do flot
necessarily turn to [aesthetically] violent (artists]. The addition of
[Aesthetically] Violent Coaching, however. appears to set the stage for the
potential development of later [virulently artistic acts of aggressiveness.
(142)
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Unlike the limited number of violent coaches an individuaÏ inadvertently learns
from in physical violentization, in artistic violentization, violent coaches are flot
only represented by the human teachers who practice and/or preach violent andi’or
aesthetically violent manifestations—through “teclmiques’ that include
‘vainglorification.” ‘ridicule,” “coercion,” “haranguing,” afld besiegement’—
but also by the limitless number of artisticalÏv antagonistic interlocutors that an
isolated artist-in-the-making incessantly seeks out whenever he or she becomes
intrigued or overwhelrned with the desire to create. to inspire or to simply be cvii.
Thus. artistically antagonistic outiets manage to impart malefic intent
through techniques that dissimilar virulent artists thernselves impart through
transgressive artistic desire. We have already alluded to some of the medieval
aestheticailv-violent coaches. However, considering specific examples of virulent
artists and their artistically virulent manifestations have been suggested by
Lentricchia and McAuliffe. let us surmise a chronologically-illustrative sampling
of the aestheticallv sinister tutelage interpreted as contemporary makeshifi
phantoms: Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground (1864) and Crime and
Funislnnent (1866); Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1902); Thomas Mann’s
Death in Venice (1912); W.B. Yeats’ Faster, 1916” (1916): Jean Genets Our
Laav of TÏze ftowers (1944) and The Thief’s Journal (1949); J.D. Salingef s The
Catcher in the Rye (1951); Jean Genet’s Deathwatch (1954). The Balcony (1956).
The Blacks (1958) and 777e Screens (1961); Anthony Burgess’s A ClocJnt’ork
Orange (1962): Stanley Kubrick’s A CÏocicwork Orange (1972); John
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Cassavetes’s The Killing of a Chinese Bookie (1976); Mai-tin Scorcese’s Taxi
Driver (1977); Jack Henry Abbot’s In tue BeÏÏy of the Beast (1981); Thomas
Bemhard’s Wittgenstein ‘s Nephew (1982); Gordon Lish’s Dear Mi. Capote
(1983); Mai-tin Scorcese’s The King of Comedy (1983); Thomas Bemhard’s
HeÏdenpÏatz (1988); Don DeLilÏo’s Mao li (1991); Brett Easton Ellis’s American
Psycho (199f) (Lentricchia and McAuliffe, &imes ofArt 1-168).
While listings of virulent artists and artworks remain potentially endïess.
clearly. as demonstrated through titie revisions, inscriptions, remakes and
adaptations, transgressive artistic desire remains something learned, experienced,
and created as opposed to a supernatural gifi handed down or up. In the end,
“[aesthetically violent] coaching does flot necessarily teach the [transgressive
artist-in-the-making] how to [create]. Instead, the [aesthetic] coach teaches that,
when [inspired], taking [artisticaÏly violent] action is a personal obligation”
(Rhodes, Allen, Nowinski, and Cillessen 127).
Upon entering the second stage of artistic violentization, creative defiance,
the artist-in-the-making lias been lefi to contemplate the next logical stage in their
creative development by inwardly pondering rhetorical questions in the vein of:
“Do killers, artists, and terrorists need one another?” (Lentricchia and McAuliffe.
Crimes of Art 2). As in Athenian defiance, the artist-in-the-making consciously
proceeds to examine the undeniable difference that exists between the idyllic
manner in which individuals should treat one another and the authenticalÏy violent
manner in which they do treat one another. The intensity that accompanies the
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transgressive artist-in-the-making’s inward contemplation cannot be underscored
since artistic ‘experiences as odious and [inspirationaÏ] as those undergone during
[imaginative] brutalization leave a dark and indelible imprint upon the mmd”
(Athens. Creation of Dangerous 57-5$). Consequently, the artist-in-the-making,
desiring nothing other than to replicate and control the artistic antagonism they
have been seduced and assauÏted by in the past. begins to undergo a mental
transformation that terminates the passive audience member previously assaulted
by artistic violence while giving birth to the aspiring virulent creator who
perpetrates through artistic antagonism.
The transgressive artist-in-the-making thus makes a commitment to
attempt bis or her own unique brand of violent creation when or if provided with
the feasible opportunity, supplies or means to do so. “It is as /the [artist-in-the
making] had been partially deaf and has only now heard what his coach had been
telling them: resorting to [artistic] violence is sometimes necessary in this world”
(Athens. Creation ofDangerozts 60). In short, during the creative defiance stage
of artistic violentization, the transgressive artist-in-the-making vows that since
they are flot inclined. equipped or prepared to harm people through corporeal
gestures, thev will embrace the next best thing and thereby aesthetically invent the
aggression prompted from the blending of the inspirationally wrenching
experiences of aestheticallv violent subi ugation, personal aesthetic horrification.
and aestheticalÏy violent coaching.
As it remains an impossibility for the transgressive artist-in-the-making to
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become a virulent artist until a legitimate attempt to actualize the creative
violence thus far only fantasized about transpires. artisticaÏly-violent dominance
engagements constitute the third stage of the artistic violentization process.
Perhaps the quintessential example of an evil artist-in-the-making entering into an
artisticalÏy-violent dominance engagement remains the previously mentioned
incident wherein Genet. upon hearing the poem of a fellow prisoner and insisting
that it could be outdone, composes and recites “The Condemned Man” amidst
jeers. Though Genet does not conventionally prevail in that particular incident,
Athens would have surmised that the sheer profundity of his realization, together
with the renewed need for taking decisive [artistic] violent action against a
protagonist. only hardens the subject’ s resolve” (Creation ofDangerous 69-70).
0f course. the quintessential example of an aestheticaÏly aggressive field that
actually supplies an outiet for artistically-violent dominance engagements remains
an offshoot of advertently combative poetry, modem-day battÏe-rapping. As
Director Curtis Hanson describes during the making ofhis film 8 Mile:
free-style rap batties, opponents using words as fists. The words are
improvised as quickly as they are spit. They rhyme, they are to a beat. and
they are aimed directly at the specific weaknesses of the opponent. And
when you sec these batties. you sec their dexterity with words, and their
use of words as weapons. you sec the way in which they hurï invective at
each other literally as fists. as though h were a boxing match. (“Battle
Rhyme for Real lime” n. pag.)
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for those who doubt the impact of a defeat in a mere ‘artistically-vioÏent”
dominance engagement. heed the following words by the virulent artist Marshall
Mathers.6 whose own life-story fuels the artistry behind Hanson’s motion
picture:
If I lost a battie. it would feel like rny entire world would be crumbling.
And a lot ofpeople would say: “What’s the big deal? Get over it. You lost.
Try again. Whatever.” “No. you don’t understand. I just lost a battie. My
whole life is over.” That’s how you feel. (“Battie Rhyme for Real Time”
n. pag.)
Therefore. be it an early rendition of Jean Genet attempting to creatively assault
bis fellow prisoners through belligerent lvrics or ‘The Real Siim Shady”
(Mathers) attempting to creatively assault his fellow opponents through preciseÏy
the same means. once again, what rernains just “as important as the operating
circumstances surrounding an [artistically-]vio lent dominance engagement is its
immediate outcorne” (Athens, “Violentization in Larger” 13).
Physically violent offenders rely upon other people’s judgements in
conjunction with their bloodied opponent’s inability to figlit on or back as
indicative signs of whether or not dominance engagements have been successfully
perpetrated. Artistically violent offenders, on the other hand, must rely on the
affirmative judgements of dissimilar audience members in conjunction with
legitimate critics who provide dissimilar forums in which to express virulent art.
Hence, artistically-violent dominance engagements are ofien decided for the
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aspiring evil creator by publishing houses. record labels, film studios, art
galleries, et al. for the virulent artist to legitimize the impact lie or she lias desired
to impan upon the masses since entering into the second stage of artistic
violentization. their work must be interpreted as possessing the killer or
marketable combination of salacious skill and orninous appeal for the fourth and
final stage to be entered.
Contrarily, if the artist-in-the-making is unable to complete ail requisite
stages of artistic violentization. even imaginary violence inevitabiy fades away as
a viable option and the transgressive artist-in-the-making will be demoted back to
their mundane and original status of isolated individual. In other words.
alternative fields wili have to be located in which to express created and creative
cvii. As in traditional Athenian vioÏentization, mereÏy possessing the desire to
create violence does not suffice without a viable audience willing to undergo and
vouch for a virulent artisf s inventiveness. Aspiring malefic creators who are
horribÏy or incessantiy defeated in violentlv-artisric dominance engagements will
thereby be left in a state of limbo as their cvii wiil neyer be bom. Thus the final
stage of artistic violentization, artistic virulency. propels the successful virulent
artist atone into the role of nefarious or maievolent creator. Moreover, upon
acceptance of both new-found and new-formed notorietv.”’ the inward
contemplation is now foreseeable: “Overly impressed with a sudden risc from a
lowÏy [artist-in-the-making] to a lofty [virulent artist], he [or she] becomes
anoganf (Athens. “Violentization in Largef’ 17).
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0f course, it is not so much the arrogance than it is the confidence of this
newly-hailed virulent artist that uÏtimately drives them to create and embody what
we now unequivocally know to be violent makeshifi phantom consultants.
Therefore. for ail intents and purposes, artistic violentization remains nothing
other than an application of an existential brand of symbolic interactionism to the
making ofdangerous artistry. If not for the four significant acts ofmetamorphosis
as profiled in Saint Genet. both the rationale and the feasibility serving to inspire
a specffic formulaic model of antagonistic creation would have neyer existed.
Indeed, this thesis would have neyer had the scholastic prompt or gail to promote
artistic violentization as a viable developmental process unless both Athens and
Sartre’s own correlative models supported the evidence. Hence. the artistic
violentization process serves to demonstrate how transgressive artists are created.
Transgressive artistic desire serves to demonstrate why.
f inally. as Athens himself might have recapitulated by the close of The
Creation ofArtistically-Dangerous Violent Offenders:
In short. the theory developed here explains the creation of [artistically-]
dangerous violent crirninals as taking place through [an artistic]
vioÏentization process comprised of four stages, each one of which is
based upon distinct [aesthetic] experiences. Thus, this [artistic]
violentization process is from top to bottom a [creatively] experiential one.
As wiÏl be recalled. the notion of [aesthetic] experience as used here
integrates, rather than segregates, the human [mmd] with its [creative]
1—,
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U environrnent, so that factors playing upon [virulent artists] from inside
their bodies and from outside in their [creative] environrnents are not
falsely separated into two different reaims. (89)
The differences between artists who create imaginary crimes and criminals who
perpetrate real-life crimes are non-existent. Both are equally culpable as their
motivations have been respectively irnparted by correlative phantom communities
and makeshifi phantom consultants. Although the following chapter will examine
the specific breed of crirninal artist who undergoes both physical violentization
and artistic violentization, the veracity of the latter should be confirmed through a
conclusive sumrnation of Sartre’s creative criminology. For instance, in Saint
Genet’s component “On The Fine Arts Considered As Murder,” the existentialist
poses a rhetorical question that countless hostile creators throughout the ages have
tactically dared to answer (prior to transfonning this question into the basis for
justifications and inspiration alike): “Since murderers achieve glory by forcing
good citizens to dream about crime, why should [the virulent artist] not enjoy
sirnilar glory by forcing them to dream about it without becoming a crirninal?”
(Saure, Saint Genet 485).
Sartre readily confirms: “Haunted by the problem of the Other, which is
his problem, [the virulent artist] lias spent lis life mediating on the phenomenon
of embodiment. He lad to make himself become the Other that he already was”
(Saint Genet 489). Genet himself alludes to these phantoms of inspiration in lis
infamous confession: “I recognize in thieves, traitors and murderers. in tIc
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mthless and the cunning, a deep beauty—a sunken beauty” (The Thief’s Journal
64). Those creators who choose to ignore the significance of symbolic
interactionisrn, and even those who have mistakenly substituted an almighty
power for a phantom community member (such as Nietzsche in his Composition
of Thus Spake Zctrathustra)7 wiÏÏ neyer be equipped or informed enough to
unmask his or ber original crisis. Sartre explains that this crisis is in fact nothing
other than the fatal instant—the initial moment of violent creation for
Athenians—as incessant repetition perpetually haunts the virulent artist as an
inescapable consequence to be accepted as bi-product. Therefore. in regards to
Genet:
Ail the basic themes of bis thought and life are to be found in each of bis
works: one recognizes the same motifs from book to book: would anyone
dream of reproaching him for this? If so, one would have to condemn
Dostoievsky for having written the same novel over and over and Kafka
for having written the same story a hundred tirnes. (Sartre, Saint Genet
484)
Sartre had in fact challenged the criminologists of bis day to read between the
artistically sinister lines. Eerily enough. more than a half-century would pass
before Lentricchia and McAuliffe seized upon the precise relationship that exists
between our watchdogs and those allegedly reduced to impotence when the
scholastic duo agreed to open C’rimes of Art ± Terror with a sensationally
deplorable correlation between the physical and artistic violence that embodied
132
the manifestation of evil that transpired on September 11, 2OO1.
Contemplate the following: ‘He will make the innocent discover the Other
in himself; he will make him recognize the Other’s most improper thoughts as his
own; in short. he will make them experience with loathing his own wickedness”
(Sartre. Saint Genet 495). Is this Sartre speaking ofthe virulent artist as fuelled by
transgressive artistic desire? Or is it Lentricchia and McAuliffe speaking of
Osama 3m Laden as fuelled by the desire to exact revenge upon the West? The
quote remains equally applicable and particularly so for postmodernist audience
members accustomed to having the broader distinctions blurred by disparate
makeshifi phantom consultants and mottai community members alike. However,
despite the fact that maÏefic intent remains hard at work behind both species of
criminal mastermind. the former interpretation is to 5e credited Serein for “to read
Genet is to let poetic beauty feed upon prose. And it is also, for the reader, a new
way ofbeing a criminal” (Sartre, Saint Genet 517).
Fortunately, it does flot require an analyst. an artist, or even a
criminologist to confirm precisely how. proceeding a developmentai process
entailing “imaginative brutalization,” ‘creative defiance.” artistica11y-vioient
dominance engagements” and ‘artistic virulencv.” evii thinkers transform into
aestheticaily nefarious perpetrators. “Thus.” Sartre explicates, ‘the criminal is an
archetype of the Ethics of Evil. And [...] the greater murderers whose photos
Genet pins on the waÏÏs of bis prison ceil play for him the role of intercessors”
(Saint Genet 87). As the final chapter of this thesis wilI confirm, the impact of
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criminaÏ artists who have experienced the full spectrum of created and creative
violence remain the best equipped and most perfectly positioned of makeshifi
profilers to support the evidence presented herein. Consequently, there only
remains one pivotai question lefi to be posed: How does a virulent artist wishing
to both exact and examine manifestations of evil transform into an authentically
hardened criminologist?
oChapter Foar:
Hardened Criminals I llardened Criminologists
o
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“l’m struggiing like a magician who tries to prevent a charm, who wants to destroy a rival’s
speil. l’m struggiing like a chosen victim who bas been sighted and is aiready caught. l’m struggiing
without moving, with ail my attention taut and vibrant. l’m waiting. l’if explode later on. [‘m
hardening. l’m struggiing.”
Jean Genet, t’tiracte ofthe Rose (289)
“The model we emulate is a fanatically deflant and alienated individual who cannot imagine
what forgiveness is. or mercy or toierance, because he has no experience ofsuch values. Ris emotions
do not know what such values are, but he imagines them as so many ‘weaknesses’ precisely because the
unprincipied offender appears to escape punishment through such weakness’ on the part ofsociety.”
Jack Henry Abbott, In the Bellv oJthe Beast (13)
By the end of “Violentization in Larger Social Context.” Athens revamps
and extends his original model in order to illustrate the entrenchment of violent
acts and actors in communities at large. Admittedly informed by the joumalist
tumed-sociologist Robert Park,9 Athens delineates the fundamental patterns of
three prevailing or definitive societal communities: ‘civil minor,” “turbulent
minor.” and “malignant minor.” Beyond appraisals of their residential dominance
engagements and respective degrees 0f socialization, Athens echoes yet another
french phulosopher—this tirne the author of Discipline and Ptnish, Michel
foucauh60—in verifing that man-made institutions in particular serve to suppÏy
the groundwork “from which ail communities are constructed, demolished and
reconstructed” (Athens. “Violentization in Larger” 20). In the end, it remains the
overwhelming incongruitv that exists between how community members allege
their institutions function and how they operate in actuality that serves to
legitirnize both a philosophical charge and a criminological point of entry.
Athens insists that lis revised mode! remains specifically motivated by
Park’s environmentally informed conception of what broader societal
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communities must consist of: ‘Every community has a location. and the
individuals who compose it have a place of residence within the territory which
the community occupies” (Park. Hurnan Communities 181). Park had actuallv
anticipated the core of Atiiens’ future designation of the phantom community
when. upon living in Chicago in 1914, the transitioning societal profiler urged his
readers to recognize that a community is not ‘merely a physical mechanism and
an artificial construction. It is invoÏved in the vital processes of the people who
compose it, it is a product of nature and particuÏarly of human nature” (Park, The
City I). Prompted by such irrefutable truths, Athens extends that assertion by
reinforcing that people’s vital processes are aÏways accompanied by conflicts that
arise and transform into dominance engagements.
Whereas civil minor communities institute non-violent dominance
engagements to resolve potentiai confrontational situations, turbulent minor
communities institute either violent or non-violent dominance engagements to
resolve or perpetuate confrontations (Vioientization in Larger” 23, 29).
Conversely. malignant minor communities exist as the most dangerous of ail
societal constructs as they institute the violent dominance engagement to
perpetuate ail confrontations (‘Vioientization in Larger” 26). MiddÏe-class realists
would therefore do well to consider civil minor communities to be utopian and
turbulent minor communities to be those in which they themselves reside.
However, whiÏe Athens beÏieves that malignant minor communities are embodied
by societys impoverished ghettoes and crime-infested vicinities, lie has neglected
L)
to reveal the authentic malignant cornmunity wherein state-sanctioned virulence is
created as necessity and patrimonial legacy alike.
Not surprisingly. the authentic malignant community is the authentically
microcosmic institution that Jack Henry Abbot infarnousiy referred to as the belly
of the beast—the modern-day prison. However, in order to understand why even
Athens himself would have hesitated to draw a truly authoritative correlation
between the authentic malignant community and the contemporary penal
community, one has to consider an act of metamorphosis that would take place
outside the wails of officiai criminological enquiry.
In his groundbreaking work from 197$ entitled The Victim cis CriminaÏ
and Artist, H. Bruce Franklin recognized the importance of incarcerated makeshifi
profilers who have undergone both physical and artistic violentization prior to
becoming unequivocal experts in the field ofpenal analysis:6’
Many important figures in European and American literature have been
incarcerated as criminals: Socrates. Boethius, Villon, Thomas More,
Cervantes. Campanella, Walter Raleigh, Donne, Richard Lovelace,
Bunyan, Defoe, Voltaire, Diderot, Thoreau, Meivilie. Leigh Hunt, Oscar
Wilde, Jack London. Agnes Smedley, Maxim Gorky, Genet, O. Henry.
Robert Loweli, Bertrand Russeli, Brendan Behan, Chernyeshevsky and
Dostoevsky, Stalin and Solzhenitsyn, Christ and the Marquis de Sade.
There is certainiy nothing unusual about activists and writers being
imprisoned as criminals, and, as we have seen, quite a few imprisoned
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criminaïs have become authors. (233)
In 1998. Franldin tactically updated past assertions in Frison Writing in 20th1
Centuiy Arnerica.62 subsequentlv revealing the specifically cohesive subsection of
convict literature that, according to this investigation, purposefully transforms
into corroborating evidence by the exclusive practitioners of an authentically
hardened brand of malevolent analysis:
True. there have been many eminent individuals prison writers from other
countries, such as Boethius. Cervantes, Campanella, Thomas Moore,
Walter Raleigh. John Donne. Richard Lovelace, John Bunyan, Daniel
Defoe. Leigh Hunt, Oscar Wilde, Maxim Gorky, Chernyeshevsky,
Dostoyevsky. Solzhenitsyn, Francois Villon, Voltaire, Diderot. the
Marquis de Sade. and Jean Genet. But unlike the works of these
individuals, modem American prison writings constitute a coherent body
of literature with a unique historical significance and cuiturai influence.
(1)
Indeed. unlike sociology, psychology. criminology. or even traditional penology,
no field other than hardened criminology—exclusively comprised of the
interconnected American prison-writers who have lived with and/or as violent
offenders both inside and outside of malignant (penal) communities—can offer
Ïucid, accessible, creative and above ail, intrinsically corroborative verifications
based on relevant first-hand experiences with microcosmic violence and the
coaches who perpetuate such.
Upon its initial release in 1964, The Autobiography of i1vlalcolm X was
haiÏed as the pioneering effort of hardened criminology and, in conjunction with
the ill-received political anxiety awakened by both the Viet Nam War and
escalating prison populations (Franklin. Prison Writing 11-12). had tactically
transformed into a makeshifi phantom consultant for caged American artists ready
to embrace their interpretive roles as societal profilers. Indeed there exists a
profound reason whv the list of twentv-three inspirational makeshift phantom
consultants from over the last two centuries presented in chapter three includes
fine artistically offensive manifestations by international prison writers. However.
due to the fact that Abbott’s In the Betly of the Beast was the only piece of
hardened crirninology acknowledged or suggested by Lentricchia and McAuÏiffe,
let us herein identify through yet another chronologically-illustrative sampling the
most compelling and cohesive of hardened makeshifi-phantom-consultants:
Malcoim X’s Azttobiography (1964), Malcolm’s Braly’s On the Yard (1967),
Fidridge Cleaver’s Sou! on 1cc (1967), Etheridge Knight’s Poems from Prison
(1968). Robert Beck’s Piinp: The Sto.’y of My Life (1969). Paul Mariah’s
‘Quarry/Rock: A Reality Poem in the Tradition of Genet” (1969), George
Jackson’s Soledad Brother (1970), Edward Bunker’s No Beast so fierce (1973),
Miguel Pinero’s Short Eves (1974), Angela Y. Davis’s With My Mindon freedom
(1974). Pin Thornas’s Seven Long Times (1974), Malcolm Braly’s false Starts: A
Memoir o/San Quentin and Other Prisons (1976), Edward Bunker’s The Animal
factory (1977), Jack Henry Abbott’ s In the Bel!y of the Beast (1981), Nathan
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C Heard’s House of Siammers (1983), Assata Shakur’s Assata (1987),
Washington’ s Iron Ho tise: Siories from the Yard (1 992), Sanyika Shakur’ s
Monster: The Aulobiographv of an LA. Gang Member (1993), Dannie Martin’s
Coininitting Journatism (1993). Mumia Abu—Jamal’s Live from Death Rmi
(1995), Patricia McConnei’s Sing Soft, Sing Loud (1995). Leonard Peltier’s My
Life is A’’ Sunclance (1999). Jimmy Santiago Baca’s A Place lu Stand (2001), and
Jimmy A. Lerner’ s Yan Got Nothing Coming (2002)63
As authenticated by the above listing of prolific contributors, constituents
of hardened criminology are unique in that they serve to represent communities
comprised of incarcerated or previously incarcerated males and females. political
and non-political prisoners. as well as African Americans. Muslim Americans.
White Americans. Hispanic Americans, Jewish Americans, and Native
Americans. That such a convergence of criminal artists manages to crystallize as
the birth of corroborative makeshift pro fiers, despite the perpetual racial tensions
that permeate ail minor communities and il-respective of any individualized
hidden agendas. insinuates that society s malevolent preserves of restricted power
do not waste their time discriminating. Instead they target each one of us equally.
Therefore. whereas both Sartre and Athens have wiseïy reÏied on the
confessionals of prisoners in order to arrive at significantly parallel truths, the
former bas purposefully delineated the renowned life and works of an
introspective criminal artist via Jean Genet whereas the latter has rnistakenly
extracted interpretive data from arguably premature prison narratives via
o
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interviews with incarcerated case studies solely equipped to reiterate and, at best.
question manifestations of authentic violent behaviour.64 Once again, hardened
criminologists are ilot only equipped to reiterate and question, like case studies.
but to recreate and unmask. as artistically virulent profilers. society’s authentic
violent coaches.
In civil and turbulent minor communities, the ruling group achieves power
through veiled acts of legislative coercion. In malignant communities, the ruling
group achieves power through an amalgamation of physical and psychological
coercion. However. since the strategic objectives and desired outcomes fuelling
both of these dominance engagements emulate one another, does makeshifi
repetition not beget makeshffi repetition? ‘Dominance.” Athens reminds us, ‘is
the universal principle on which ail social experiences. institutions, and in tum
.
communities are uhimateiy based” (“Violentization in Large?’ 21). for those
exclusive individuals who transgressively desire to maintain their elevated ranks
in and on the existent hegemonic power structure, nothing works to their
advantage more than making the seemingly free citizens of a nation think that
they can bvpass violentization—particularly since we have been created to
stridently impart or silently condone systemic coaching upon conception.
In 1971. Robert Beck. the notorious American pimp-tumed-profiler. had
managed with precision to cail out society’s authentic violent coaches in
his
collection of essays entitled The Naked SouÏ of Iceberg SÏim.6 Removing the
duplicitous patriarchal veneer of the subjugators and culprits in question, the
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hardened criminologist cogently asserts:
The irony is that the cynicai clique of ruthless men who masquerade as
champions of justice and humanity are reaÏÏy the architects of repression
and murder at home and abroad. Cops and prison guards are the ruthÏess
slaves and shields and the victims thernselves of these viciousÏy cold
biooded men who perhaps become emotionai only when their power is
threatened. (136)
Thus conternporary American prison writers have tactically followed the
phantoms of corruption and hypocrisy until hitting a seemingly impenetrabie wall.
However, through overlapping accounts, manifestations, and transformational
utilizations of the power hierarchy, these prolific criminality experts cornmunally
indict the very forces that Athens merely gestures towards.
This gesture becomes amplified in “Gender and The Politics of
Punishment” wherein the editors of Prison MascuÏinities. Don Sabo, Teny A.
Kupers. and Wiiiie London. present a tanible model of the contemporary
American inter-prisoner power hierarchy—in and of itseÏf an authoritatively
magnified version of the hegemonic superstructure at work in ail inhabited
communities (Gramsci 190-22 1):
DOMINANT PRISONERS[:j Tough Guys with the Capacity and
Willingness to Use Violence to Get What They Want[.] PRISONERS
WITH RESOURCES[:] Stand-up Guys, Gangs. and Inmates Who Can
Move within the Prison, Operate in the Prison Economy Because of Their
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Access to Drugs and Contraband. and Carry Out Contracts, Assaults. and
Extortion Schemes[.] WEAKER. ST1GMATIZED PRJSONERS[:]
Snitches. Homosexuals, Sex Offenders, Child Abusers. Bitches, and Punks
(Sabo. Kupers. London 9)
Based on the etemal utility of this structure. it becomes easy to fathom how
Europe’s Jean Genet had littie choice but to allow his own sexual predilection,
smaller physical stature, and sheer inability to perpetrate successful phsical
violence to collectively contribute to bis incontestable position at the bottom. As
Sartre readilv affirms: ‘It is sufficient for this community to reject him and for
Genet to want to be adopted by it ail costs. In the past, the child tries to love bis
judges. This therne is imrnediateÏy inverted to become that of resentment’ (Saint
Genet 429). Thus the premier existential profiler confirms the grander
significance of a devastating societal allocation, as well as its enduring influence
on a violent offendef s and a virulent artists developmentai process.
Genets “dominant prisoner” from bis 1949 play Deathwatch had
symbolically embodied the institutionalized product of a malignant conversion—
‘You might even cail him a Green Eyes with a coat of shoe-polish. Green Eyes
with a srnoke-screen, Green Eyes covered with mud, Green Eyes in the dark”
(1O61O7).66 Despite international corroboration, though very rnuch so in the vein
of Genet’s evidentiary findings, two of Americas most notorious hardened
criminologists, San-Quentin-Prison-Writers Malcoim Braly and Edward Bunker,67
were branded government property long before the age of consent. Abandoned by
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his parents as a teenager. Braly spent his adolescent years injuvenile facilities and
by the age of forty had spent seventeen years behind bars (Lethem xii). Deserted
by his mother when he was four, Bunker stili holds the distinction of being San
Quentin’s youngest convict upon entering at age seventeen (Styron x). Beyond
accepting the penal complex’s intestinal composition as a genuine reflection of
their ovin Ieamed natures, both men have endeavoured to convey that experienced
convict chameleons or “dominant prisoners” eam positions of power within the
confines of the authentic malignant community by systemic mirnicry—through
achieving favourable standing with immediate officiais and through manipulating,
controlling, and/or dominating fellow prisoners.
Athens stipulates that “it is the ultra-violent and violent persons who rise
to the top and marginally violent persons who sinks to the bottom of a malignant
minor community’s dominance order” (“Violentization in Larger” 27). Afier
probing the timeless inter-prisoner power hierarchy and its purposeful utilization
in Bralys calculating novel On die Yard as well as Bunker’s equally tactical work
The Animal factoiy, an undisputed legacy of violence reveals itself to be nothing
more than an incorporation of self and societal deceptions. Braly describes his
“ultra-violent criminal” ChiÏiy Willy as a young veteran of the prison system at
twenty-six and a seemingly permanent criminal intent on replicating the violent
routines his state-sanctioned coaches have perfected. As both virulent artist and
virulent perpetrator, Braly knows his anti-hero only too well. In The Victim as
Criminal and Artist, Franklin presents the similarities between character and
145
creator by interjecting overlapping details from their criminal careers:
Chilly, like Braly, had been involved with crime from his youth. beginning
with the burgiary of a store. A few months after his release from reform
school. he •‘staged a string of armed robberies with two other boys,”
covering three states and ending in a running gun battie, flot totally unlike
BraÏy’s own youthfui spree. Like Braiy and his two companions. ChiÏly
and the other two boys “were sent to prison in the state of their anest, and
upon completion of that sentence they were extradited home in chains to
be tried for the roblieries they had committed before they 1eff (193).
Chully is paroled at age twenty-four. a two-time Ioser with almost seven
straight years of reform school. countv jail and prison behind him.” [...]
When he is sent back to prison. he is cÏassified as a habituai criminai.
(199)
As per the unofficial rules that govern any hardened criminologist’s purposeful
correlation of the authentic maÏignant community and the inter-prisoner power
hierarchy, those who are reliant upon Chilly WiÏly for his goods and services, as
well as those who cannot protect themselves from his control, can be classified as
weaker, stigmatized prisoners.” Accordingly. those who take orders from ChiÏiy
and follow out the arrav of tasks associated with his prison-yard enterprises can
be classified as “prisoners with resources.” Chilly himself exists as an
unequivocally dominant prisoner.” a seif-sufficient gangster and prison-house
magnate who deffly “controls a small empire of cigarettes, pharmaceutical
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narcotics. and petty bureaucratic favors, orchestrated 5.i a routine of minimal
violence and. as his name suggests, maximum cool” (Lethem viii).
Ironically. Chilly is in charge of the very illegalities that govemment
officiais and corporations have been accused of controlling, albeit from plush
executive offices opposed to enclosed gravel yards. Nevertheless, the dominant
prisoner’s overali profits pale in comparison to the funding authentic malignant
institutions procure on an annual basis.68 Upon her own release from the prison
vortex. Angela Y. Davis would call out the lucrative double standard by stating
that today’s prisons are “becoming an integral part of the U.S. economy, which
means that there are stakes other than anti-crime stakes that keep the prison
industry expanding” (Frison Industriat CompÏex 13). Consistent with FoucauÏt’s
hypothesis that the human body can be transformed into both an ‘object” and a
target” of power, one must aiways be wearv of “the body that is manipuÏated,
shaped. trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces”
(DisctÏine and Funish 136). Dead-set on flot becoming one of the commodities,
ChiIIy decides that rather than turn his body into a “property” he wiÏÏ transform it
into a strategy” invoïving ‘manoeuvres. tactics. techniques. [and] functionings”
(foucauÏt, DisciÏine and Funish 26). In short, true chameleons will learn to
emulate the controlling techniques implemented by their captors in order to
control the makeshifi captives oftheir own design.
By creating a dominant prisoner in his own image, Braly grants other
makeshift profilers a rare gaze into authentic keepers and reapers and hence the
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techniques imparted by authentically-malignant violent coaches and their victims.
For example, Chilly remains an individual who, like any dominant government
power. protects himself and his criminal clique—yet he also remains an individual
who, like any dominant govemment power. will inevitably terrorize the weaker
individuals outside of lis protection. f ittingly, in On the Yctrd. Bralys symbolic
characterization ofthe authentic violent coach who supersedes the highest level of
the power hierarchv is San Quentins Head-Guard. who remains more than happy
to be a suent partner receiving a large percentage of Chilly’s illegitimate profits.
11e Lieutenant is aÏso eager to remind Chilly that. despite any possible delusions.
those who have created the power hierarchy aiways work to ensure that dominant
prisoners neyer become remotely stable. Therefore, when the corrupt official
asserts lis dominance 1w instructing Chillv to slow down ‘production,” lis
calculated response reveals what Braly as prolific hardened criminologist lias
learned about the futility of possessing provisional control under the reign of
permanent rulers:
We1l. then.” Chilly said, automatically assuming lis educational voice,
strictly to facilitate the continuation of your meteoric rise through the
department. and because were sud tight buddies. you cant expect a man
to straighten up bis hand if you don’t give him any room to hope in. Now,
that’s me. You show me where I can make an A on that great report card
in the sky. and Fil listen. I won’t like it because it’s not my game, but I’ll
listen. and if you can make sense maybe I’ll play. But you can’t do that. I
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don’t see any light and there aren’t any windows you can open for me. But
I’m flot crying, so why shouÏd you care how I amuse myself?” (96)
0f course. Olsen’s sardonic answer cuts to the heart of the matter: l’rn told it
hurts our image” (96). Maintaining the institution’s image flot only supplants
justice but perpetuates those illusions and façades that lead us to believe that
malevolence is only perpetuated by those wlio exact detectable violent force.
The magnitude of a hierarchical microcosm within a microcosm becomes
subtly exposed when one of Chilly’s “prisoners with resources” agonizes over lis
flucmating hierarchal status afier sitting down to break bread with the gang’s
ranking members:
They squatted down on their heels like Yaquis, the open package of rolis
in the center. There were eight rolis. two apiece and two lefi over. The
arithmetic was of vital interest to Red. He wasn’t able to enjoy the roli le
was eating because he was afraid lie was going to have to settie for two
roils whule the others ate three apiece. It wasn’t just his hunger, and he was
hungry. but each time he sloughed off with the short end ofthe goodies lis
place in the group was clearly defined for the moment — a mascot, or a
pet. Under this pressure he remembered an entertainrnent he lad planned,
and he took a coverless magazine from lis pocket. {...] Opening it to a
photograph lie passed the magazine to Clullv. (89)
The quiet control achieved over one of bis top men reinforces the extent of
Chully’s true power. Surely a man such as Red resembles the brand of pseudo
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Sartrean actor for whom Nietzsche makes allowances, those individuals “who are
denied horns or the sharp fangs ofa beast ofprey with which to wage the struggie
for existence” (On Truth and Lying in a IVn-MoraÏ Sense $75). Moreover,
regarding relationships that are both fomied and forged in confinement. the
hardened criminologist Derrick Corley reports that most prisoners establish ties
with other prisoners for two main reasons: for protection, being part of a group
or crew is stronger and safer than being alone; and for convenience, to pool
resources and connections so that they can do a better bid” (106). Red’s
paranoid fear of being watched and policed by Chilly onÏy illuminates the
dominant prisoners strategic gaze and reign over the rolls/roles of his prisoners
with resources.
Athens wams: “If marginally violent people remain in malignant
communities for too long. they may be sooner or later brutalized. which could
spiit their seÏves apart at the seams” (Yio1entization in Larger” 27). Through
omnipotent supervision. Chilly maintains his own elevated ranks by anticipating
that inevitabilitv and thereby existing as a frightening paraHel to that which bas
been the most effective governmental device to etemalize humankind’s tyrannous
nature. namely. surveillance (Parenti 131). foucault has noted that the utilization
of surveillance itself can be traced back to the nineteenth-centurv use of Jeremy
Bentham’s Panopticon. a prison system where ceils were situated around one
central watchtower from which a supervisor or guard could observe the inmates
yet the inmates could neyer be exactlv sure when or where they were being
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watched—inevitably leaving them to “probe” themselves (Discipline and Punish
202). That surveillance exists as an unmitigated instigator of veiled dominance
engagement remains a fact confirmed by Red’s assessment of his makeshifi
competition as well as the steadfast principles fuelling supply and demand.
•‘The military is based on guile,” says Sun Tzu. “Acts due to advantage, /
Transforms by dividing and joining” (27). The same techniques and strategies
accompanying the dominant soldier or the dominant convict suggest that any
shape-shiffing commander, penal. subcultural. societal, govemmental, or
presidential, actualizes successful dominance engagements through amalgamated
manifestations of physical and psychological warfare. By the end of On the Yard,
Chilly makes one crucial mistake in that he accumulates so much illusionary
power that systernic phantoms decide to take it ail back. Chilly’s relationship with
a “weaker, stigmatized prisoner” normaÏly ends afier a transaction or service.
However. the prison administrators decide to overthrow the dominant prisoner by
situating an extremely amenable homosexual prisoner in his immediate space. As
the prison administrators know only too well. the installation of a receptively gay
convict in the previously one-man pod carnes the same consequences of dangling
raw meat in the face of an emotionaily-starved Rottweiler: the mad dog will bite
and when he does there will be blood. Once again. this correlation can only be
confirmed by those who have experienced or witnessed this dynamic first-hand.
As the former political activist-turned-hardened criminologist Mumia Abu Jamal
authoritatively elucidates in “Caged and Celibate:”69
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At one level, homosexual relations reftect and reproduce pecking orders of
dominance and submission among the prisoners themselves. At another
level, savvy administrators look the other way on such couplings, because
they can utilize these relationships to extend their control. (140)
How do the interchangeable keepers and reapers conquer the interchangeable
keeper and reaper? They clearly tantalize Chilly with the one commodity that he
carmot procure, an emotionally charged relationship fuelled by acts of physical
coercion and mental submission.
That Bralys hardened manifestation permits a weaker prisoner at the
bottom of the power hierarchv to contribute to a dominant prisoner’s downfall
demonstrates the futility of residing within a model crafled by sinister coaches
with vested interests. In his own aptly-titled work The Animal factory, Edward
Bunker tactically presents a more seasoned rendition of Chilly Willy in Earl
Copen, a prison-house chameleon created in the virulent artist’s own malignant
image:
Copen was serving lis third term in San Quentin, having corne the first
time when he was nineteen. and he sometimes feit as if he’d been bora
there. If he’d ever conceived eighteen years ago that he’d be in the same
place at thirty-seven. he would have killed himself—or so lie thouglit
sornetimes. He was as comfortable as it vas possible to be, and stili he
hated it. (19) [...] Earl had several vocabularies and selected the one he
wanted according to whom he was talking to and what it was about. He
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could use this soft twangy voice and exaggerate it to buffoonery—or, he
could give off the obscenely vicious radiations ofa rabid doberman. (74)
Indeed. as with Malcoim Braly and Chully Willy, Edward Bunker and Fan Copen
maintain their own undeniable semblances. Moreover, like the background he
wouÏd create for his symbolic anti-hero. Bunkef s own corrupted youth was spent
behind the hardened and padded walls of state-run orphanages and juvenile
facilities. In the introduction to 3unkers autobiography, William Styron provides
an ample springboard for the biographical parallelisms:
Bunker[/Copen] vas in and out of foster homes and military schools. from
which lie began to run awav with determination augmented by an
obstinate antiauthoritarian streak well developed even at that early age. At
eleven lie was committed briefly to Camarillo State Hospital for
observation, and a year later lie was sent to juvenile reform school at
Whittier. [...] Twenty-nine days into freedorn he was caught t;-ying to rob
a liquor store and was shot (though not seniouslv wounded) by the owner.
This crime gained Bunker{/Copen] a sentence to the youth prison at
Lancaster. even though lie was considerably younger than the legally
mandated age of eighteen to twentv-five. (x)
Based on Bunkers own veriflable interactions with countless prison guards and
administrators. readers are granted an all-access pass into the behind-the-scenes
show illegitimately controlling the authentic malignant community. As with
Braly’s Chilly. investigating the relationships between Earl (dominant prisoner)
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and a ranking prison officiai (violent coach), the young men in his crew (prisoners
with resources), as well as a newcomer to the prison environment (weaker,
ostracized prisoner) reveais the ancient spokes of patriarchal dupiicity in motion.
“For Fdward Bunker,” writes franklin. “the criminal achieves victory over
society bv fu1fihlin his own character to the utmost, something which Bunker has
achieved more successfully in art than in life” (Victim as Criminat 266). This
existential assessment of the author’s mission only highlights the contemporary
raison d’être fuel1in artistic violentization and, for a select few, hardened
criminology.
The specific relationship between Fan and the high-ranking Lieutenant
Seeman, the convict’s direct jailhouse supervisor, once again serves to reveal how
both lawmaker and lawbreaker emuiate one another without necessarily intending
to do so. It was an odd friendship.’ writes Bunker, “the former submarine boss
who epitomized Middle America and the hard-core convict so ravaged by moral
confusion that he believed in nothing except personai IoyaÏty” tAnimal factory
43). Unlike Braly’s Lieutenant Olsen. Bunker’s Lieutenant Seeman has interests
beyond extracting profits from Eanl’s prison-yard ventures. That both men are
white in a prison full of predominantly African-American convicts ailows for
common biases to estabiish the prejudiced tie. When a violent sex offender named
Buck Rowan attempts to dominate a fresh fish who is under Earl’s panoptical
protection. the maladjusted osmosis of interchangeable keeper and reaper exposes
itself. Subsequent to the attempted rape. Fan successfully perpetrates a
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dominance engagement against Rowan and is subsequently sent to isolation for
both his stabbing and hospitalisation. Lieutenant Seeman proceeds to look the
other way when Rowan’s IV tube becomes mysteriousÏy spiked. Due to the fact
that Rowan is a sex offender and, more importantÏy, that Fan will owe the
lawman a significant favour, Seernan feeÏs entireiy comfortabÏe pÏaying the part of
a criminal. Accordingly, if his own peers question him about the incident, he can
simplv maintain a patriarchal status quo by denying involvement regardÏess of
culpability. (In fact, he might even tut-n to Bunker’s stock answer from Educacion
oja feton: “I didn’t see nuthin’; I didn’t hear nuthin’: I dont know nuthin”
(263)).° Once again. Bunker’s EarI has mastered the penal power dynamic by
monitoring privileged officiais such as Seeman—however, privileged officiais
such as Seeman have created the penal power dynamic and thereby control
dominant prisoners such as Fan.
Regarding the community’s “prisoners with resources,” the influence Fan
holds over his cnew resembles the influence attained by any quintessentiai
jailhouse chameleon in that by utilizing surveillance on objects and targets, true
knowledge—and hence true power—seemingly belong to the dominant prisoner
alone. When two of Earl’s men, T.J. and Bad Eye, threaten flot to follow orders
until curiosities about an impending race war are entirely satisfied. Fan tactically
sidesteps repercussions by pretending to identify with thein concems while
actually sizing up the potential for a dominance engagement. Bunker
consequently allows his semi-fictitious lead to interpret his own malignant
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community members: ‘Ear1 was capable of violence as the answer to any
problem. T.J. was less quick but relentless; Bad Eye was more explosive but
could be reasoned with afier the first blaze oftemper” (Animal factory 34). Since
ail individuais bound to power models must either know their place or risk falling
off altogether. Fan as a provisional General anticipates his created soldiers and
they predictably relent.
Upon assuming what Sun Tzu refers to as a deliberately “unfathomable”
course of action, the dominant prisoner eventually attempts to invert the inter
prisoner power hierarchy by superseding his own authority and helping a
“weaker, stigmatized pnisoner’ named Ronald Decker successfully escape from
San Quentin without any reverberations. However, that Earl decides flot to leave
with Decker only reinforces that dominant prisoners atop the power hierarchy can
be manipulated into believing that makeshifi power actually counts for something
tangible. (“Earl turned away, then snorted an ironical laugh. Aw, fuck it [...] I
run something around here” (Bunker, Animal factory 202)). Regarding the
perpetual nature of this logic, Athens verifies that “although the faces of the
people occupy the top and bottom rungs of any pecking order change, a
dominance order of some type or another aiways remains” (“Violentization in
Largef 22). The incentive to stay in prison for a dominant prisoner such as Earl
has been authoritativeÏy ampiified in great detail by hardened cniminologists who
stiil realize that microscopic interpretations remain vital to our understanding of
the Wcst’s violent mirroring ofhierarchal powers.
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Why Athens remains quick to discredit any practitioner who cannot speak
on or to violence authoritatively is somewhat baffting.7’ Until he himself resides
in the authentic malignant community without a visitor’s pass, any gauging of
pure expertise should be lefi to authenticaÏÏy hardened criminoÏogists alone. It
remains these profilers who not only work but live to reveal precisely the same
brand of hypocrisy and violence that American prison writers had been
documenting since the earliest of slave narratives (frankÏin, Victim as Criminal
3)72 In On the Yard and The Animal Factory specifically, Malcoim Braly and
Edward Bunker veil insightftil verification on violence and power in order to
protect themseïves and their peers from those allegedly civil community members
who continue to have the most to lose. As Sanyika Shakur confirms in his 1993
memoirs: “My consciousness about the larger enemy was being raised bit by bit.
Why wouldn’t someone want us to leam about who we really are?” (232). An
abhorrently “civil” implementation of the (aptly dubbed) 1977 ‘Son of Sam’ law
and Titie 2$ of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 540.20(b)—the latter
stipulating that an inrnate may not receive compensation or anything of value for
correspondence with the news media” (Franklin Victim as Criminal 15)—are
demonstrations of some of the coercive techniques implemented by authentic
violent coaches who need to keep true identities at bay.73
However. legislative powers do flot replace acts of physical and
psychological coercion altogether. In bis 2002 prison-memoirs entitled You Got
Nothing Coming. the Jewish-American prison-writer Jimmy A. Lemer
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purposefully describes a convict referred to as Big Hungry, a tbree-hundred-and
fifiy-pound African-American sexual predator who has been set loose by officiais
in order to terrorize a Nevada prison’s general population. A ranking
administrator who believes that Lerner lias disrespected him in the past
purposefluly misleads Big Hungry into believing that Lemer lias been hitting on
the violent predatof s love interest. 1f not for a last minute intervention by two
other prisoners, Lerner would have been tactically destroyed by the powers that
be on account of their utilization of a corporeal commodity (Big Hungry)
transforrned into a microcosmic weapon of mass destruction. Imparting the
consequences of provoking authentic violent coaches wlio control hierarchical
positioning and hence physical safety, Lerner as hardened criminologist lucidÏy
recalls: “The Hunger is lifting me right off my feet—by my neck. A massive right
paw pulls back to center a killing shot to my dome lights” (174).
If hardened criminoÏogy can, in fact. be legitimately discredited, why do
sanctioned officiaIs do everything within their power to silence incarcerated
profilers before evidentiary manifestations are made available to anyone other
than malignant community members? Answers sliould be evident at this stage of
the present investigation. Athens thus incorporates a rather naïve recommendation
that not only bypasses legitimate conspirators but actuaïly requests assistance
from the veiled violent coaches who perpetuate violentization in malignant
communities:
{It] serves the long-term interest of members from ah our minor
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communities. including those from the most refined, civil ones, to support
the search for and development of programs to help transform malignant
minor communities into civil ones. (“Violentization in Larger” 37)
Legitimate powers do flot dominate unless they maintain panopticaÏ control. If
Athens had interviewed genuinelv reflective hardened criminologists as opposed
to interviewing undemanding hardened criminaïs, the symbolic interactionist
would have been reminded that there will neyer be enough power to go around.
This chilling admonition rernains horrifically evident as it conjures those
ageless phantoms of the authentic sinister design. the inter-prisoner power
hierarchy that existed in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany.74 Consider
the following amalgamation of the inter-prisoner structure that existed at the
Dachau concentration camp and the inter-prisoner power hierarchy that exists in
America today:
GREEN TRIANGLES / DOMINANT PRISONERS
(Criminals. Kapos. and Dignitaries) / (Tough Guys. Violent Guys)
YELLOW STARS AND RED TRIANGLES / PRISONERS WITH RESOURCES
(Jewish Prisoners and Political Prisoners) I (Stand-up Guvs. Gang Members. Connected Inmates)
PINK TRIANGLES / WEAKER. STIGMATIZED PRISONERS
(Hornosexual Prisoners) / (Snitches. Hornosexuals. Sex Offenders. Child Abusers. Bitches. and
Punks)7
As Athens daims, violent models might very well be created. Stiil, the most
consequential and malignant of structures are clearly perpetuated.
Corroborating evidence from Mai-tin Sherman’s 1979 play Bent serves to
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reinforce the homosexual prisoner’s (or pink triangle’s) flailing position at the
very bottom of the inter-prisoner power hierarchy.76 Reminiscent of Braly’s
depiction of Red’s anxietv over his rolls/”roles.” Sherman’s depiction of a
concentration camp’s mess-hall illuminates an ageless pecking order through a
clear-cut serving process:
The K4PO wears a green triangle on his prison unzforrn. Prisoners corne
up, oie 1w one, with bowts in their hand. to be fed. They alt wear prison
unïforrns. [A PRI8ONER with Li yeÏÏow star enters. The KAPO stirs the
Soup. He fus the PRISONER s bowt. The PRISONER leaves. A
PRISONER with a red triangle enters. The K4PO stirs the soup. He fils
the PRISONER bowÏ. The PRISONER teaves. [A PRISONER with a pink
triangle] enters. The KAPO does not stir the soup.]
HORST: OnIy soup. You skimmed it from the top. Ther&s nothing in it
but water. No meat. no vegetables.. . nothing.
KAPO: Take what you get.
HORST: [Reaches for the ladie.] Give me some meat.
KAPO: [Pushes him back.] Fucking queer! Take what you get! (36)
This scene (and immediate situation) lias been confirmed by the makeshifi
German profiler Heinz Heger,77 who in The Yen With The Pink Triangles
provides first-hand insight into the ageïess power hierarchy and thereby
specifically reveals what societv’s authentic violent coaches continue to be
govemed by:
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Our block senior and his aides were “greens” — that is, criminals. They
looked it. and behaved like it too. Brutal and merciless towards us
queers.’ and concerned only with their own privilege and advantage, they
were as much feared by us as the SS. (34)
Priceless commodities such as ‘privilege’ and “advantage” are the authentic
goods that keep civil and turbulent communities from desiring to aid maÏignant
communities in an authentic manner. Abu-Jamal, originally incarcerated for
attempting to convert his own malignant community in the ghettoes of
Philadeiphia, bas insisted: “Repression is flot change, ifs the same old stuff’ (“B
Block Days and Nightmares” 354). No hardened criminologist has reftited that
emulating violent coaches, even those who the Allies atlegedÏy despise, onÏy
preserves those techniques that continue to keep power etemaily reserved.
Athens concedes that “although civil major and minor communitieS are
aiways preferable to malignant or even turbulent ones, they are now far from
perfect in their operation” (“Violentization in Larger” 38). The hardened
criminologists have flot only reported that they are far from perfect but, in reality.
authentically malignant. That the power structure existent in contemporary
America perpetuates the backdrop for precisely the same type of dominance
engagements once permeating the makeshifi and man-made institutions of
Germany should not be shocking but rather disturbing. Nevertheless, for those
who choose to remain weary of hardened criminoIogys practitioners based on
deceptiveiy officiai judgements imparted by dominant others—and thereby permit
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society’s authentic violent coaches to maintain their collectively iniquitous
gaze—then perhaps a final verification should be made by the only makeshifi
profiler accepted by creators. perpetuators and residents of malignant
communities. During the final stages of Hitler’s reign of terror, once America’s
most renowned and respected lawman. Sing Sing Prison’s Warden Lewis E.
Lawes—the premier makeshifi profiler to identify a prison as its own interpretive
community78—painstakingly acknowledged that the misleading govemmental
men who sanctioned his own rise to power were in fact ‘proud” to emulate the
most sinister model known to mankind. As Lawes-Biographer Ralph Blumenthal
had reported in Miracle at $ing Sing: How One Man Transforrned The L ives of
America ‘ Most Dangerous Prisoners:
And who were those, he asked. who hid behind the magic word ‘peace”?
Who could flot be for peace’? And on whose terms? [...] There could be
peace—a monstrous peace—in the vast prison bouse Hitler had made of
Europe. And so, he warned, a domestic fascism was afoot in America,
fermented by traitors backing Hitler who called him invincible. worth
doing business with, sentiments that meant only one thing, Lawes said:
Thev ‘tantedhim to win. (270-271)
Adolph Hitler. the malignant makeshifi-phantom-consultant afler Mcm Kampf79
only appears to be dead and gone since both his societal and microcosmic models
ofevil. the violent structures and the violent coaches, remain perfectÏy intact.
Authentic dominant coaches will continue to bank on our mass caging of
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personal liability. Sartre was flot merely being optimistic when lie espoused: “The
right-thinking man shuts himself up in a voluntary prison and locks the door. but
bis stubborn freedom makes him leave by the window” (Saint Genet 25). Athens
should know that in an effort to combat the authentic phantoms of systemic
power, their help cannot be enÏisted. We must embrace and engage the flrst-hand
experiences of hardened criminologists for it remains our condemned profilers
alone who authoritatively and authenticallv represent society’s revelatory models
of created violence.
oConclusion
o
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ccViolelice violates the self. Yet that’s exactly wbat the system believes in, wbat tbe system
preaches, wbat tue system practices: violence. Certainly I believe in the necessity offlgbting the
system. and in the necessity ofself-defense, but l’m flot going to employ the sarne tactics and methods
the system uses every day. Wby replace tbe system witb tbe sanie thing?”
Mumia Abu-Jamal, Deal!; Blossoins (100)
“At last, witbout bis knowing how, departure became possible. He was able to go out, and
began to walk in a state ofoppressive well-being whicb covered over eddies oflimitless hatred. Wben
lie bad gone tbirty meters lie stopped. l lefi the door open on them.’ Ne retraced bis steps. As he drew
near, lie felt sobs rising, becorning knotted in bis chest below bis throat, and remaining tliere. He sbctt
bis eyes, drew tbe door sbut. Tbe locL clicked: Iocked. Ne started off again. ‘lt’s not flnisbed. lt’s
beginning...”
André Malraux, \/an s Fate (27 1-72)
The scope ofthis thesis bas been interdisciplinary in nature as it proceeded
to unrnask the legitimate interlocutors responsible for both aggressive human
performance and imaginatively aggressive expression. S ituating Sartre’ s
existential acts of metarnorphosis within Athens’s developrnental stages of
violentization bas legitirnately equipped dissirnilar ontological profilers with the
tools necessary to explicate the phantoms that could be argued to haunt ail
dangerously violent manifestations. In order to accurately assess those isolated
individuals merely incapable of creating physical violence, as well as those
virulent artists eager to create violence through alternative outlets, a simultaneous
amplification to both Sartre’s Other and Athens’s phantom community revealed
the crucial situational motivators imparted by makeshift phantom consultants.
Their communal existence bas been suggested by disparate media-violence
researchers over the past century and their identity remains fuelled by what
Lentricchia and McAuliffe designate as transgressive artistic desire.
This project bas also confirmed that hardened crirninologists immersed in
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O the malignant microcosms of society provide the substantiated evidence required
to forge ahead in seizing the duplicitous designs of our man-made institutions.
That the same governing conventions apply to both societal and phantom
communities reinforces that duplicating sinister models rernains entirely
custornary. Note the universal testament by makeshift profilers in the vein of
Sanyika Shakur: I did not start this cycle. nor did I conspire to create conditions
so that this type of seif-murder would take place. My participation carne as second
nature” (13 8). Once again, authentic violent coaches rernain the allegedly civil
cornrnunity rnernbers who clearly shroud models of violence at home and abroad
in order to ensure that tangible power neyer becomes allocated equally.
An integrative melding has thus permitted profilers to dernonstrate how a
resurrected brand of existential crirninology serves to dernystify corresponding
propellers behind physical, systernic, internalized and, of course, artistic designs
of manifested cvii. Genet’ s criminal philosophy has been corroborated by Sartre.
whose existential theory has been verified by Athens. whose criminological
model bas been amplified by hardened criminology. whose authentic corpus of
evidence brings us back to Genet. Prior to elucidating feasible connections and
implementations based on the symbolic interpretations of evidentiary findings. it
is worth reassessing the subject and subjects ofculpability.
Regarding individual freedom, Richard Restak’s moderator queries of
Athens: “So I take it that you would not agree that there is a ‘Mark of Cain,’ a
teli-tale neurologie sign by which potentially violent people can be identified? OrQ
0 166
that a person’ s brain organization predetermines their propensity for violence?”
(Restak 81). By now, combatants ofbad faith should be prepared to anticipate the
symbolic interactionist’s commonsensical response: Since human beings are
normaÏÏy aware of at least some of the contingencies that confront them in any
situation. they can alwavs exercise some degree of control over their conduct”
(Restak 82). Athens proceeds to stipulate that a choice to engage in violent action
is arrived at afier a consultation with internallv significant accomplices who serve
as phantom community members. Consequently, upon detecting interior cuiprits,
it does remain possible to escape intimate interlocutors and thereby daim
responsibility for entirely conscious acts.
In order to arrive at ‘I am my choices,’ Sartre originally argued that.
regardless of the perpetual presence of the antagonistic Other. one’s primary and
secondary group members can be anticipated as makeshifi captors and thereby
eluded. Thus the existential profiÏer’s fininglv foretelling terminology underpins a
preventative indictment: “If the phantom persists, it becomes ftat. ineffectual: I
know that h cornes from me” (Sartre. Saint Gener 364). Genet. upon tactically
recognizing and then breaking away from his malignant phantom cornmunity,
confirms the Sartrean directive through Green Eyes’s dramatic confession: “If I
say my crimes,’ it’s because I know what I’m saying. I say ‘my crimes.’ And no
comments or I might get nasty” (Deathwatch 108). for the individual who
escapes into the isolation of imagination, who circumvents human phantom
community members and assumes makeshifi phantom consultants in their place,
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undeniably, the same extent of culpability remains. As aiways, the creation of
violent intent does flot require the participation ofhuman coaches alone.
However. regarding the culpability of those who perpetuate artistic
violentization through the creation or promotion of makeshifi phantom
consultants, the issue of responsibility is by no means self evident. While an
imaginary act of violence would seem to be entirely Iess harmfi1 than a physical
act, it certainly rernains possible for one virulent artist’s creative ferocity to beget
actual destruction by more than one isolated audience member. At the same tirne,
to curb or set legitimate restrictions on artistically violent artwork remains an
unmistakable nod towards authoritarian censorship. As dissirnilar criminologists
over the decades such as Athens and Samenow have argued, clearly. there
remains an overwhelming number of people who do flot transform fictional
characters into significant phantom consultants. Therefore, this pivotal issue
ultimately cornes down to whether or flot the entertainment-oriented desires ofthe
many should be sacrificed for the potentially transgressive desires of a few.
According to Grossrnan. even an imbalanced trade-off remains well-worth the
inconvenience: “As we now reap the tragic harvest of our past impotence. we
know in our minds and hearts that we cannot afford to go down the sarne road as
before’ (1 18). Indeed. both the creators and the distributors who continue to profit
off of imaginary violence cannot allow the freedom of individual expression to
overtake a conscious obligation to prevent physical harm inspired by their
products.
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Subsequently, regarding the relationship that exists between individual
cuÏpability and those who disseminate systemic violentization, a patrimonial
Iegacy of quiet consent continues to dominate resoundingly. In The &ttanic Bible,
followers are asked to consider: “If hurnans ceased wholly from preying upon
each other, could they continue to exist?” (LaVey 3:4)80 The answer is of course
‘yes, however, not as comfortably.’ Turbulent community members do not have
the courage or desire to address makeshift demons to a sufficiently reveÏatory
degree; and symbolic prisoners-with-resources, caught in the middle of
hierarchical power, cannot afford the inconvenience. Athens contends that it is
entirely unfathomable to believe that individual comrnunity members who support
the authentic violent coaches of society do not irnplicitly “brutalize each other” by
default (“Violentization in Larger” 39). Once again, the relationship between
individual culpability and those who perpetuate systemic violentization bas
always been rooted in resurrected models of emulation. As a resuit, any
implementation that serves to feasibly combat violent situations must also work to
legitimately dismantie violent institutions.
Sartre’s own admittedly fluctuating stance on solutions to man-made
violence confirms that feasibi e phi losophical implementati ons and feasible policy
based implementations are not synonymous offerings. In Sartre cind Violence:
Citriously Ambivalent, Ronald Santoni substantiates the existential profiler’ s
oscillation:
In sorne of Sartre’s early writings, he clearly took a stand in opposition to
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violence and tried to show how it was anti-community. Then he moves on
to speak of violence as though its a unifying thing. Then he moves clearly
in the direction of justifying violence. (183)
Perhaps this cyclical account reaffirms the existentiaÏ psychoanalyst’s
ftmndamentally ontological goal of profiling concretely through individualized
stages of metamorphosis—not curing or rehabilitating ineffectually through
institutionalized models of power. In spite of this question mark, Sartre couÏd
have been defending himself upon rationalizing in Saint Genet when he declares:
One must will an act to the very end. But the act is alive, h changes. The
goal one sets at the beginning is abstract and consequently false. Little by
littie h is enriched by the means employed to attain it, and ultimately the
concrete goal. the true goal, is what one wants at thefinish. (582)
Thankfullv, Sartre’s words and actions had spoken volumes when the existential
criminologist declined the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1964. Honouring both the
experiences and the evidentiary findings of makeshifi convict profilers. he
rationalized to critics: .CA writer must refuse to allow himself to be transformed
into an institution” (Haught n. pag.). 0f course. this directive does flot reveal an
implementation su rnuch as it does a purposeful direction in which to look for
viable solutions: hence. to combat malignancy authentically, we must rely on
those who authentically combat malignancy as second nature and who symbolize
the inverse of Sartr&s directive—virulent institutions that transform into writers.
While the cohesive body of work created by contemporary American
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prison-writers rernains a logical source for the undeviating implementations
required herein, it is in fact a subsection of hardened criminology, hardened
political activisrn, that serves to supply bona fide solutions for diffusing violent
situations and dismantiing violent institutions. A hardened political activist can be
defined in one of two ways: either as a hardened crirninologist who transforms
into n campaigner for mass societal reform while immersed in the authentic
malignant community or as a hardened criminologist involved in political
activism before entering prison who cornes to view the authentic rnalignant
community as a microcosmic model of what (and who) should be dismantled.
Malcoim X, Angela Y. Davis, Mumia Abu Jarnal. Jarvis Masters, Marilyn Buck,
and Stanley Tookie’ Williarns are merely a handful of the representative
rnakeshift carnpaigners recognized for their contributions to hardened political
activisrn.81 As Franklin elaborates in Prison Liierature in America:
Now we have two overlapping groups of prison authors; the political
activists thrust into prison. and the common criminal thrust into political
activisrn. The distinction between these two groups tends to dissolve as the
definition of crime. from both sides of the law, becornes increasingly
political. (242)
Fuelled by transformation and amalgamation, incarcerated or previously
incarcerated political activists and their policy based discourses extend
observations beyond the realm of recognition into the territory of implementation.
In lieu of correlations from the previous chapter between hardened criminology
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and symbolic interactionism, it is not surprising that hardened political activists
inadvertently serve to confirrn, illuminate and/or discredit Athens’s own proposed
implementations.
For instance, in Tue Crealion of Dcingerons Violent Criminals, Athens
endeavours to present a “violent crime control policy” intended to prohibit
individuals from entering into the developmental stages of violentization. Insistent
that ail community members directly involve themselves in the termination of
violent individual creation, Athens nonetheless promotes a lirniting or “selective
rehabilitation” process aimed at transforming “only nascent criminals into non
criminals before they becorne hardenect criminals” (Creation of Dangerous 98).
Consequently, he argues for violent coaching to be dismantled and replaced with
affirmative role models whose non-violent acts of tutelage would likely parallel
the strategies observable within Vygotsky’s aforementioned Zones of Proximal
Development. However, in Violeni Criminal Acïs and Actors Revisited, Athens
amplifies his initial findings and thereby inadvertently evokes vital directives that
makeshifi political activists have authentically corroborated since Alexander
B erkman’ s Frison Memoirs ofan A narchist •$2
Rhodes offers a concise summary ofAthens restorative call to action:
Efforts to reduce family violence, to reduce school violence, to offer non-
violent coaching such as training in negotiation, anger management and
conflict resolution, to discourage bullying, to offer (non-violent)
mentoring of children at risk, to discourage violent coaching of school
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athietes. to improve child welfare. to counsel belligerent young people. to
support gun control, to dissolve or pacify street gangs and rnany more
sucli antiviolent initiatives should be effective. (Why They Khi 317)
By discounting the interpretive power of the makeshifi phantom consultant,
Athens has obviously neglected to address the curbing of artistically violent
manifestations created by media and/or entertainment outiets. Once again, for the
sake of communal tranquilitv. this remains a deadly occlusion lest we forget the
creation of the Son of Sam, John Lennons killer, the Columbine tragedy. etc.
However. that Athens clearÏy demands for the mass rehabilitation of cycles is to
be commended. In order for there to be an end to violent primary group members,
undeniably, there must first be an end to a patrimonial lineage of violence and
values. Seizing upon the created violence that exists in and through the
intertwined institutions mentioned above. the symbolic interactionist justly
promotes alternatives that symbolically attempt to flip aggressive manifestations
in the bud.
Gesturing towards the primary individuals and institutions responsible for
propagating violence confirms that only implementations accounting for
synonymous reflections can be considered authentic; and only hardened
authentications incessantly arrive through political activists born and bred in
volatile conditions. Upon being immersed in the authentic malignant community,
makeshifi implementers attain microcosmic vantage points that serve to enable
philosophical assessments as well as theoretical alternatives. The incarcerated
O political reformist Eldridge Cleaver had addressed the amalgamated violent
individual/institution in great detail.83 In 196$, afier arguing that any communitys
hierarchy can veil a trigger-happy social order.” the former Minister of
Information for the Black Panther Party observed that society’s extended version
of the inter-prisoner power hierarchy needed to undergo a radical reconfiguration.
In SouÏ On Ice, he manages to emphasize the undeniable futility of relying on
systemic leaders who have aiways profited off of our incessant acts of bad faith:
The Omnipotent Administrator starts with a basic anti’ reflex. Any liberality he
might show is an indication of the extent to which he has suppressed bis anti’
reflex, and is itself a part of his lust foi- omnipotence” (Cleaver I $0). Once again,
Athens paradoxicallv looks towards the individuals who violently supervise said
admini strators for the rehabilitative means required for legitimate transformation.
In contrast. hardened political activists verify that in order for non-violent
models to become viable. those who sit atop the power hierarchy must first be
thoroughly dethroned by any means necessary. In BÏood in My Eye, the hardened
political activist George Jackson reminded bis audience of the perils attached to
waging war on ageless generals: “They know how to hold on to their privilege,
could they have held it this long otherwise? We are being repressed now. Courts
that dispense no justice and concentration camps ai-e already in existence” (46)g4
Why would disparate makeshift profilers in the vein of Saure potentially argue for
violence to end violentization? Due tu) the fact that authentic violent coaches
perpetually refuse to relinquish any of their hierarchical power or positioning.
L’
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L Recent hardened practitioners, picking up exactly where makeshifi profilers like
Cleaver and Jackson left off in the 1960s and 70s, stili verify the sarne acts of
“deliberate indifference” by allegedly civil community members who feign efforts
to end violent cycles.85
Dannie ‘Red Hog’ Martin’s revelatory essays from the 19$Os and 1990s
on veiied goverrnental tortures earned the hardened politicai activist state
sanctioned penalties and reprisais that included “being thrown in the hole,
deprived of writing materials, and then transferred to a remote prison in the
Arizona desert” (franklin, Prison Writing 337). As an incarcerated journalist
turned-profiler, Martin paid deariy for recognizing a caveat that transforms
conventionai solutions into naive pipedreams: until we ah take an active role in
assuring the installation of legisiators authenticaliy willing to make equitable
concessions, our communities shah remain as warped and futile as the vested
interests fueliing ah modeis of violentization. Unfortunateiy these words have
stood the test of time and their continuous challenge remains costly. In turn, the
hardened political activist Leonard Peitier, arrested in 1975 afier the Pine Ridge
Lakota massacre in South Dakota (Matthiessen 169), would oniy evoke the wraith
of omnipotent administrators and faise politicians upon choosing to fight for the
rights of native community members in both the United States and Canada.
Surveying both the individuai and the institutionai degrees of faiiure
regarding the transformation of violent phantoms worldwide, Peitier concludes his
1999 mernoirs Prison Writings: My Life is My Sundance with two hauntingly
C
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compassionate imperatives:
Let us forgive the worst among us because the worst is in ourselves, the
worst lives in each of us. along with the best. Let us forgive the worst in
each of us and ail of us so that the best in each of us and ail of us may be
free. (214)
AH leamt hypocrisies aside. we know ourselves to be not only institutionally but
individually complicit in perpetuating those who dominate ineffectual models and
programs that have neyer been designed to succeed. Consequently, transforming
authentic violent coaches into authenticalÏv-civil cornrnunity members remains as
an exercise in futility until we consciouslv choose to annihilate the very collusion
that systemic bullies anticipate and require.
Lest we forget the dangers of leaving a quest for non-violence to those
who have neyer had a legitimate interest in universal harmony, the hardened
politicai activist shouÏd symboiicallv rest atop our new inter-communal hierarchy;
the hardened criminologist should svmbolicallv occupy the second tier of
responsibilitvz and everyone else as makeshifi existential profilers and communal
anchors should be accountable for ensuring our model’s integrity. The logic that
fuels a radical metamorphosis or departure from the existent structure has fittingly
been aforementioned by Sartre: This gme of hide-and-seek will end only when
we have the courage to go to the limits of ourselves in both directions at once”
(Saint Genet 599). By simultaneously embracing the hardened criminal artists and
rejecting the artistrv of systemic criminals. what could we possibly have to lose
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that has flot aiready been taken from or by us? In order for quiet consent to find
itself repiaced by strident rebellion or perceptible resuits, the tiers of power rnïist
be occupied by society members qualified to play their parts—by those who can
Iegitimatelv speak to the conditions of individuals plagued by violent phantoms,
violent communities. and violent selves.
Finallv. this project would be rerniss flot to include or address that which
has consistentiy served as the most violent of institutions or makeshifi systems—
the family unit. If hardened political activists, hardened criminologists. and
makeshifi existential profilers could occupy a new communal structure of
deveïopmental interaction, unquestionabÏy. each Ïevel’s efforts would need to be
directed toward ensuring that ail violent coaches become removed or reassembied
so that positive coaching via Vygotskvs Zones of Proximal Development can
assume a fixed position. In addition, makeshifi phantom consultants cannot be
allowed to develop into intimate interlocutors by isolated individuals who do not
have the support or attention of family members. Ail eiiminatory strategies must
be implementations that everyone—existent as primary group members for
somebody—authenticaiiy strive toward in order to instali themselves as
affirmatively non-violent phantom-community members in the future.
In American Superreatisin, Jonathan Veitch dutiftiÏly wams of the dire
ontological consequences attached to shirking ethical responsibilities: “In the
absence of any catharsis, the mmd takes revenge on itself with a relentiessness
that ends in nihilism” (131). In other words, the longer others are allowed to
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assume our own roles and responsibilities is the doser one gets to being
compÏetely powerless and invisible. Considering that Sartre and Athens rely on
makeshifi prison narratives in order to arrive at significant interpretations of
violent phantoms and actors remains an auspicious indication of the fact that
textual sources and first-hand references by experts are not only existent but
riddled with implementations that should have been leamed by now. UndeniabÏy,
just as violent phantoms wiÏÏ only be combatabÏe once they are recognized as
such. non-violent implementations wili only be powerful when information has
been made accessible to ail.
oNotes
o
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The American experimental-psychologist 3.F. Skinner discarded
Freudian tenets and feit that an individual’s chojces. violent or otherwise, came to
be proceeding the learned consequences of experiencing those choices first-hand.
The British psychologist Hans Eysenck believed that “a combination of hereditary
and environmental factors” could be attributed to criminal behaviour (quoted in
Innes 202). However. he, like Skinner, also realized that many individuals were
capable of engaging in criminality proceeding rational interpretations of potential
gains and losses.
2 In 1876, Cesare Lombroso, who had conducted the majority of bis
experiments in Italian prisons, authored L ‘Uomo Delinquente, a work wherein
dissimilar criminal actors are alleged to be detectable upon examination of
physical attributes such as the skull, nose, cheekbone, and ears. Lombroso
actually attempted to correlate specific phvsical features to specific criminal
professions.
Blumer’s understanding of symbolic interactionism. an ideology deep
rooted in William James pragmatism, involves the meaningftil deaÏings between
individuals as they strive toward gaining knowledge of their immediate selves
within specific social contexts. Blumer posits three core principles in order to
illuminate bis theory, namely, “meaning,” ‘language,” and thought.” Individuals
interact with one another based on the meaning they aliocate unto one another;
language provides individuais opportunities to communicate with others through a
negotiation of signs and signais: and thought serves to transform individuals’
interpretations of signs and symbols affer assurning different vantage points
(Griffin 18).
The Austrian bom Gross was a professor of criminoiogy and penai law
who is regarded as the first makeshift profiler to buttress the significance of
criminal profihing as an ali-encompassing holistic technology.
Whiie this thesis subscribes to the works and philosophies of the french
theorist Michel foucault and in particular Discipline and Funish, dissimilar
ontologicalÏy-minded academics bave consistentÏy over-relied on Foucaultian
ideologies in order to fortifv individualized postulates surrounding power and
privilege or lacks thereof Although status quo for philosophical and Iiterary
specialists. criminoiogists and concrete practitioners have every right to question
or challenge—as thev have with Sartre’s verbosity—what appears, at seiect times,
to be intentional obscurities. Nevertheless, the fourth chapter of this investigation
will include an application of foucault’s hypothesis that human bodies can be
altered into weapons and targets of systemic powers-that-be.
6 Like Blumer before him, Athens would corne to rely on Mead, a social
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psychologist at the Llniversitv of Chicago. whose presupposition was that human
actors undergo stages of evolutionary development. In Mmd, Self and Society,
Mead writes: ‘Human society as we know it could flot exist without rninds and
selves since ail of its most characteristic features presuppose the possession of
minds and selves by its individual members” (227).
In bis last will and testament. the Marquis de Sade readily confesses and
therebv provides an elucidation: ‘Jmperjous. choleric. irascible. extreme in
everything, with a dissolute imagination the like of which has neyer been seen,
atheistic to the point of fanaticism, E.. .1 kiil me again or take me as I am” (222).
Indeed. the principle of delicacy onlv applies to the individual who desires to live
in the fantastical or imaginative as opposed to the mundane or real.
De Quincey was a critic and essayist who remains best known for bis
1 $22 autobiography Confessions of an Engtish Opium Eater. In “Murder
Considered as One of the f inc Arts,” he tactically endeavours to bestow true
aestheticisrn unto any introspectiveiy virulent manifestation—be it painting or
murder—that serves to provoke a significant sensory reaction.
Prior to bis assassination. Il Hajj Malik El-Shabazz evocatively
foreshadowed bis fate: “I know that societies often have killed the people who
have helped to change those societies” (3 89). Transcribed by Alex Haley and
integral to any inclusive or authentic study of race or power relations in Western
society and beyond, Maicolm’s life story remains a symbolic warning to
contemporarv Americans and the symbolic muse for American prison writers.
Irrefutably. the demagogue’s confessional serves to underpin the importance of
anticipating veiled enemies at ail costs.
‘° In 2001, The Josepli Beil Centre for Forensic Statistics and Legal
Reasoning was formed in the hopes of amaigamating research. development, and
implementations that wilI benefit the future of criminal justice science and
practice. Beli. who met Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in 1877, was extremely well
hown for being able to deduce his patients’ routines, livelihoods, culturai
influences, and sometimes even their narnes (The SherÏock Holmes Society of
London. 2004). One of Bell’s contemporaries, the french scientist Edmond
Locard. remains highly regarded by evidence technicians and profilers. Locard’s
“principle of exchange” serves to dernonstrate how organisrns that corne into
contact with one another inevitablv transmit and/or leave identifiable particles. In
Stephen White’s fictionai novel CoÏd Case. in a chapter entitled “The Dead
French Detectives.” the clinical psychologist pays tribute to the scientific
profiler’s overarching approach by introducing a fictitious organization named
“Locard.” a crime prevention unit dutifully comprised of law enforcement
officiais. forensic specialists. special prosecutors, and disparate philosophicaÏ
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“others” (12).
Originally tagged The .44 Caliber Killer” by members of the press,
Berkowitz actually dubbed himself “Son of Sam” in a letter received on April 17,
1977 by Captain Joseph Borelli of the New York City Police Department’s
“Operation Omega” Task Force. Berkowitz’s murderous rampage took the lives
of six people between July of 1976 and July of 1977, a statistic he subsequently
blamed on Satanic possession after his arrest. However. in a 1979 interview with
the FBI’s Richard Ressier. Berkowitz reportedly admitted to fabricating his
“devil-made-me-do-it” defence afier admitting that killing women simply tumed
him on sexually. In the book Whoever fights i’vlonsters, Ressler—who is clearly
familiar with Nietzsche’s Beyond Good & EviÏ—devotes a section to Berkowitz
and how the ovenvheÏming media attention lie received only served to propel
ftwther violent acts.
12 Existentially speaking. the concept of bad faith involves more than
inauthentic acts or seif-deceptive behaviours. Acts of bad faith paraïlel deliberate
refusais to acknowlede human freedom.
13 Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis should flot be confused with the
existential psychoanalysis anributed to the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig
Binswanger. who, in his 1963 work Being in 11w World, relies on Heidegger’s
concept of Dasein (‘being there’ or ‘existing’) and discards traditional science.
Binswanger took a special interest in the interpretations of mentally iii patients
and his goal was to release them from the burdens accompanying their
disorganized modes ofbeing-in-the-wortd.
14 Ovid’s ageless creatures live on in the aesthetic reaims of Kafka and
Sartre both. Kaflcas “The Metamorphosis,” first published in 1915, would
inadvertently serve to inspire the philosophical musings of Sartre considering the
non-fictitious Jean Genet becomes a symbolic bug long before the fictitious
Gregor Samsa undergoes the same creative transmutation. Kafka’s The
Judgement” and “In the Penal Colony.” written two years prior to and four years
proceeding “The Metamorphosis,” were also transformed by Sartre so as to
provide conelative backdrops (and borrowed tities) for Genet’s existential
biography and deveÏopment.
ID The two basic modes of existence, being “in-itself’ (en-soi) applies to
the existence of non-conscious objects whereas being “for-itself’ (pour-soi)
relates to conscious beings and freedom. When the for-itself negates the in-itself,
a move towards authenticity has been made. Therefore, if an individual’s mode of
being is in-itself, acts of bad faith are imminent (May 12-14).
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16 Bio-physiological theories from Mednick’s “Biology and Violence”
have been tampered with by Athens. who transforms the scientist’s major findings
on children’s autonomic nervous systems and potential connections to violent
criminality. Wolfgang and Fenacuti. in contrast, concem themselves with an
individual’s socio-environmental factors and Athens’s framework thereby could
have derived from the sociologists’ decisive observation: “We are lead back to the
extemal social environment as the area where the causative key to aggression
must at present be found” (143).
17 Lombroso’s phvsiognomv would flot have been possible if it were not
for the Italian prisoners he autopsied in the 1 870s. Indeed, prisoners’ minUs and
bodies have been utilized by cornpletely dissimilar criminological profilers in
their quests to arrive at the foot causations of deviant behaviour. Even Patricia
Jacobs contested research in the 1960s on X and Y chromosomes chiefly relied
on the genes of Scottish prisoners. (The magnitude of extracting reveÏatory
evidence from prisoners’ minUs and bodies bas been elucidated further in this
investigation’s fourth chapter).
18 Cooley. the son of a prominent judge, was a University of Michigan
sociologist who allowed his own personal experiences with primary group
members to dictate the course of his life and work. In a letter to bis mother. he
writes: “I should like as an experiment to get off somewhere where father was
neyer beard of and see whether anvbody would care about me for rny own sake”
(315).
19 As the novice existential crimino[ogist succinctly clarifies in the abstract
preceding his academic paper: “Man is viewed as essentialÏy free of any
deterministic forces or elements and he is free to choose bis existence, to change
bis existence, or to remake bis nature” (Sapp I). This statement is not wrong,
however, it is incomplete. Sapp. who deserves credit for making an intrinsic
connection between existentialism and a ftinctioning une of criminological
questioning, does not identity any other external forces or interÏocutors and
thereby makes a theoretical connection that, prior to an inclusive integration of
Athens. remains inconclusive.
20 There have been many unauthorized conclusions and solutions offered
up by academics and analysts in the name of Sartre’s specific philosophy.
However. Sartre himself emphatically reiterates that his existential psychoanalysis
does not offer individuals finite solutions or cures. The goal of Sartrean profiling
is to help patients disserninate the chamzing signs and symbols in their lives so as
to reveal but not restore authentic consciousness and freedom. Moreover, it is the
individual alone who possess the best vantage point from which to makes
authentic observations.
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21 Barrett’s Irrational Man was first published in 195$ and remains one of
the most lucjd and accurate examjnations into the root of existentiaÏ thought. My
own project primarily relies on scholars who were also contemporaries of Sartre
(like Barrett. Cranston, Barnes, May and Girard) since viable applications should
be indicative of clear and accurate disseminations anived at with Sartre’s
overarching situation and condition in mind—as opposed to the postmodernist
trend to simuÏate or regurgitate without regard for intelligibiïity. For instance,
while Ronald Santoni’s 2003 book Sartre on Violence has been recognized in
order to fortify a point. other recent instaïrnents including George Cotkin’s
Existential America (2003). lan Birchall’s Sartre Against StaÏinisrn (2004) and
Thomas f lynn’s Sartre: A Biography (2004). as well as Yiwei Zheng’s Ontology
and Ethics in Sartre ‘s Earlv PhiÏosophy (2005) are not credited herein since they
contain mundane. inconect. repetitive and/or manipulated applications that Sartre
wouÏd not automatically subscribe to if he were alive today.
22 J• Harold Ellins’s four-volume tome The Destructive Power ofReligion:
Violence in Judctism, Christianitv, and Islam serves to reinforce, in a truly historie
and holistic fashion. the intrinsic relationship between religious and violent
practices.
23 Athens posits “that whenever people undergo dramatic personal change
or else live or work in a community in which they are ‘social misfits’ for too
long, then they will inevitably suffer from at least some personal disorganization”
(Violentization in Larger” 7). More than anthing else, dramatic self- or personal
change will be undergone in verifiabÏy drastic or intense circumstances.
24 The 1992 and 2003 documentaries Aiteen: The Selling ofa Serial Kitter
and Aileen: Lijk anti Death ofa Serial Killer, as well as the 2003 film Monster.
depict Wuomos’s true crimes, trials and tribulations prior to her execution by the
Sate of Florida in 2002. A first-hand account was finally provided by Wuomos
herseif in the posthumously-released 2004 autobiography Monster: My True
Story.
2D According to Hazel Barnes, the Jonah CompÏex remains for
existentialists an inational desire to assimilate and to identify with oneself either
the object of knowledge or a beloved person” (“Key to Special Terrninology,”
$03). Clearly. violent coaching has the potential to be readily embraced by
novices since lessons are being imparted by assumed “role models” in the truest
sense of the term.
26 Upon his division’s capture in June of 1940, Sartre began composing
Being and Nothingness under legitimately dismal conditions in a German prison
camp.
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2? When in the existential mode of “Being-for-Others” (être-pour-autrui),
an individual resides outside of self as an assurned object for others. For Sartre, to
exist for others wilI equate to incessant discord of self since the for-itself attempts
to reclaim itselfby advertently or inadvertently making an objects out ofothers.
28 The applicability of The Art of War to fields other than rnilitary warfare
has been confirrned by its appearance on disparate course syllabi ftorn
depailments of philosophy, history, literature, business, and athletics.
The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan posits the “Gaze” as belonging
to the object rather than the subject. For the existential analyst, writes Barnes.
being the object of an other’s gaze inevitably evokes feelings of indignity
(Introduction” xxxix).
30 Sartre’s creative pieces, be they novels or plays, are aiways symbolic
soundboards for his philosophical contentions. Whether it is the dramatic
character of Orestes challenging mighty Zeus or the paradoxical Garcin playing a
part and knowing the price, Sartre’s facts cannot be hidden by bis fiction.
31 Gothic Iiterary creations in the vein of Matthew Lewis’s The Monk serve
to provide an enduring theme: More haunting than an unspeakable crime rernains
an unknowable perpetrator. Indeed, whereas tales of horror readily award
culpability to an array of supernatural elements, our authentic demons insist on
tormenting the contours of tangible freedom.
32 Grossman begins bis barrage of rhetoricai questions by alluding to none
other than the slasher-fiim icon “Freddy Krueger” (piayed by Robert England).
who made his first appearance in Wes Craven’s 1984 film A Nightmare on Ehn
Street. Freddy quickly developed into a staple of popular culture and bad dreams
alike due to his ghastly reappearances in seven back-to-back Nightmare
instalments culminating in the 2003 collaboration freddy 14v..Jason.
There is no originality to be found in the statement: “All religious texts
were written by human forces with vested interests.” However, since too many
individuals stili refuse to believe that fact, realists have littie choice but to repeat
themselves.
Ail eleven of the essays that appear in Richard W. Kaeuper’s 2000
anthology Violence in MedievaÏ Society serve to unanirnously confirm an
overwheiming dependence on brutal practices in relation to human interaction,
survival, and routine.
Criminal profilers within the FBI’s Behavioral Science Services
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(established at Qunatico’s FBI Academy in 1972) folÏow five specific analytical
‘stages” prior to the apprehension of violent actors: profihing input” and
collection: “decision process models’ and organization; ‘crime assessment” and
reconstruction: •criminal profile” and correlation: as weli as ‘investigation” and
revision (Innes 96).
36 Explicitly graphic games (like Doom), musicians (like Marilyn
Manson), and films (like The BasketbalÏ Diaries) have made their makers and
distributors hundreds of millions of dollars. However. in the incessant game of
‘risk vs. reward. we are just as culpable as the corporations bringing these
phantoms to life.
“Eventually I crossed that invisible une of no return,” confesses the Son
of Sam. “I did not how that bad things were going to result from ail this”
(Berkowitz, 1999. n. pag.). To ridicule organizations such as Media Fower for
ChiÏdren, the Cerner for Media Literacv. the National Coalition on TV Violence,
or the National Institiite on Media and die farnilv only perpetuates dangerous
models and profitable designs. Clearlv. primary group members shouÏd have
enough sense to realize that extreme isolation and violent displays can only equai
future acts of devastation.
38 Mark David Chapman stood outside and waited for John Lennon at The
Dakota. the musicians residence located on the corner of 721( Street and Central
Park West in Manhattan. When Lennon emerged. Chapman opened fire.
The anti-social Holden Caulfield remains a prorninent and archetypical
Ioner of Western literature and cu[ture. A prognostic passage from The Catcher in
the Rye eerily serves to provide the interpreted part that Chaprnan ultimately
chose to accept and pull-off: What I have to do, I have to catch everybody if they
start to go over the cliff—I mean if they’re running and they dont look where
they’re going I have to corne out from sornewhere and catch them” (Salinger
173).
° Sartr&s The Words. initially pubÏished in 1964, remains a unique and
pivotai work in that it serves as the French phiiosopher’s existential analysis of
self Accordingly. posited tools for a phenornenological self-examination are flot
only contained in this autobiography but symbolicaliy put to work through first
hand evaluations of immediate and repetitive confrontational situations.
41 Thomas Wolfe—who is not to be confused with Tom Wolfe, the author
of 1968’s 117e Electric KooÏ-Aid Acid Test and 1998’s A Maii in full—became
prominent in 1929 upon the publication of Look Horneward, AngeÏ, his first of
four major autobiographical novels. The Southem author’s printed words have flot
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only served to motivate but direct makeshift human profilers. The French
Canadian Wolfe-specialist Steve Bordeau has insisted that Wolfe “made” him
interpret others confessionals by supplying a point of view that only ontological
detectives can provide: ‘In that exits are entrances and vice versa” (n. pag.).
42 Sartre clarifies in his 1950 study into the french poet, drug addict, and
self-confessed demon” Baudelaire: ‘When he found himself abandoned and
rejected. Baudelaire chose solitude deliberatelv as an act of self-assertion, so that
his solitude should not be something inflicted on him by other people”
(BaïideÏaire 18). Accordingiy, when Baudelaire consciously chooses isolation, he
sirnultaneously abandons the probability of significant consultations with
anything other than makeshifi phantoms.
In Shakespeare’s 1603 play, Hamiet’s father, the King ofDenmark, has
been murdered by Hamlet’s uncle. the new King of Denmark, who marries
Hamlet’s mother. the immobile Queen. 0f course, Hamlet’s hesitation to avenge
his father’s untimeiv death by means of violence surely incensed the blood-thirsty
audience members of Elizabethan England, just as it would the trigger-happy
audience members of today.
The fatality” that Genet speaks of can be associated to Sartre’s
postulate of the fataI instant” in Saint Genet wherein a “living dead man”
symbolically serves to die over and over again by consciously choosing how to
overcome the incessant arrivai of confrontational situations despite the existence
of others and the anticipation of outcome: ‘0ne is stili what one is going to cease
to be and already what one is going to become” (Saint Genet 2).
Satire emphasizes both the creativity and assumed identities affihiated to
Genet’s iliegal break-ins by confirming that he also induiged in piay by spinning
round among iilustrious memories in order to change into a high-heeled lord”
(Saint Genet 404).
46 Athens hvpothesizes in The Creation of Dangerous Violent Criminaïs
that ‘vioient notoriety’ and ‘sociai trepidation” are simuftaneousiy experienced
by the individual in question before the “cuiminating” plateau of ‘malevolency”
can be reached (81).
“I later had the greatest difficulty in overcoming their attitude,” admits
Genet in regards to his adversariaÏ audience and poem (Saint Genet 429).
However. Sartre purposefully underpins that Genet’s audience had the greatest
difficulty in overcoming his attitude: “With lis prisoner’s outfit Genet creates a
scandai: once again he is the Other. the black sheep. the Undesirable. Arnong the
men in jackets [...] he is the Condemned Man whom they do flot want to be.”
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(Saint Genet 428).
As Barrett confirms in Irrational Man: “For Sartre there is no
unalterable structure of essences or values given prior to man’s own existence.
That existence has meaning, finaÏly, only as the liberty to say ‘No” (244).
Athens readily admits that his theory of violentization was virtually
unknown before Richard Rhodes’s resunection of the symbolic interactionist’s
criminological opus in Whv They Kili. The fourth volume in the SocioÏogy of
Crime, Law and Deviance series (Violent Acts And Violentization: Assessing,
AppÏying, And Developing Lonnie Athens’ Theories), published in 2003, was
entirely devoted to the assessment of Athens’s evidentiary findings by means of
dissimilar modeis and formulas relied on by the likes of criminologists,
sociologists, neuroiogists, and even dangerous violent offenders.
)O This investigation’s own “artistically-violent” developmentai process
clearly amalgamates the four stages of deveiopment as posited first by Sartre (on
his own terms) and then by Athens (in his own terms) so as to arrive at both the
causation of creative aggression and the making of makeshifi phantom
consultants.
As a poet, painter, playwright. author, actor, director, and designer,
Cocteau was unlike men such as Freud due to the fact that first-hand experiences
from disparate fields and outiets could be relied on and transformed effectively.
Cocteau obviously believed that our conscious understanding of toxic. harmless
and even neutral internai forces serve to permit an authentic backdrop for
aesthetic confessional and thereby tangible revelation.
2 Based on the aforementioned design and purpose of Sartre and Athens’s
correlative four-stage developmentaÏ processes, additions to titles of works or
statements in works are based solely off of plausible and commonsensical
substitutions that our investigation has thus far proven necessary. Unsound
modifications have flot been attempted or supported since specificity cannot be
comprised.
The Violent Socialization Scale tests the validity ofAthens’ components
when weighed against the experiences of institutionalized prisoners and college
students.
Any listing of transgressive artists and their works will always be
indicative rather than representative. Once again, since the individual alone
interprets the impact of the makeshifi phantom consultant, the same artist or work
can be deemed monumental or inconsequentiai.
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As Aino Konkka elaborates in “Power. Pride and Politics in Rap
Music:”
BattÏe rapping is one of the oÏdest styles of rap. Two rappers would meet
and start competing — remotely reminding one of the singing competition
between Viinmiinen and Joukahainen in the Kalevala, the Finnish
national epic. Battie rapping is based on spontaneity, verbal wit,
imagination and quick reactions. Another, perhaps more sensible
comparison could be the West Indian calypso competitions. Battie rapping
may sound offensive, but it is significant as being a [physicallyj non-
violent way of competing and gening rid of extra energy and frustration.
(n. pag.)
56 Marshall Bruce Mathers III. who performs under the stage name
“Erninem,” becarne an instantaneous fixture in contemporary popular culture
following the 1999 release ofhis first major album The Stim Shady LP. The semi
ficfional film 8 AfiÏe parallels bis real life to the extent that both he and the film’s
protagonist. an emerging rapper dubbed ‘B. Rabbit” (who is perhaps the altered
spirit of John Updike’s literary protagonist), have to ‘baule” their ways out of
Detroit in order to escape turbulent conditions. Mathers. who was actually born in
St. Joseph. Iviissouri. in 1972. has taken his painful and violent first-hand
experiences. particularly those involving bis absentee father, abusive mother, and
unstable ex-wife, and transformed them into fuel for unabashedly graphic—and
unbelievably profitable—lyrics.
Nietzsche solidifies bis abstract reliance on unconfirmed forces through
the statement: Providing one bas the slightest remnant of superstition left one
can hardly reject completely the idea that one is the mere incarnation. or
mouthpiece. or medium of some almightv power” (“Composition of Thus Spake
Zarathustra” 201).
In order to extract the aesthetic beauty from the horrific repulsiveness,
Lentricchia and McAuliffe take a disconcerting approach to 9/11 by seemingly
paralleling the way in which De Quincey’s fictitious critics approached the
sensory evocations of murder and art. b justify their discoimected attitude.
Lentricchia and McAuliffe callously reiterate that for most of us {...] the
thousands slaughtered are abstract. [...j We neyer really did, or ever really wiÏl,
grieve for them. thought we may think we do so in the world made by Oprah”
(Crimes ofArt ± Terror 5).
Like Sartre, Park did not believe in passing moral judgements on the
existence of environmental entities’ discernable pattems. Like Genet, Park was
also a race-relations activist and concemed with systemic manipulations of social
communities.
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C 60 Foucault’s Discipline and Funish has been integral to countless
contemporary works on power relations and. in particular, the prison system.
However, first-hand accounts by those who have incessantly suffered the
consequences of power/penal relations should be relied on much more
significantly, as this investigation ultimately serves to demonstrate.
61 H. Bruce Franklin has been recognized by the majority of scholars in his
field as Americ&s foremost prison writing specialist and historian. In The Victim
as Criminat and Artist. which was expanded in 1989 and re-titÏed Frison
Literatitre in Arnerica. Franklin includes one of the most extensive bibliographies
ever compiled on American prison narratives and authors.
62 Franklins anthology Frison Writing in 2OttfrCentuly Arnerica has been
configured as a chronological sampling of prominent prison writers who not only
capture the encompassing prison conditions at various points in Arnerican history
but also the timeless hypocrisies ofAmerican culture.
63 The chronological listing of American prison authors has been compiled
in lieu of extensive independent research. H. Bruce franklin’s contributions, Beil
Gale Chevignys Doil?g Tirne anthology. as well as private consultations with
international prison-writing-experts including England’s Howard Cunneli,
Germany”s Jan Alber, and Canada’s Jason Haslam.
64 The reliability of Athens’s case studies are not being questioned herein,
however. we must acknowledge that there exists an enormous difference between
answers prompted by questions and confessionals prompted by revelations.
Although Athens daims to have filtered out the unreliable or uninformative case
smdies through his own fiftering out process (which presumably became more
accurate with more experience), prison writers have taken it upon thernselves to
provide us with the evidence and data that makeshifi profilers have been
anempting to correlate since the days ofLombroso.
6 Beck, who assumed the pseudonym Iceberg Slim in his days as a high
flying pimp on the streets of Chicago, has been regarded as one of the most
influential prison writers of the late twentieth century due to his unique individual
tiare and enlightening ÏyricaÏ aestheticism. Ihese attributes are demonstrated
evocatively throughout his corpus ofwork which includes the 1969 autobiography
Fimp: The Sto,’y of Mv LUe. the 1971 collection of essays The Naked SoitÏ of
Iceberg SÏirn. the 1977 novel Long White Con. and the posthumously-published
1998 nove! Doom fox (originally written in 1978). As a cultural icon and
rhvthmic mastermind, Siim inadvertently paved the wav for the existence of rap
as a musical genre in the early 1980s, a detail confimned by rap moguls such as
Ice-T (Tracy Marrow) and Ice Cube (Oshea Jackson), who have proudly
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attributed their own stage names to the artist in question.
66 Genet’s play Deathwatch made its Paris debut in february of 1949.
Green Eyes, an archetype of the amalgamated siimer and saint, figuratively spoke
for Genet on the subject of crime and authenticity. He asks and then wams us:
‘Are you ready? 3e careful. The axe is going to faÏl” (129). The Puerto-Rican
American prison-writer Miguel Pinero. a hardened criminologist out ofNew York
State’s Sing-Sing Prison. paid his tribute to Genet and Green Eyes in the award
winning 1974 play Short Eyes.
67 Located in Marin County and opened in 1852, San Quentin exists as
Califomia’s oldest functioning penal complex. In 1953, the prison’s resident
librarian, Herman K. Spector, compiled San Ouentiniana: Books fubÏished by
Officiais and Inmates of San Ouentin. for a truly interesting perspective on San
Quentin, refer to the hardened crirninology posited by Jimmy Santiago Baca in his
prison essay Past Present.” a piece that serves to relay the painful experiences of
revisiting San Quentin to shoot the 1993 film (written by Baca) Btood In. BÏood
Oïtt.
63 According to the latest figures released by the United States Department
of Justice: State correctional expenditures increased l45% in 2001 constant
dollars from $15.6 billion in fY 1986 to 38.2 billion in fY 2001; prison
expenditures increased 150% from $11.7 billion to $29.5 billion” (n. pag.). Going
by the numbers. the American prison system continues to be the epitome of big
business.
69 Mumia Abu-Jamal (formerly Wesley Cook) remains notorious for
speaking out on countless penal and systemic injustices as a makeshifi prison
joumalist and hardened potitical activist. Prior to and upon his arrest in 1981 for
allegedly murdering a Philadeiphia police officer. Abu-Jamal, who has been
petitioning to save his own life ever since a “death warrant” was signed in the
1990s, has wTitten. recorded and released major works for public consumption
including Live from Death Row (1995), Death Btossoms (1997), and We Want
freedom (2004).
70 Bunker’s autobiography has actually been published and marketed under
at least two separate tities. Education of a Felon and Air. Bitte: Memoirs of a
Renegade (the latter dde an allusion to his role as Mr. Blue” in Quentin
Tarantino’s 1992 film Reservoir Dogs). Bunker, who also wrote the existential
screenplay for the 1985 film Runawav Train. concludes his memoirs with an
optimistic vow: “A lotus definitely grows from the mud” (294).
71 Athens remains well known in the criminological community for
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unabashedly attacking the credibility of fellow academics upon ascertaining that
no genuine first-hand experiences with violence and/or violent actors has been
undergone by the ‘authority’ in question. As lie imparts to Rhodes in Why They
Kilt: “Academia is a world where lying is accepted” (268).
72 Two of the most influential American slave narratives remain I 845’s
Narrative of the Lfe of frederick Dougtas, An American SÏave. Written by
Himseif and 1 862’s unconventionaÏlv-titled An Autohiography of Gerald TooÏe,
the State s Prison Convict. who murdered DanieÏ Webster, Warden of the
Connecticztt State Prison, on the 2Z ofliarch, 1862 (Written by Himset Being a
full Confession of Crimesfor which he was sent to the State Prison....
In “The Resurrecfion of the Dangerous Classes.” Jon Marc Taylor
alludes to how many states force “civil commitment” programs on prisoners—
civil commitment meaning indefinite incarceration” (104).
By Mav of 1944, six million Jewish people had been murdered by the
underlings and instruments of authentic violent coaches in and outside of
countless extermination cites throughout Eastem Europe. Virtually ail of the
concentration camps in Qermany and Poland also housed non-Jewish
communists. socialists. monarchists, homosexuals, gypsies, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
and commonplace criminals.
The amalgamated representative structure of the correlative German and
American power hierarchies lias been derived from an amalgamation of Heinz
Hegef s first-hand experiences in The Men With the Pink Triangles as well as
Sabo, Kupers and Londons aforementioned configuration from Gender and the
Politics of Punishment.”
76 Bern’ is a dramatic portrayal of homosexual prisoners struggiing to
overcome the repercussions of their identities and inclinations upon being
transported to the concentration camp at Dachau. Forced to endure the
consequences of being located at the very bottom of the camp’s power hierarchy,
two of Sherman’s main characters. Max and Rudy, meet with dissimilar fates due
to conflicting ethical stances and unmatched survival skills. Sherman’s theatrical
production was debuted in Londons Royal Court Theatre in 1979 and then
rnoved over to Broadway one year later. (The moderately-successful 1997 screen
adaptation of Bent was written by Sherman himself and stays true to the original
script).
Hegef s depiction of the atrocities and hardships endured by
homosexual prisoners in wartime German. like Gad Beck’s heart-wTenching
first-hand accounts in An (hiderground Lfè: Memoirs of a Gay Jew in Nazi
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Berlin, serves to reveal a warped masculine code that bas been systemically
prograrnmed into captors and captives alike.
Lewis E. Lawes vehemently opposed the death penalty but stili executed
over three hundred men while acting as Sing Sing’s warden. A man clearly tom
between professional duty and personal honour, Lawes’ s cautious indecisiveness
bas been summed up in bis 2004 biograpby: “Treat ci man like ci dog andyou wiÏt
make a dog of him. But what if you treat him like a man, he wondered, and he
made a dog ofyou?” (Blumenthal 262).
Over one and a haif million copies of Mcm Kampf were purchased in
1933. Today, Hitler’s opus bas served as a serninal guide and text for a countless
number of neo-Nazis worldwide. Over eight hundred websites affihiated to
prominent “White Power” organizations (including the National Socialist White
People’s Party, the Libertarian National Socialist Green Party, the American Nazi
Party, the National Socialist Movernent, the British Nazi Party, the Northern
Alliance, the White Aryan Resistance, the Aryan Vanguard, Jew Watch, and
Storrnfront) continue to consult and/or plagiarize virulent passages from the
dictator’s memoirs. (The specific recruiting measures and techniques practiced by
the violent coaches of wartime Germany and contemporary Western society are
elucidated further in Rhodes’s 2003 study “Violent Socialization and the 55-
Einsatzgruppen”).
80 LaVey, who passed away in 1997, founded the Church of Satan in 1966
and wrote the definitive guide to his cult’s daernonic practices and ideologies in
1969. Burton Wolfe’s 1974 biography The Devil’s Avenger: A Biography of
Anion Szandor LaVey as well as Blanche Barton’s 1990 biography Secret Life ofci
Satanist: The Authorized Biography ofAnton LaVey are definitive looks at the
iconic author, musician, philosopher, high priest, and ultimate con artist.
$1 Prominent phantom consultants delivered by the likes of Malcolm X.
Angela Y. Davis, and Mumia Abu-.Iamal appear to be cited in anthologies and
encyclopaedias as apparent rules of thumb (Franklin; Steck). Jarvis Masters’s
1997 Finding freedom: Writing From Death Row, Marilyn Buck’ s 1999 article
“Prisons, Social Control, and Political Prisoners,” as well as Stanley ‘Tookie’
Williams’s 2005 memoir Bute Rctge, Black Redemption are but a few of the
pivotal hardened texts that authentic violent coaches should feel threatened by.
$2 Berkman’s final vow in Prison Memoirs of cm Anarchist inspires the
existential beginning that both Sartre and Genet would endeavour to embrace:
“My resurrection, dear friend. I have found work to do” (515).
83 In 1957, Cleaver was convicted of assault and banished for nine years to
Q
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two of California’s most dangerous prisons. San Quentin and Folsom. During his
incarceration. the former Black Panther subsequently developed original theories
on revolution. race. and violence and created a philosophical doctrine that can stili
serve to fuel community members working together as one phantom force.
Jacksons reference to the German concentration camps should flot be
taken lightly. On August 21, 1971, he was killed by prison guards in San Quentin
afier an aileged escape attempt.
“Deliberate Indifference” is actually the title of an accusatory piece that
received an honourable mention in the PEN Arnerican Center’s 1993-1 994 contest
and was subsequently featured in Sabo, Kupers and London’s Prison
Masculinities anthology. The first-hand account was written by the now-deceased
hardened political activist O’Neil $tough, who had documented the consequences
of first-hand experiences (particularly with HIV-positive and AIDS-infected
imilates) through highly-acclaimed j ournalistic confessional s. In the vignette “A
Moment,” Stough acknowledges our painstaking reflection: “I feel for both the
savage beast and its frightened prey” (138).
o
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